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A.

INTRODUCTION

First Thoughts

Law is a world of words. Law also depends upon a singular
confidence in the power of words. On that confidence rest many of
the most cherished features of our civilization.
Two aspects stand out in the law's faith in words. First, legal
craft assumes that words can earn their keep, that they can impart
principle and guide specific decisions. Legal texts might seem vague.
But lawyers know how to try to render them precise. Legal texts
might seem distant, or awkward, or stupid. But read as law, and not
just as literary fragments, they demand to be relevant, coherent, and
sensible. Legal texts might seem morally compromised. But interpretive charity, informed by the legal tradition as a whole, can find in
them reflections of fairness and justice, or even wisdom.
A second aspect of the law's special confidence in the power of
words is its belief that legal ideas and categories are real things. All
legal systems posit entities and attributes born of what Lord Coke
called "the artificial reason of the law."' Most legal systems also
embrace a set of images, metaphors, fictions, and even puns.2 Yet
legal culture has the boldness to treat these linguistic creations as a
species of reality, with real import and effect. That claim of reality is
ontological, and normative. The upshot is that the legal imagination
does not only believe that legal words have the power to convey
coherent, sensible, and wise meaning (the first aspect of the law's

1. Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608). See
generally Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 35 (1981).
2. See generally MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOwN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND
THEOLOGY (1985); LON L. FuLLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES'
Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); Pierre Schlag, Cannibal
Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929
(1988). For related examples, see Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV.
871, 893-909 (1986) (discussing one use of fictions); Richard H. Weisberg, Text into Theory:
A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV. 939 (1986) (considering the suggestion that judicial opinions are a mode of fiction).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
HOFSTRA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

faith in words). It also believes that they have the power to help
create meaning-to settle what is coherent, sensible, and wise. This,
of course, is a point of contention with legal skeptics, but it is really
not so remarkable. All human activity uses words to help organize
experience and in some sense create its own reality. Law is only
more self-conscious about it.
The law's confidence in the power of words is finite, and rightly
so. Legal craft can only do so much. Legal rules operate in the real
world, understood by categories drawn from other aspects of experience. The artificial reason of the law always risks losing touch with
those other realities and descending into silliness.
To be suitably cautious about the law's self-confidence is one
thing, however. To lose that confidence-particularly at the behest of
forms of skepticism dominant in the larger culture-is something else.
When that happens, the result is rarely an explicit crisis of faith.
Lawyers remain lawyers and judges remain judges. (Legal scholars
are a different story.)3 Rather, it often is a queer combination of selfindulgence and loss of nerve-a sour, dissociative turn to the law's
special relationship with the language out of which it is built.
B. The Problem
This Article is about one such turn. It presses the themes
sketched above, by way of a look at one specific comer of the law
and a few specific legal words. The word that interests me most is
"jurisdictional," although I also want to think about terms such as
"thirty days" or "ninety days." The comer of the law is the doctrine
of jurisdictional time limits.
In modem Anglo-American legal doctrine, legal issues are either
"jurisdictional" or "non-jurisdictional." 4 Jurisdictional issues go to the

3. A discussion of the state of legal scholarship is beyond the scope of this Article.
For some contributions to that debate, see Symposium, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and
Purposes, 90 YALE LJ. 955 (1981); Symposium, Contemporary Legal Theory, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 441 (1986).
4. To be sure, some courts have spoken of certain issues as "quasi-jurisdictional" or
"almost jurisdictional." In certain contexts, courts have used the term "quasi-jurisdictional" as
a precise term of art. It can refer, for example, to a class of facts that "are necessary to be
alleged and proved in order to set the machinery of the law in motion, but which, when
properly alleged and established to the satisfaction of the court, cannot be attacked collaterally." Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893) (Brown, J., dissenting).
Similarly, though more specifically, it can refer to a class of factual findings that an administrative agency must place on the record for its decision to be upheld. See Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1954) (quoting United States v. Chicago, M.,
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power or authority of a tribunal. Non-jurisdictional issues do not. I
will have more to say on this later.' One context in which the division between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional issues is drawn is
that of time limits in the law. These time limits include statutes of

limitations and limits on appeal. They also include limits on filing
various motions, rules for filing petitions of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court and rules for beginning administrative actions
or moving from administrative to judicial tribunals. Some time limits,
such as most limits on appeal, are said to be jurisdictional. Others,

such as most ordinary statutes of limitations, are not.'
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, briefly stated, is this: if
a time limit is jurisdictional, courts will interpret and apply it rigidly,
literally, and mercilessly.7 A necessary pleading or motion or notice

St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1935)).
In other contexts, formulations like "quasi-jurisdictional" or "almost jurisdictional" are
used more generally, and sometimes to little more than rhetorical effect. See, e.g., League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728, 769 n.28 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that
"although criminal venue [under Texas law] may be 'quasi-jurisdictional' in nature, venue can
be acquired by 'consent' of the parties"), opinion on reh'g en banc, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994); Benning v. Board of Regents, 928 F.2d 775, 777
n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding Eleventh Amendment issues to be "quasi-jurisdictional"); Young
v. Herring, 917 F.2d 858, 862 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1992)
(opining that rule announced in a Supreme Court case was "quasi-jurisdictional"); United
States v. Rosen, 764 F.2d 763, 766 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986):
In our judgment, however, there is a difference between a collateral attack on a
particular sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. [sic] 35 or 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, and a
direct appeal from multiple count convictions. With a collateral attack, only a
specific sentence on a specific count is before the district court. The narrow scope
of review on a collateral attack is almost jurisdictional in nature.
Id. at 766; Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. 1962) (reporting that some Texas
courts have treated "the plea of forum non conveniens almost as jurisdictional").
I leave to another day whether some or all of this type of language represents the
same failure of legal imagination that I try to identify in this Article.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58, 68-84.
6. As I explain later, I do not consider it part of my brief in this article to question
whether particular time limits are, or are not, properly considered jurisdictional. See infra part
III.B.2. Rather, I take those attributions for granted and consider their consequences.
7. For United States Supreme Court cases, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45
(1990) (holding that the statutory requirement that petition for certiorari in civil case be filed
within 90 days of entry of judgment in lower court is mandatory and jurisdictional and that
the Court has no authority to extend filing period except as statute permits); Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (noting in dictum that the notice and 60-day
delay requirement are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit under the statutory
citizen suit provision); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) (finding equitable
tolling possible on a non-jurisdictional filing requirement); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455
U.S. 385 (1982) (finding time limit at issue to be non-jurisdictional, and therefore subject to
equitable tolling); Browder v. Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1978) (fail-
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might arrive late at the courthouse because of a massive snowstorm, s
or chicanery or innocent error by the other side.9 A necessary act
might be omitted due to the negligence of the court itself. ° But all

ure to observe jurisdictional time limit resulted in denial of appeal); United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (same).
For other federal cases, see Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1347 (2d
Cir. 1993) (The court held that appellants could not escape effect of jurisdictional time limit
on filing post-trial motions, even though they relied on district court's purported extension of
the time limit. The court explained that "[T]he reliance argument is flawed, . . . because it
fails to recognize that the Rule 50(b) and 59 time limitations are jurisdictional and that excuses are therefore unavailing."); Shendock v. Director, 893 F.2d 1458, (3d Cir. 1990) (en
banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990) (holding that the jurisdictional time requirement
could not be tolled out of equity); Hardin v. City Title & Escrow Co., 797 F.2d 1037, 104041 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that, because time limit is jurisdictional, it must be "strictly
construed," and is not subject to equitable tolling under doctrine of fraudulent concealment);
Lofton v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that statutory time limits
for bringing Title VII actions are jurisdictional and must be strictly enforced); see also Mark
A. Hall, The JurisdictionalNature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399 (1986) (citing
numerous cases respecting federal time limits on appeal).
For state cases, see Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico, 542 P.2d 1349, 1356
(Cal. 1975) (finding timely filing of notice of appeal to be jurisdictional requirement; therefore, it is absolute prerequisite to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, and court lacks all power
to consider arguments of estoppel or excuse); In re Hanley's Estate, 142 P.2d 423, 424-25
(Cal. 1943) (holding that courts may not extend jurisdictional limit even to relieve against
mistake, inadvertence, accident, or misfortune; time limit would be strictly enforced even
when failure to comply was due to misrepresentation by opposing counsel as to date from
when time limit should be computed); East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. District Ct., 842
P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992) (holding 180-day notice requirement for actions filed under Governmental Immunity Act must be strictly complied with as jurisdictional prerequisite to action);
Ecker v. Town of W. Hartford, 530 A.2d 1056 (Conn. 1987) (finding that period of limitation of action was a non-waivable jurisdictional prerequisite); Fredman Bros. Furniture Co. v.
Dep't of Revenue, 486 N.E.2d 893 (Ill. 1985) (determining that "a significant distinction
exists between statutes of limitation and statutes that both confer jurisdiction on a court and
fix a time within which such jurisdiction may be exercised"); City of Devondale v. Stallings,
795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1990) (holding failure to file timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect to which substantial compliance doctrine, otherwise governing all civil rules,
does not apply); McVay v. McVay, 270 P.2d 393 (Mont. 1954) (accord); Daniel v. B. & J.
Realty, 589 A.2d 998 (N.H. 1991) (holding that the rule regulating time of appeal to zoning
board was jurisdictional and board was therefore required to apply it literally).
8. See Teague v. Regional Commissioner, 394 U.S. 977 (1969) (Black, J., Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Teague is discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-49.
9. See, e.g., Pomper v. Thompson, 836 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1987) (government sent
an incorrect anld misleading notice as to appeal rights); Zakem v. United States 78-2 TCM
(CCH) P9584 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (plaintiff relied upon IRS District Director's incorrect letter
setting forth the time for filing an appeal and was barred for late filing); In re Hanley's
Estate, 142 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1943), discussed infra note 207 and text accompanying notes 30506.
10. See, e.g., Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 411 N.E.2d
277 (Il1. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (Employee filed a timely charge before Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission alleging that his employer unlawfully terminated him.
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that simply is too bad. If the time limit is not jurisdictional, courts

might still apply it rigidly, literally and mercilessly. t But, they do
leave themselves room for some flexibility."t
The doctrine of jurisdictional time is part of a broader notion
that at least some jurisdictional requirements should be "strictly"
interpreted. I will be referring to other instances of that principle at
work, and much of my analysis has application beyond the context of

jurisdictional time limits. My focus will be on time limits, however,
for several reasons beyond the usual bid for focus and manageability.
First, courts apply the rule of strict construction with special
vigor to time limits. The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits has its
chinks. 3 Some cases manage to bend it almost to the breaking
The Commission did not schedule a fact-finding conference until 5 days after expiration of
the statutory deadline. The Illinois Supreme Court held that failure to comply with the time
requirement deprived the Commission of jurisdiction).
The United States Supreme Court reversed in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455.
U.S. 422 (1982) (holding that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion violated Logan's due
process rights); see id. at 436-37. The possibility of resorting to the Constitution as a deus
ex machina, however, should be of small comfort to anyone interested in the underlying logic
and implications for the legal culture of the state court's analysis.
11. See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (applying time
limit literally on other grounds, and holding that there is therefore no need to determine if
the time limit is also 'jurisdictional"); Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); California v. Yuba Goldfields, Inc., 752 F.2d 393 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); School Dist. of Allentown v. Marshall,
657 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1981); Commonwealth v. Clinton, 374 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Mass. 1978)
(holding that a statute requiring police officers to deposit requests for complaints in district
court within three-day limit "must be strictly construed . . .[the] uncertainty that results from
a literal reading of the statute is to be resolved in favor of the defendant") (citations omitted); In re Nomination Papers of Am. Labor Party, 44 A.2d 48, 50-51 (Pa. 1945) (finding
that although court below had jurisdiction to hear the petition in question, it could not grant
the requested relief because appellant failed to prove compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Election Code).
12. Cf Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
196 (1992) ("[R]elief from strict construction of a statute of limitations is readily available in
extreme cases and gives the court latitude in a case-by-case analysis. The equitable tolling
doctrine has been applied by the Supreme Court in certain circumstances, but it has been
applied sparingly . . . ".)(citations omitted); Radich v. Fairbanks Builders, Inc., 399 P.2d
215, 217 (Alaska 1965) (finding that non-jurisdictional time limit can sometimes be relaxed
when strict application would be unfair); Machules v. Department of Admin., 523 So. 2d
1132, 1133 n.2, 1134 (Fla. 1988) (holding that because time limit was not jurisdictional,
doctrine of equitable tolling was applicable).
13. See, e.g., Vlaicu v. INS, 998 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that time limit for
filing notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, but in "unique circumstances," if party
is misled by court's conduct or words, appellate tribunal might have jurisdiction to hear an
otherwise untimely appeal); Pinion v. Dow Chemical, 928 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1991) (articulating "unique circumstances" exception to "strict," "jurisdictional" time limit, to be employed
only when court has lulled a party into failing to file a timely appeal yet declining to apply
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point. 4 The history of the doctrine, as I will emphasize here, is ambiguous." Nevertheless, in a legal age wary of absolutes, the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits comes close. Even when it is not

absolute, its gravitational pull is weighty.
Second, courts apply the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits
with special earnestness. The legal culture-in particular judicial cul-

ture-treats jurisdictional time limits with something approaching
reverence. The proper construction of jurisdictional time limits might
not be an inherently interesting topic. But to a student of the legal
culture, that special reverence marks the doctrine as having the potential to reveal deeper truths.
Third, the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is more than a
rule of law. It is also a rule of protocol in judicial chambers, a part
of the internal code of judges, law clerks, and court clerks. 6 Both

exception to case at bar); Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Braggs Electric Const. Co., 569 F.2d
1036, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that in certain "unique circumstances," district court
can vacate and reenter the original order to create a fresh judgment from which a timely
appeal might be perfected); In re Jordan, 840 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1992) (discussing doctrine of
"constructive filing," sometimes available under California law when failure to file is due to
negligence of counsel); Whitaker v. Human Rights Comm'n., 540 N.E.2d 361 (111.App. Ct.
1989), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 134 (11. 1989) (discussing narrow estoppel exception to
jurisdictional time limits); cf. James v. United States, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in denial of cert.).
14. See, e.g., Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (holding that pro se prisoners'
notices of appeal are considered "filed" at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for
forwarding to the district court); Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (holding that time limit within which to appeal agency action is jurisdictional, but
period for seeking judicial review can be made to run again if agency by a new promulgation creates opportunity for renewed objections); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. ICC, 720 F.2d
958 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that even though time limit on review of agency action was
jurisdictional, it would not, under "unusual circumstances" of this case, bar challenge to conditional agency action that was originally meant to be a temporary stop-gap, but which had
lasted for more than two years, thus creating "greater reason" to call it into question); Torres
v. Derwinski, I Vet. App. 15, 17 (1990) (holding that as the court's address was not available at the time the appellant requested judicial review, "literal compliance with the statute
was impossible"); Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Express, 819 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Mo. 1991) (finding
that strict compliance with jurisdictional time limit is required only after ambiguities in statute
are resolved, and those ambiguities, in certain contexts, can be resolved under rule of liberal
construction).
I have no large stake in drawing a sharp distinction between the cases cited in this
note and those cited supra note 13.
15. See infra part IV.B.1.
16. I can speak to some of this from personal experience. When I began my clerkship
for Justice William Brennan at the United States Supreme Court, one of the first topics
broached during our orientation was the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time limits. The other clerks and I were told, not only that violations of jurisdictional time
limits could not be forgiven, but that it was the practice of the court clerk's office to refrain
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law and protocol treat the rigidity of jurisdictional time limits as a
fact of nature before which judges feel genuinely and atypically powerless. Indeed, the term "jurisdictional," regarding time limits, sometimes simply seems to mean "literal" or "strict" or "not admitting of
exceptions."' 7 Finally, time limits are deceptively simple and straightforward. That is exactly why they are so potentially revealing.
One of my goals in this Article is to argue that the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits is misconceived, or at least a miscalculation.

It does not follow that, simply because a rule is jurisdictional it
should always be literally enforced.
This is not to say that jurisdictional time limits should be loosely

enforced. Maybe some should be. Maybe not. Maybe some non-jurisdictional time limits should be enforced more strictly than they are.
But the jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional character of a particular
time limit is not the automatic key to deciphering its meaning or the

strictness of its application.
This analytic point will turn out to be manifest, or so I will
argue. The other interesting question, then, is why the law should

have so miscalculated. The expected answer might be that it sank into
senseless formalism, 8 or that it created a fetish out of the word "ju-

risdiction." 9 I believe that senseless formalism had something to do
from forwarding to the individual chambers petitions for certiorari that violated jurisdictional
time limits. This was taken as a matter of course, and almost as a fact of nature, by a Justice otherwise known for his judicial activism and expansive view of legal interpretation.
17. Cf. infra part I.B.1 (discussing and rejecting possibility that the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is only a semantic usage); part 1V.A.1 (discussing and rejecting the
possibility that the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is only a linguistic subterfuge).
18. There is a long academic tradition of criticizing certain jurisdictional doctrines for
adhering too formalistically or rigidly or blindly to certain classical conceptions of
jurisdictionality, and ignoring "policy" concerns such as efficiency, fairness, or the integrity of
the political or judicial system. See generally I JAMES W. MOORE, Er AL., MOORE's FEDER0.60 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter MOORE ET AL.]; Hugh B. Cox, The Void
AL PRACTICE
Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHi. L. REv. 86 (1948); Dan B. Dobbs, The Validation
of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle (parts I & 2), 53 VA. L. REv. 1003, 1241
(1967) [hereinafter Dobbs, Validation of Void Judgments]; Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap:
Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 491 (1967); Hall, supra note 7; Edward P. Krngman, Filling the Void: Judicial Power
and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164 (1977) [hereinafter Krugman,
Filling the Void]; Note, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).
This trend should, however, be sharply distinguished from the very different and, to
my mind, much more benign effort to import concerns of policy into the drawing of jurisdictional lines themselves, or into deciding which issues are truly jurisdictional and which are
not.
19. See, e.g., 1 MOORE Er AL., supra note 18, 0.60(4) (describing as "fetish" the doc-
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with the mistake. But so did a failure to understand and respect important formal distinctions.
More to the point, the problem with jurisdictional time limits is
not that courts have treated jurisdiction as too important. It is that
they have not treated it as important enough. Indeed, the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits co-exists with a steady general erosion of the
integrity of the idea of jurisdiction, and I suggest that this is no coincidence.
Put in the terms with which I began this essay, the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits is an example of the law suffering from a
form of neurosis arising out of a crisis of confidence." Automatic
categorical literalism is not a symptom of legalism. It is, for all its
pretensions to the contrary, a sign of a deep mistrust of legalism.
My approach in this Article, then, is not the usual skeptical
impatience with doctrine,2' but an effort to recapture the nuances of
doctrine. I will devote some attention to what I call the "Idea of
Jurisdiction," and its implications.' I agree with current doctrine that
parties alone cannot simply waive jurisdictional time limits (unlike
non-jurisdictional ones). I also agree that courts cannot simply excuse
them as a matter of judicial discretion, if discretion is understood as
akin to an act of grace. But there is a long distance, washed away in
the development of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, between
these narrow, specific restrictions and a more general rule of literal,
strict, and merciless construction.
As stated, I will not argue in this Article that any particular
jurisdictional time limits should be read less literally or more flexibly.
Similarly, I do not want to weigh in, as such, on the endless debates
about whether law works best with rigid norms or flexible norms,

trine that questions of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

366 (1969) (discussing same proposition).
20. See infra part IV.C.
21. For some observations on this phenomenon in legal scholarship, see David R.
Bamhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and
Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 127 (1988); Geoffrey P. Miller, A Rhetoric
of Law, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (1985) (reviewing JAMES B. WHrE, WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING:

CONSTITUTIONS AND

RECONSTITUTIONS

OF LANGUAGE,

CHARACTER,

AND

COMMUNITY (1984));

Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE LJ. 1113, 1116-18 (1981); Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90
YALE LJ. 1149 (1981); cf supra note 18 (providing examples of skeptical trend in academic
study of jurisdictionality).
22. See infra part II1.A.
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rules or standards?

All I will argue is that the categorical distinc-

tion that current doctrine draws between the way it reads jurisdictional time limits and the way it reads non-jurisdictional time limits is
neither required nor justified.
I am interested, though, in why the legal culture ever reads a
legal norm other than literally. What justifications or explanations
does it offer?
I will argue that these justifications and explanations can take
two very different forms.2 ' They can reflect faith in the integrity and
potential of the law's interpretive project. Or they can reflect an abandonment of that faith, and a resort to norms that stand against the
law rather than find their way into it. Often, these two visages stand
side by side in uneasy, even healthy, tension. But the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits marks a cleavage point, a test of assumptions

and commitments. And the rigid, literal, interpretation of jurisdictional
time limits--only because they are jurisdictional-is the sad, confused
underside of a trend whose more usual manifestation is a flight away
from legal words altogether.
Part II of this Article will describe the doctrine of jurisdictional

time limits in its current form. Part I asks, in systematic fashion,
whether there is any justification for the doctrine of jurisdictional

time limits. It does in particular by reference to that classic Idea of
Jurisdiction to which the doctrine claims obedience, but to which-it

will turn out-it has only a tenuous connection.
Part IV shifts the analysis from an inquiry that is mainly con23. For some of the voices in this conversation, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 22-28, 72-80 (1978); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 15-30 (1976); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE (1991); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE LJ. 943 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984); John H. Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance
in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari,79 VA. L. REV. 717, 736-39 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 823 (1991); Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 24 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293 (1992).
24. I will later refer to these two forms of argument as "Blackstonian" and "Aristotelian," respectively. See infra part IV.C.2.
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cerned with justification to one that is centered on explanation.' In
part IV, I ask why, if the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is so
flawed, the legal culture would nevertheless take it for granted. After
chasing down some partial leads in search for an explanation, I look
to the history of the doctrine, and also to the recent history of the
Idea of Jurisdiction, to see where and why the law took the turns that
it did. I then speculate about the deeper forces involved in shaping
the doctrine and their implications for our ideas about law and legal
interpretation.
II. THE DoCTRINE OF JURISDICTIONAL TIME LIMITS
Courts often interpret time limits, and for that matter other rules
of law, strictly or literally. That in itself does not prove very much.
However, the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, in its most revealing form, always rests on an explicit contrast. The form of that contrast is simple: if a time limit is jurisdictional, the court will read it
or treat it one way; if it is not jurisdictional, the court will read it or
treat it another way. Thus, whether the time limit is jurisdictional can
be crucial to whether a litigant can argue excusable neglect, estoppel,
substantial compliance, or any other similar grounds to stretch the
literal language of the time limit.'
Some cases distinguish between jurisdictional time limits and
"mere" statutes of limitations." The most well-known example in
recent years is the Supreme Court opinion in Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines." The time limit at issue in Zipes was that which governs
the filing of claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-

25.

Cf. Dan Shaviro, Statistical-ProbabilityEvidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103

HARV. L. REV. 530, 552 (1989) (pointing out the important distinction between explaining a
legal rule and justifying it).
The organization of this Article does not, to be sure, track this distinction perfectly.
For example, the argumentative core of part Ill begins with a semantic analysis that is a
matter of neither justification nor explanation, but rather clarification. See infra part III.B.I. It
finishes with a functionalist discussion that, in the nature of such arguments, lies in an uneasy grey zone between justification and explanation. See infra part III.B.6.
26. See cases cited at supra note 7.
27. For cases specifically referring to "mere statutes of limitations," see, in addition to
cases cited and discussed in this part and supra note 7, Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 525
F.2d 124, 127 (6th Cir. 1975); Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703, 705 (5th Cir. 1957);
Barrett v. State, 560 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1990); King v. L. M. Southern Real Estate &
Improvement Co., 155 N.E. 797, 798 (Ohio 1927); see also United States ex rel. Louisville
Cement Co. v. ICC, 246 U.S. 638, 642 (1918), which is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 323-24.
28. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
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sion. The Court considered whether TWA could waive the time limit
by failing to raise it at a sufficiently early stage in the proceedings. It
held that the time limit was "not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit
in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is
subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling."'29
The basic inquiry in Zipes, and the distinction that it assumes,
has been repeated in many other cases. For example, in Shendock v.
Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs," a pro
se black lung claimant believed that he was appealing an adverse
ruling by the Department of Labor. Rather than file a petition for
review with the Federal Court of Appeals, however, Shendock left a
letter indicating his desire to appeal with the local black lungs complaint office. The letter was left within the sixty-day time limit on
such appeals, but nothing was actually filed with the court until many
months later.
The court decided that Congress intended the time limit to be
"jurisdictional."3' It went on to hold that "[e]quitable tolling or estoppel simply is not available when there are jurisdictional limitations."32 The court also refused to entertain the possibility that
Shendock's letter might constitute a filing under the statute. Quoting
other precedent, it maintained that jurisdictional requirements demanded "punctilious, literal, and exact compliance,"33 and that if "the time
limitation is jurisdictional in nature, thus going to the very power to
adjudicate, the court must consider the delay sua sponte and apply the
statute strictly."'
The distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time
limits also appears in the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisprudence.
For perhaps accidental reasons, the time limit for certiorari petitions
in civil cases is contained in a statute,35 while the time limit for cer-

29. Id. at 393.
30. 893 F.2d 1458 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc).

31. Id. at 1466.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting LaVallee Northside Civic Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Comm'n, 866 F.2d 616, 625 (3d Cir. 1989)) (citation omitted).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1989), providing:
Any other appeal or any writ of certiorari intended to bring any judgment or decree in a civil action, suit or proceeding before the Supreme Court for review shall
be taken or applied for within ninety days after the entry of such judgment or
decree. A justice of the Supreme Court, for good cause shown, may extend the
time for applying for a writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding sixty days.
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tiorari in criminal cases is the product of a rule of court. 6 This
alone seems a valid ground for distinction, since a court presumably
has more leeway with its own rules than with a statute. But, for
many years, the Court has framed the distinction in jurisdictional
terms. The leading primer on Supreme Court practice captures both
the case law and the routine of Supreme Court functionaries, stating:

[Tihe time limitations prescribed by Congress ...make the untimely filing of a petition a jurisdictional defect. In such cases, the
Court to cannot waive the untimeliness or to entertain the petition .... This jurisdictional requirement of timeliness is strictly
applied in civil cases. No exceptions or waivers are recognized; no
matter how extenuating the circumstances, an untimely petition will
not be entertained. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education,
402 U.S. 962 (airline lost all the papers); Teague v. Commissioner
of Customs, 394 U.S. 977 (unforeseeable snowstorm created a postal
delay) ....

The Court is so firm in its holding that it lacks jurisdiction
over a petition in a civil case filed beyond the time limits set by
Congress that it has instructed the Clerk to reject such a petition
without docketing or circulating it to the Court ....
A party's only remedy [would then be] to file a motion asking
the Court to order the Clerk to accept a petition which he has rejected, perhaps on the ground that the Clerk's time calculations were
wrong. No such motion has as yet been granted ....
But where the time limitation is established by rule of
Court, . ..the Court has just as consistently held that an untimely
filing is not a jurisdictional defect and that an untimely petition can
be entertained and granted and the case reviewed if there are compelling reasons for overlooking the untimeliness and for granting
review7
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is not absolutely airtight. A small number of recent cases have interpreted jurisdictional
time limits to admit some form of tolling or estoppel." Other cases

36. Sup. CT. R. 13.1.
37. ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GREsSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 278-79 (7th
ed., 1993) [hereinafter STERN & GRESSMAN] (footnote omitted). Cases reiterating this distinction include Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596, 598 n.*(1968) (criminal case) and Missouri
v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990) (but holding that petition for rehearing in Court of Appeals "tolls" running of certiorari limit because, until Court of Appeals disposes of rehearing
petition, there is no "judgment" from that court).
38. E.g., People v. Thomas, 389 N.E.2d 1094 (N.Y. 1979) (prosecutor in criminal case
negligently failed to bring to attention of court that defendant's attorney had not filed an
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have engaged in sometimes imaginative interpretations to avoid the
literal effect of the statute.39 But these cases are in such a distinct
minority that they only emphasize how entrenched the doctrine is
otherwise. Moreover, even these exceptional cases demonstrate the
gravitational pull of the doctrine, either by their tone of near-apology
or by a hypertechnicalism that tries to obscure the real interpretive
stakes at hand.
Expressions of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits have also
faced some academic criticism. However, these criticisms tend either
to argue that a given time limit is not jurisdictional at all, or that

courts have turned jurisdiction into a fetish.'

effective notice of appeal). The court stated:
[w]e remain convinced that strict construction [of the time limit contained in the
statute] is appropriate since the time limits within which appeals must be taken are
jurisdictional in nature and courts lack inherent power to modify or extend them.
Nevertheless, because the omissions on the part of the prosecutor, though
no doubt made more critical by assigned counsel's less than assiduous performance,
the
frustrated the good faith exercise of the defendant's right to [appeal] ....
People should be estopped from invoking the bar of the one-year limit . . . [particularly since] the defendant made diligent efforts to preserve his right to appeal . . . [and it cannot] be disputed that by [sic] for the cumulative effect of the
prosecutor's inaction, the defendant would have learned of his failure to file an
effective notice of appeal early enough to make timely application for relief.
Id. at 1096 (citations omitted).
39. See cases cited supra notes 13-14.
40. Most directly, see Hall, supra note 7. Hall summarizes his argument as follows:
The federal courts have fundamentally misconceived the nature of limitations on
the time to appeal. The appellate courts have made a fetish of their own authority
by characterizing timing defects in notices of appeal as "jurisdictional" and dismiss-'
ing untimely appeals late in the appellate process even though the parties entirely
overlook the error. Properly conceived, appeals periods are like original jurisdiction
limitation periods; they involve primarily the interests of the immediate parties, not
fundamental societal interests. They should therefore be subject to waiver by the
parties.
. . . In sum, at all levels of analysis-precedent, analogy, statutes, rules,
rudimentary logic, history, policy, and practicum-it is inescapable that appeal periods should not be imbued with the mystical "jurisdictional" aura that connotes an
importance different in kind from other procedural rules.
Id. at 399-400, 427 (footnotes omitted).
In a sense, Hall's argument is almost the exact converse of mine. Hall addresses most
of his argument, not at the rule of strict construction that courts have applied to jurisdictional
time limits, which he sometimes takes for granted, but at the notion that these rules, because
they are jurisdictional, cannot be waived. I argue that genuinely jurisdictional time limits
should not be waivable, but should be seen as being, at least potentially, capable of a more
forgiving substantive construction than courts have generally been willing to give them.
For analysis similar to Hall's see Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAv & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (1984):
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To my mind, the most powerful criticism of the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits is found in a small dissenting opinion by
Justice Hugo Black, in Teague v. Commissioner of Customs, the
snowstorm case just cited.4 Justice Black, dissenting from a denial
of certiorari, joined only by Justice William Douglas, argued as follows:
The statute governing the time for seeking certiorari in a civil
case ...

provides that a petition for review of any judgment or

decree "shall be taken or applied for within ninety days after the
entry of such judgment or decree." It is suggested by the Solicitor
General, on behalf of respondents here, that this statute is "jurisdictional," and that we must follow it. I agree, of course, that we
should follow the statute. But we must first determine what the
statute means. Commentators and this Court alike have often said
that the statute is "jurisdictional," and no doubt this statement is
true in certain senses of that term. But the statement certainly is not
true if it is intended to suggest that the statute deprives this Court
of all power to hear cases filed after the 90-day period, regardless
of whether the delay was caused by snowstorms making the transportation of the mails impossible. Under no known principle of
statutory construction can such an interpretation

. . .

be supported.

Nor have I been able to find any case interpreting the statute in this
way. Although many cases repeat the "jurisdictional" formula, none
of them that I have found involved situations where the delay was
wholly caused by circumstances entirely beyond the petitioner's
control ....
.. [The Court's Draconian interpretation of the statute is not
supported by our prior decisions. Nor does the language of the statute itself dictate the Court's result. The statute does not say explicitly that the time limitation may be inapplicable under certain extenuating circumstances, but it also does not say that the time limit
must be ruthlessly applied in every conceivable situation, without
regard to hardships involved or extenuating circumstances present.
The Court therefore must decide what is the more sensible interpretation of the statute. I for one cannot think of any purpose Congress

The present [federal] law treats ripeness and timeliness as jurisdictional in the
sense that they are objections that cannot be waived and must be raised by the
court sua sponte. This is a fetish which serves no significant systemic interest; the

status and authority of the [federal] district court is scarcely threatened by the
consideration of an appeal that is out of time.

Id. at 170 (citation omitted).
41.

394 U.S. 977 (1969).
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might have had that could possibly be served by holding that a
litigant can be defeated solely because of a delay that was entirely
beyond his control. . . It might be well to imagine for a moment
what would have happened if some Senator or Representative had
suggested an amendment to "clarify" the [time limit] . . . by stating
that a petition filed after the 90-day period will not be out of time
"when the delay is caused solely by an interruption of the mail
service due to snowstorms." It is conceivable that more than a few
members of Congress would consider such an amendment an insult
to this Court's intelligence and would feel it unnecessary to lead
this Court by the hand on such matters of elementary common
sense. It is impossible, however, to believe that any of them would
have regarded an amendment to the opposite effect as properly
reflecting the purpose of the statute, and yet this opposite amendment, ruling a petition out of time under these circumstances, is
precisely the amendment that the Court today tacitly engrafts . . ..

The most remarkable thing about this dissent is how unremarkable it
is.43 I do not necessarily endorse Justice Black's specific interpretation of the time limit under consideration. Nor do I necessarily endorse his particular mode of statutory construction, which uneasily
combines intentionalist rhetoric with constructivist argument." But
his general approach seems well in line with a long line of precedent
suggesting that courts must sometimes go beyond the literal content
of a statute in order to discover its true meaning, particularly when
the result otherwise would be absurd.45 Moreover, any number of

42. Teague, 394 U.S. at 981-84 (Black, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
43. Note that ihe Supreme Court has since created a rule that serves as a partial solution to the "snowstorm" problem. Time limits are now measured by postmark dates rather
than by dates of receipt. Sup. CT. R. 29.2 (1990). Interestingly though, this rule merely replaces one mercilessly applied bright line test with another. In that sense, it is both
underresponsive and overresponsive to Justice Black's concerns.
44. 1 do not suggest, however, that Justice Black's method lacks any serious intellectual
respectability. It is not unlike, for example, Richard Posner's position in RICHARD A. POSNER,
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (1985) which suggested that "the judge should
try to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would
have wanted the statute applied to the case before him." On the other hand, Judge Posner
has since repudiated that approach. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 286-309 (1990).
45. See, e.g., Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940) (IRS argued that literal reading of tax statute forbid even a timely amendment of corporation's tax return that
would change erroneously calculated declared value of corporation's capital stock. The Court
held that no purpose of the statute or interest of the Government would be thwarted by
allowing such an amendment, declaring that "[a]ll statutes must be construed in the light of
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their purpose. A literal reading of them which would lead to absurd results is to be avoided
when they can be given a reasonable application consistent with their words and with the
legislative purpose."); Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (disallowing criminal
prosecution for offense caused by entrapment by government officials):
It is manifest that these arguments [in favor of allowing the prosecution]
rest entirely upon the letter of the statute. They take no account of the fact that
its application in the circumstances under consideration is foreign to its purpose;
that such an application is so shocking to the sense of justice that it has been
urged that it is the duty of the court to stop the prosecution in the interest of the
Government itself, to protect it from the illegal conduct of its officers and to preserve the purity of its courts. But can an application of the statute having such an
effect-creating a situation so contrary to the purpose of the law and so inconsistent with its proper enforcement as to invoke such a challenge-fairly be deemed
to be within its intendment?
Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the law and
producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has frequently been condemned.
Id. at 446 (citations omitted); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167 (1931), stating:
All laws are to be given a sensible construction. A literal application of a statute
which would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided whenever a reasonable
application can be given which is consistent with the legislative purpose.
Notwithstanding the broad language of the section, we think it may be
given a reasonable construction, and the one most consistent with its apparent purpose, by the application of the principle noscitur a sociis.
Id. at 175-76 (citations omitted); United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, (1926), stating "All
laws are to be given a sensible construction; and a literal application of a statute, which
would lead to absurd consequences, should be avoided whenever a reasonable application can
be given to it, consistent with the legislative purpose.". Id. at 356-57; Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), stating:
It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance, but if
this leads to an unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter further. We may then look to the
reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in
accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning
in order that the purpose may not fail.
Id. at 194 (citations omitted); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892) (immigration statute made it unlawful for employers to "prepay the transportation, or
in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration" of immigrant alien employees).
This court held that although members of clergy were within literal reach of the statute:
[NV]e cannot think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like
that in the present case. It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are
full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of
the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are
used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to
the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include
the particular act.
Id. at 459.
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contemporary theories of statutory construction 4 6-- static and dynamic, intentionalist and constructivist, as well as purposive, pragmatic, or
even linguistic-would support at least the outlines of Justice Black's
approach to the problem.'

For state cases, see State v. Superior Court, 627 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1981); People v.
King, 851 P.2d 27 (Cal. 1993); People v. Silvola, 547 P.2d 1283 (Colo. 1976); Murray v.
Hobson, 13 P. 921 (Colo. 1887); Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Health Planning
and Dev. Agency, 600 A.2d 793 (D.C. 1991); People v. Collins, 217 N.E.2d 1 (I. 1966);
Watt v. Mayor of Franklin, 121 A.2d 499 (NJ. 1956); Brown v. Love, 639 P.2d 1181 (N.M.
1981); State v. Best, 233 S.E.2d 544 (N.C. 1977).
For a more general discussion of "equitable construction," see infra part IV.C.2.
46. For sources surveying the current debate on statutory construction, see infra notes
352-53.
47. Most legally literate readers will notice the irony that Justice Black himself was
famous for holding, as a matter of principle, to absolutist, arguably "literal," readings of
many issues. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's extension of Fourth Amendment to wiretapping); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's invocation of
unenumerated "right of privacy" to invalidate state restriction on use of contraceptives). Most
notable was his interpretation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment. In Black's
view, the clause protected all speech absolutely from regulation on the basis of its content,
without regard to balancing tests, considerations of clear and present danger, or exceptions
such as obscenity or libel. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293
(1964) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (libel); Kingsley Int'l. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (obscenity); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (balancing test); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (clear and
present danger test). By the same token, he was reluctant to extend the protection of the
First Amendment to non-speech conduct that happened to be expressive. See, e.g., Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (flag burning); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (Black, J.) (picketing). And he was often more
tolerant than the majority of the Court of time, place, and manner regulations that in his
view were not directed to the content of speech. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (wearing of black
armbands by schoolchildren). But cf Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting) (supporting balancing test for regulation of conduct that indirectly affects ideas). For Justice
Black's own summary of his views, see HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 43-63
(1969).
These views did reflect for Justice Black a general jurisprudence of textualism and
literalism. See generally BLACK, supra, at 9-10; Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990
Term: Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan
Debate Ignores), 105 HARv. L. REv. 80 (1991). But it would be a mistake to imagine that
Black's views on literalism were either unwavering and uncritical or unreflective. See
Calabresi, supra, at 87 n.17. His Teague opinion demonstrates that. And so do other cases.
For example, in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Justice Black quoted with approval the
view that:
[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their firstfooting . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
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Nevertheless, to most contemporary judges, Black's dissent, in its
attitude toward jurisdictional time limits, would seem wilful, or misguided, or illogical, or all of these. 8 The remainder of this article
examines why that might be.
]III. THE DoCTRINE AND THE IDEA OF JURISDICTION
As just stated, the most potent objection to the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits comes straight from Justice Black's argument in
Teague.49 Granted, some time limits are jurisdictional. Jurisdictional
time limits are important. Jurisdictional time limits are also mandatory. But that still leaves open an important interpretive question.
What does the jurisdictional rule mean? What is its true content?
Does it allow any room for flexibility, or tolling, or mitigation? The
words of the rule, however categorical they seem, cannot a priori shut
off that interpretive inquiry. To say that the rule is mandatory does
not itself resolve anything about the meaning or nuances of the mandatory rule.
Again, the point is not whether Justice Black was right about the
time limit in Teague, or about any other specific time limit. I am
defending his premise in Teague, not his conclusion. There are strong
arguments for the strict reading of particular time limits, or even most
or all time limits. Some of these arguments are instrumental. Strictly
construed time limits create incentives for compliance. They encourage repose and advance finality." They reduce the burden on courts

deprives then of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance.
Id. at 39-40 (announcing the judgment of the court) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 635 (1886); see also, e.g., H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107
(1970) (Black, J.) (invoking "entire structure" of National Labor Relations Act to reject a
"strict, literal interpretation" of one of its provisions).
48. But cf. supra notes 13-14 (citing cases).
49. 395 U.S. at 981-84.
50. See, e.g., Browder v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating that purpose of strict time limit "is 'to set a definite point of time when litigation shall
be at an end,' unless within that time the prescribed application has been made; and if it has
not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the appellant's demands") (quoting
Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412, 415 (1943)); see also Matton Steamboat
Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412, 415 (1943); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Mehrtens, 494
F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); United States v. Isaacs,
392 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. I11.1975); Tamminen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 327 N.W.2d 55
(Wis. 1982).
An ironic complication here, though, is that, because jurisdictional issues can be raised
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of deciding when leniency is in order. Other arguments flow from
theories of statutory construction that resist deviations from literal
language." But none of these arguments explains the singularly literal, singularly rigid, interpretation of jurisdictional time limits.
The question, then, is whether something in the "Idea of Jurisdiction" itself, in the jurisdictional character-the jurisdictionality--of
certain legal issues, warrants closing the interpretive door. Working
through that question will require a more careful account of just what
jurisdiction and jurisdictionality are.
A. The Idea of Jurisdiction
A good starting point is the classic, prosaic concept of jurisdic-

tion and jurisdictionality in Anglo-American law. I shall call this

concept the Idea of Jurisdiction.5 2 The Idea of Jurisdiction is a prom-

inent motif in Anglo-American legal culture. Like many other classical ideas in that culture,53 it was most fully and confidently defined

in the nineteenth century.'

It remains a major theme in the law,

sua sponte, and often collaterally, holding that a given time limit is jurisdictional can frustrate
finality in one respect while promoting it in another. Cf. In re Santos, 112 B.R. 1001, 1004
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that time limits for filing dischargeability complaints and objections
to discharge in bankruptcy proceedings are not jurisdictional in part because "a determination
that the time limits are jurisdictional would allow a dischargeability judgment to be collaterally attacked on the grounds of untimeliness at any time, a result clearly at odds with the
purpose of promoting finality and certainty of relief').
51. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 78 (1944); Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHL L. REv. 1175 (1989).
52. What I have in mind bears some resemblance to the "axiom of jurisdiction" described in Note, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical
Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 713-725 (1979).
53. By "classical," I do not intend to suggest that these ideas are beyond time or
change. Professor Dobbs argued that many of the ideas we now associate with
jurisdictionality, including the notion that parties could not confer jurisdiction by waiver or
consent, realized fruition in the nineteenth century, after a slow process of development. Dan
B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REv. 49 (1961). What one
should make of this history, however, is not pre-ordained. It might reflect the pure contingency of legal doctrine. Or it might reflect, as I put it later in this article, "a genuine maturing
of legal understanding." See infra text accompanying note 287.
54. For example, the last general treatise on jurisdiction and its meaning and consequences appeared, to the best of my knowledge, in 1899. See WILLIAM F. BAILEY, THE LAW
OF JURISDICTION (1899).
More recently, concern with jurisdiction and jurisdictionality has tended either to be
lumped into more diffuse studies of procedure or sidetracked into the new analytic category
of federal jurisdiction, a subject that, with all due respect, often has no more to say about
the theory of jurisdiction than would a study of federal agents have to say about the theory
of agency. For accounts of the intellectual history of the development of federal jurisdiction
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though compromised and diluted.
Described in its most robust form, the Idea of Jurisdiction has a
simple core: jurisdictional issues implicate the power or legitimate
authority of a court.5 Some legal rules are substantive. Others are
procedural. Both substantive and procedural norms provide rules of

decision for courts. In contrast, jurisdictional rules specify whether a
given tribunal has the authority to decide those other issues, and to
bind the rest of the world to its decision. 6 One way of putting it is

as a main rubric of our law, see Akhil R. Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688 (1989)
(reviewing PAUL BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988)); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States,
and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 671 (1989); Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller,
Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections From the Oral History of Herbert
Wechsler, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 854 (1993).
It should be noted that one of the aims of this Article is to refocus scholarly attention on the notion of jurisdiction itself, apart from the special concerns, both substantive and
jurisprudential, implicated in the study of federal jurisdiction.
55. See Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 305 (1923) (noting that "jurisdiction is the power to decide a justiciable controversy"); Faunteroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,
235 (1908) (stating that the distinction between jurisdictional and merits issues "is plain;
[o]ne goes to the power, the other only to the duty, of the court"); The Resolute, 168 U.S.
437, 439, aff'd, The William H. Hoag, 168 U.S. 443 (1897) (holding that "jurisdiction is the
power to adjudicate a case upon the merits, and dispose of it as justice may require");
McNitt v. Turner, 83 U.S. 352, 366 (1872) ("[J]urisdiction is authority to hear and determine.
It is an axiomatic proposition that when jurisdiction has attached, whatever errors may subsequently occur in its exercise, the proceeding being coram judice, can be impeached collaterally only for fraud."); Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that "at issue
in a factual [F.R.C.P.] 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction-its very power to hear
the case") (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir,
1977)); Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of New Haven, 439 A.2d 997, 999
(Conn. 1981) (holding that "subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong"); Duvall v.
Duvall, 80 So. 2d 752 (Miss. 1955), stating:
[J]urisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction, and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Id. at 754; State v. Pounds, 525 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (concluding that
"jurisdiction is the power of the court to decide a controversy between parties and to render
and enforce a judgment with respect thereto").
56. Cf. Byke v. City of Corpus Christi, 569 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), stating
that:
Jurisdiction does not relate to the rights of multiple plaintiffs as between themselves; it is distinguished from procedure in that "jurisdiction" of the subject matter
relates to the power of a court to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render
a valid judgment, while "procedure" relates to the form or manner in conducting
the suit.
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this: a court with jurisdiction has the right to be wrong and still be
authoritative.57 That is, in a sense, the essence of authority. 8 A
court without such authority, without jurisdiction, does not even have
the right to be right.
Standing alone, this core notion might appear to be a thin propo-

sition. But allied with this notion in the Idea of Jurisdiction are two
other elements. The first is a set of images that emphasize the imaginative audacity of the Idea of Jurisdiction. The second is a set of
doctrines that flesh out the results of that Idea.

1. Images
The most important image associated with the Idea of Jurisdiction is that of the judge who, or the court that, lacks jurisdiction. The
Idea of Jurisdiction imagines that judge or court to be in essence,
though obviously not in every detail, no different from any person on
the street. 9 He might hold the title and earn the salary of a judge.

Id. at 931.
57. See, e.g., Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944) (finding that "[]urisdiction
to decide is jurisdiction to make a wrong as well as a right decision"); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), stating:
If the constitutional questions stated in the bill actually arose in the cause, it was
the province and duty of the state courts to decide them; and their decision,
whether right or wrong, was an exercise of jurisdiction. If the decision was wrong,
that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding.
Id. at 415; Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) (determining that the District
Court "acts equally within its jurisdiction whether it decides a man to be guilty or innocent
under the criminal law, and whether its decision is right or wrong"); In re Edinger's Estate,
136 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1965) (finding that "[j]urisdiction of the court does not depend
upon whether its decision is right or wrong, correct or incorrect"); Garverick v. Hoffman, 262
N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1970) (holding that "Ijlurisdiction is a matter of power and covers
wrong as well as right decisions"); Chittenden Trust Co. v. MacPherson, 427 A.2d 356, 358
(Vt. 1981) (holding that probate court "has jurisdiction to make a wrong, as well as a right,
decision").
58. Cf. Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in THE AUTHORrrY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY 3 (1979).
59. Among the classic formulations are the following:
"If (a judge] acted without jurisdiction, he ceased to be a judge." 2 SIR EDWARD
COKE, INsTrruEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 427 (1634); see The Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep.
1027, 1038-39 (K.B. 1612).
"[V]here there is no jurisdiction at all, there is no Judge; the proceeding is as nothing." Perkins v. Proctor, 95 Eng. Rep. 874, 875 (K.B. 1768); see State ex rel Egan v.
Wolever, 26 N.E. 762, 763 (Ind. 1891) ("Where there is no jurisdiction at all there is no
judge; the proceeding is as nothing."); Lange v. Benedict, 73 N.Y. 12, 25 (1878) (same).
"[XV]hen a judge acts, he must be clothed with jurisdiction; and acting without this, he is but
an individual falsely assuming an authority he does not possess." Hoppe v. Klapperich, 28
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She might wear a robe and wield a gavel. None of that is irrelevant?6 But absent jurisdiction, it is all peripheral. The judge without
jurisdiction might as well be an imposter. He or she might almost as
well be you or I (judges in the company excluded). 6'

N.W.2d 780, 788 (Minn. 1947) (quoting 2 THOMAS COOLEY, TORTS § 315 (4th ed. 1932);
Broom v. Douglass, 57 So. 860 (Ala. 1912)).
"[W]hen they exceed their authority, they cease to be [judges], and act as private
persons." Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557, 558 (Ex. 1680).
"When the judge acts illegally without the limits of his jurisdiction, he becomes a
trespasser.
...
Rammage v. Kendall, 181 S.W. 631, 634 (Ky. 1916).
Similarly, note that the acts and proceedings of a court acting outside its jurisdiction
are said to be "coram non judice," which literally means "in presence of a person not a
judge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (6th ed. 1990). See generally Krugman, Filling the
Void, supra note 18.
Ironically, much of the rhetoric I have quoted first arose in the context of cases defining the scope of judicial immunity from suit-a doctrine that, even in the heyday of the
influence of the classic Idea of Jurisdiction, showed special, though by no means unlimited,
deference to judges acting beyond their jurisdiction. See generally Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
338 (1871); BAILEY, supra note 54, §§ 896-910. Questions of personal liability, however,
pose distinct problems that do not arise in other contexts, for the ability of judges-as people-to function in their jobs. Thus, an expansive doctrine of immunity does not pose the
same challenge to the Idea of Jurisdiction, or to the balance between statism and the rule of
law as do, for example, expansions of "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction" or the contempt
power. See infra part IV.B.2. (discussing aspects of twentieth-century erosion of the Idea of
Jurisdiction). Nevertheless, it bears note that even judicial immunity doctrine has changed, and
arguably grown more statist, in its most recent incarnations. See infra note 350 and accompanying text.
60. It can, for example, support a presumption that jurisdiction exists. See infra text
accompanying notes 62-66, 82-84, 232, 244. It can also, even in the absence of actual jurisdiction, immunize the wearer of the robe from civil suit. See Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct.
286 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335
(1871).
61. The converse to the notion that judges without jurisdiction are akin to persons on
the street is that judges with jurisdiction are something more than mere persons on the street.
This is captured, as elegantly as anywhere, in the American practice, instituted by John Marshall, of producing, if possible, "Opinions of the Court," in which one judge or justice
speaks for a majority, rather than the seriatim opinions of individual judges or justices, which
is the practice in most other common-law jurisdictions. See GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434 (12th ed. 1991) ("John Marshall persuaded his
colleagues to abandon seriatim opinions."); Robert G. Seddig, John Marshall and the Origins
of Supreme Court Leadership, 36 U. Prrr. L. REV. 785, 796-97 (1975) (elimination of seriatim opinions in favor of single majority opinions on behalf of the Court was one of
Marshall's procedural innovations). But cf Herbert A. Johnson, Introduction: The Business of
the Court, in 2 FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 373, 381-83 (Paul A.
Freund ed., 1981) (acknowledging Marshall's innovation, but also discussing possible antecedents).
Ironically, the one important instance in which the Court modified its usual style was
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the landmark case upholding the Court's authority to
order desegregation even against the substantive and jurisdictional resistance of Southern legislatures and officials. See infra note 72 (discussing jurisdictional arguments in Southern resis-
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A corollary to this image of the court without jurisdiction is the
image of the court with jurisdiction. In the classic model, the

"courtness" of a court or other tribunal usually comes-so to
speak-in chunks. That is to say, the authority of a court is a collec-

tion of jurisdictional heads. And the whole of its authority is only by
the slimmest margin greater than the sum of those parts.6' In the

tance to desegregation efforts of federal courts).
In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court styled its unanimous opinion, not as "Opinion of the
Court by [one justice]" or even as "Per Curiam," but as "Opinion of the Court by THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER." 358 U.S. at 4. The intent
was to emphasize that all the Justices, including those who had joined the Court since Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), joined in the judgment. -See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
298-300 (1983). The effect, as several commentators have pointed out, was only to "personalize[] the institution, highlighting the fact that, after all, these were nine men speaking.' Robert Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE LJ. 455, 476
(1984); accord Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE LJ. 585, 628 n. 111
(1983); cf. infra note 70 (discussing Hildreth's Heirs v. M'Intire's Devisee, 24 Ky. (1 JJ.
Marsh) 206 (1829)).
This tale is relevant here largely because it was Justice Felix Frankfurter who convinced his colleagues to adopt the unprecedented all-by-name caption. See SCHWARTZ, supra,
at 298-300. It might be no coincidence that it was also Justice Frankfurter, both as academic
and jurist, who helped give the most eloquent voice to the erosion of the Idea of Jurisdiction
and its partial replacement by a much more statist, order-bound, conception of judicial authority, in such cases as United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308-10 (1947);
see infra text accompanying notes 342-44, 351 (discussing Frankfurter's concurrence in United
Mine Workers). It is certainly no coincidence, and also casts a shadow on Cooper v. Aaron,
that Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence in that case, chose to rely on, and quote at length
from, his concurrence in United Mine Workers. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 307-09).
62. The weaselness of this formulation is meant to accommodate the limited inherent or
residual jurisdiction sometimes asserted by courts to perform some necessary or appropriate
function even in the absence of jurisdiction over a case, and for that matter even apart from
what would be narrowly required for them to exercise their jurisdiction to determine their
jurisdiction.
For example, in the heyday of three-judge courts in federal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court, to which appeals from three-judge courts were taken, sometimes found that the statutory requirements for convening a three-judge court were missing, and that the proceeding
below was, in effect, only that of an ordinary district court augmented by two extra judges.
In such cases, the Court would, strictly speaking, be compelled to dismiss the appeal, leaving
the parties to take their appeal instead to the Court of Appeals. But what if the time limit
for an appeal to the Court of Appeals had expired? The Court's eventual solution to this
dilemma was most explicitly articulated in Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing
Co., 292 U.S. 386 (1934):
Although without jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal, this Court, in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to give such directions as
may be appropriate to enforce the limitations of § 266 [the three-judge court provi-
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gaps between the chunks, a court is, as I said, akin to any person on

the street.
The only major exception to this notion is the proverbial exception that proves the rule. It is the court of general jurisdiction-in the

American context the typical, all-purpose state trial court-that sits in
the judicial hierarchy of most states above more specialized courts
and below a system of appeals courts.' A court of general jurisdic-

sion], and to conform the procedure to its requirements. And we may frame our
order in a way that will save to the appellants their proper remedies.
By mistakenly appealing directly to this Court appellants have lost their
opportunity to have the decree below reviewed on its merits, as the time for appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals has expired. We might now terminate the
litigation by dismissing the appeal without more, and it would be proper to do so
had the correct procedure under [the three-judge court provision] been more definitely settled at the time the appeal to this Court was attempted. But in the circumstances, it is appropriate that the decree below should be vacated and the cause
remanded to the district court for further proceedings to be taken independently of
§ 266.
Id. at 392 (citations omitted). The cryptic formulation at the end of the quotation refers to
the district court's power to enter a fresh decree so as to start the clock ticking anew for a
proper appeal. In later cases, the Court abandoned even this circumlocution and just announced that it was "vacat[ing] the judgments and remand[ing] the causes to the court which
heard each case so that they may enter a fresh decree from which appellants may, if they
wish, perfect timely appeals to the respective Courts of Appeals." Moody v. Flowers, 387
U.S. 97, 104 (1967).
The point here is that the Supreme Court in such cases, though it recognized that its
jurisdiction came in discrete chunks, also claimed the power to do what a non-court could
not do. It sought to fix an injustice, to set right what was wrong by exercising its judicial
power to mitigate the effects of a litigant's mistaken claim that his or her case belonged to
one of those chunks.
But this power, in the classic Idea of Jurisdiction, is, as suggested in text, razor-thin,
available in only the narrowest of circumstances.
63. One influential modem text puts it this way:
Within each state there are usually two or more kinds of trial
courts. . . . First, there are courts whose authority is confined to certain types of
cases, defined in terms of the amount in controversy or the subject matter of the
action. These are referred to generically as courts of limited, special, or "inferior"
jurisdiction, and are denominated by such names as municipal court, district court,
probate court, etc . . . Separate from these courts of limited jurisdiction are the
trial courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., those whose authority is comprehensive so
far as subject matter is concerned-or comprehensive except for all or certain matters within the jurisdiction of the courts of limited jurisdiction.
FLEMING JAMES & GEOFFREY HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 51-32 (3d. ed. 1985).
A more timeworn account, which has, however, the advantage of emphasizing some of
the full jurisdictional implications of the institutional arrangements involved, appears in Ex
Parte Roundtree, 51 Ala. 42, 44 (1874):
The division of courts, recognized at common law, was superior, or courts of
general jurisdiction, and inferior, or courts of limited jurisdiction. Superior courts,
derived much of their jurisdiction from the common law. Inferior courts derived

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss1/1

26

Dane: Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination
JURISDICTIONALY

tion, like any court, has limits on its powers. But within those limits
it has presumptive authority over anything that comes its way.' The
their whole existence and jurisdiction from the statutes constituting them. Hence,
nothing was intended to be without the jurisdiction of a superior court, whether of
appellate or original jurisdiction, except what appeared to be so; and every presumption, consistent with the record, was indulged in favor of the regularity and
validity of their judgments; while of inferior courts, no intendment was made favorable to their jurisdiction, and a conformity to the law of their creation must
have been disclosed by their records. Such was the only division of courts at
common law-into superior and inferior. It followed from the character of jurisdiction the courts exercised, and not from the subjection of the court to the appellate
power of another tribunal. [Only in the latter sense would] all courts of original
jurisdiction [be] inferior to a court exercising over them appellate power.
See also Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (discussing differences
between courts of general jurisdiction and other tribunals); cf Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 15 (1976) (arguing that certain extensions of the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction would
"run counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress").
The distinction between courts of general and limited jurisdiction also appears as an
organizing principle in many state constitutional provisions establishing the judicial branch of
government. See, e.g., ALA. CONST., art. VI, § 6.01(a) (Amend. No. 328, 1992):
Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the judicial power of the state
shall be vested exclusively in a unified judicial system which shall consist of a
supreme court, a court of criminal appeals, a court of civil appeals, a trial court of
general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, a trial court of limited jurisdiction
known as the district court, a probate court and such municipal courts as may be
provided by law.
KY. CONST. art. 6, § 109:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court
of Justice which shall be divided into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a
trial court of general jurisdiction known as the Circuit Court and a trial court of
limited jurisdiction known as the District Court.
MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 1:
The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which
shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of
general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of
limited jurisdiction that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the
members elected to and serving in each house.
64. See, e.g., Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992-93 (D.C. 1979), in which the
court discussed the effect of the D.C. Court Reform Act:
[A]s presently constituted, the Superior Court is no longer a court of limited jurisdiction, but a court of general jurisdiction with the power to adjudicate any civil
action at law or in equity involving local law. Although Superior Court is separated into a number of divisions, these functional divisions do not delimit their power
as tribunals of the Superior Court with general jurisdiction to adjudicate civil
claims and disputes.
Id. at 992-93; Schlyen v. Schiyen, 273 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1954) (holding that when court has
general jurisdiction, objection that issue should be heard by another court is deemed waived
unless timely made); Olson v. England, 292 N.W.2d 48 (Neb. 1980) (holding that if judgment of foreign court appears on its face to have been entered by a court of general jurisdiction, its jurisdiction over the subject matter will be presumed unless disproved); People v.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
[Vol. 23:1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction is not a set of discrete
categories, but a single-if bounded--domain.65
This, by the way, helps explain the origins of the view that time
limits on appeal are usually jurisdictional while most statutes of limi-

tations are not. Statutes of limitations historically applied most typically to trial courts of general jurisdiction. They were therefore only

rules

of

decision

for

tribunals

that

were

already

mas-

ters-jurisdictionally-of all they surveyed.' Courts of appeal, however, are not courts of general jurisdiction; time limits on appeal were
often embedded in the set of rules that defined one or another chunk

of whatever jurisdiction those courts had.67
In the light of these images, the classic claim that a court without jurisdiction is a court "without power" suddenly looks more bold,

less commonplace. Power here does not mean effective physical force.
It does not even mean the ability to induce habitual obedience." It
is, instead, a normative attribute. That normative attribute reflects a

specific vision of legality and of the relationship of laws to institutions. It also reflects a potentially profound skepticism about the
allegedly self-validating claims of exercises of state power.
The radical possibilities in the Idea of Jurisdiction are even more
apparent in the world beyond the confined discourse of courts and
judges. The Idea of Jurisdiction can provide one of the languages

open to programs of political resistance.'

It is a language that

avoids revolution, but defies reigning institutions." It is a form of
Darling, 50 A.D.2d 1038 (3d Dept. 1975) (finding that not even the circumstance that another
court has been given jurisdiction can deprive New York Supreme Court of its general jurisdiction in law and equity).
65. But note that the term "court of general jurisdiction" is also sometimes used, confusingly, to refer to courts, for example probate courts in some states, that, though specialized, nevertheless have, within their domain, the full range of powers and presumptions normally associated with courts of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 523 P.2d 743
(Kan. 1974). But cf, e.g., In Re Estate of O'Dwyer, 605 A.2d 216 (N.H. 1992) (stating that
a probate court is not a court of general jurisdiction).
66. See, e.g., Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that a time
limit for bringing a certain cause in state trial court was not jurisdictional; "[b]ecause the
superior court is a court of general jurisdiction, a presumption exists in favor of retention of
jurisdiction, and a divestiture of jurisdiction cannot be inferred but must be clearly and unambiguously found").
67. See, e.g., Villalobo v. State, 151 P. 946 (Ariz. 1915); Lednum v. Lednum, 239 P.
877 (Colo. 1925); Merritt v. Interstate Power Co., 153 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 1967); State
ex rel. Reid, 255 P.2d 693 (Mont. 1953).
68. Cf H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 49 (1961).
69. Cf. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
70. An evocative example was the resistance in the 1820's to the so-called "New" state
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resistance that looks to higher law, but without needing to resort to
natural law.
In the American context, this language has often exploited, for
good or bad, the paradox built into our system of federalism. The

Federal Constitution is supreme. The Supreme Court is supreme. But
the Supreme Court, unlike the most mundane state trial court, is also

a court of limited rather than general jurisdiction." And in the real
or argued gaps left over after its jurisdiction is defined can come
resistance-as I said for good or bad-to its efforts to define the law
of the land.72

supreme court established by a Kentucky Legislature upset with the rulings of the existing
state supreme court. This resistance was ultimately vindicated by the eventually re-enshrined
"old" court in Hildreth's Heirs v. M'Intire's Devisee, 24 Ky. (1 JJ. Marsh.) 206, 207 (1829)
(holding the "New" court to have been unconstitutionally created, and without jurisdiction,
and all its acts "totally null and void").
In a dazzling rhetorical move, Judge Robertson's opinion for the court in Hildreth's
Heirs almost never referred to the "Old Court" in institutional terms. Instead, the opinion
spoke of, for example, "the mandate of Messrs. Barry, & c., certified by F.P. Blair," or
"[t]he gentlemen who directed the appeal in this case to be dismissed, and the one who
certified the order," or "[tihe gentlemen who acted as judges of the legislative tribunal . . . ." l at 206, 208. Thus, Robertson gave as stark an example as any judicial utterance has produced of the proposition that judges without jurisdiction might as well be ordinary persons on the street. But cf. supra note 61 (discussing decision of United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aaron to list all the Justices of the Court by name in the caption
to the opinion for the Court).
71. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (4th ed.
1983).
72. This was most powerfully, and painfully, evident in the efforts of some Southerners
to fight against the United States Supreme Court's mandate of racial desegregation. In the
wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), many Southern legislatures, and
groups of Southern members of the United States Congress, issued manifestos and resolutions
decrying the opinion, and in some instances announcing their official resistance to its implementation. See generally 1 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 435-447 (1956) (reprinting Congressional
"Southern Manifesto" and state legislative enactments). These documents, which were only the
official tip of a large iceberg, tended to mingle several forms of argument and rhetoric. To
some extent, they were only overheated diatribes in favor of entrenched Southern practices.
To some extent, they repeated the "interposition" arguments of the nineteenth century, which
claimed a fundamental right in the States to override federal review of state action. See generally HERMAN V. AMES, STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE
UNITED STATES (1970); Edward S. Corwin, National Power and State Interposition, 10 MICH.
L. REV. 535 (1912); Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court
of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L.
REv. 1 (1913); cf CAN. CONST. § 33(1) (providing for limited provincial override of certain
human rights provisions of Canadian constitution). To some extent, they attacked the legal
merits of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, particularly its overruling of settled precedent and its reliance on psychological evidence.
But at least part of the argument of the Southern legislative documents of resistance
relied explicitly on the rhetoric of jurisdiction, and on precise and technical, if flawed, claims
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2. Doctrines
The formal doctrines historically associated with the Idea of
Jurisdiction only rarely scrape the more radical implications of the
Idea. But they are animated by the images I have just described, and
would make no unified sense without them.
In the nineteenth century, this set of doctrines might have
seemed in every single instance to follow inevitably from the core
intuition of the Idea of Jurisdiction. I am less sure of that. But I do
think that they are fair inferences from that core. I also suspect that
they reflect its most mature embodiment. In general terms, these doc-

trines divide into at least the following claims.

about the Court's specific jurisdiction to decide Brown. For example, the Georgia House of
Representatives, in its lengthy resolution of interposition and nullification, included this argument:
That the [Supreme] Court was without jurisdiction of said cases because (1)
the jurisdiction of the Court granted by the Constitution is limited to judicial cases
in law and equity, and said cases were not of a judicial nature and character, nor
did they involve controversies in law or equity, but, on the contrary, the great
subject of the controversy are of a legislative character, and not a judicial character, and are determinable only by the people themselves speaking through their
legislative bodies; (2) the essential nature and effect of the proceedings relating
exclusively to public schools operated by and under the authority of States, and
pursuant to State laws and regulations, said cases were suits against the States, and
the Supreme Court was without power or authority to try said cases, brought by
individuals against States, because the Constitution forbids the Court to entertain
suits by individuals against a State unless the State has consented to be sued.
House Res. No. 185, Georgia General Assembly (1956), reprinted in 1 RACE RELATIONS L.
REP., supra at 439.
The Supreme Court rejected the program of Southern legislative resistance in Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) and Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 364 U.S. 500 (1960);
see also supra note 61. The Court's opinion in Cooper is famous for its reaffirmance of
judicial review of state action and the supremacy of federal judicial power. It did not, however, specifically address the jurisdictional component in the rhetoric of Southern resistance.
Had it done so, its arguments could not have relied so easily on the principle of judicial
review or the specific doctrine of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), since neither of
these in itself disposes of the jurisdictional challenge to the Court's authority. In the last
analysis, the court might have had to rely on nothing more than its own unique 'jurisdiction
to determine its jurisdiction," which itself would have had to have been grounded in nothing
more satisfactory than a general, legal-positivistic account of the Supreme Court as the ultimate law-speaking tribunal in the legal structure of the United States. See also supra note 61
(discussing Frankfurter's concurrence in Cooper v. Aaron). See generally infra part IlI.B.5.a
(contrasting positivistic claims about judicial authority with doctrinal implications of Idea of
Jurisdiction; conceding that courts have not extended the most radical implications of the Idea
of Jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court).
To say all this is not, however, to doubt the legal, moral, or historical necessity of
Cooper v. Aaron.
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a. The Urgency of Power

A court cannot do anything substantial in a case unless it has
jurisdiction.73 The existence of jurisdiction is necessary even to a

73. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988);
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (noting that
"the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the
court from which the record comes"); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 250 (1868) (holding that "[i]f there were no jurisdiction, there was no power to do anything but strike the
case from the docket"); Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722 (Miss. 1990):
Jurisdiction precedes adjudication. Before a court may say anything worth listening
to regarding the (de)merits of a party's claim, that court must have authority to
speak. That court has such authority only when the claim is one within the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and after the court has acquired personal jurisdiction of
the parties. If the court is without jurisdiction-subject matter or personal-no one
is bound by anything the court may say regarding the (de)merits of the case.
Id. at 723; Harp v. State Compensation Dep't, 427 P.2d 981, 983 (Or. 1968) (holding that a
court without jurisdiction is "without power to hear the case or do anything about it except
dismiss it").
See also BAILEY, supra note 54, § 1 ("The question of jurisdiction must be considered and decided before any court can move one step further in the cause, as any movement
is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction"); PAUL BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1703 (3d ed. 1988).
Courts have, admittedly, sometimes applied this doctrine in absurd ways. For example,
in Hoxie v. Payne, 41 Conn. 539 (1874), a plaintiff filing suit on December 11, 1873 inadvertently cited the defendant to appear "before the Court of Common Pleas . . . on the first
Tuesday of February, A.D. 1873" rather than 1874. That is to say, the plaintiff (or his lawyer, or his lawyer's clerk) did what everybody has done occasionally around the turn of the
year, which is reflexively to write down the old year rather than the new. The plaintiff then
moved in the trial court to amend the writ to insert the correct date, while the defendant
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to amend and
granted the motion to dismiss. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld. It admitted that the
statute regarding amendments of pleadings "is indeed most liberal; and the courts, to promote
justice, to prevent delay, and to save expense to litigants, have given it a liberal construction." Id. at 540. Nevertheless, the court held:
[T]he defect in this process was radical. It was not made returnable to the court
which was asked to amend it, but to one which sat a year before. That this was
done through inadvertence does not change the legal aspects of the question. The
initial order, which the court was asked to make, would, if enforced, have given it
cognizance of a cause which, on its face, was made returnable to another tribunal.
That order was properly refused. When the power to hear and determine a cause is
wanting, as in this case, there is no jurisdiction, and no court can pass an order
creating jurisdiction for itself.
Id. Thus, the court implied, a more material, even prejudicial, amendment in the pleadings
might have been allowed if the writ had been on its face returnable to the 1874 session of
court. But a purely clerical, patently non-prejudicial amendment from "1873" to "1874" would
not be so returnable.
What is absurd about this opinion is not that the court took the Idea of Jurisdiction
too seriously, or treated jurisdiction as a fetish. Rather, the absurdity lies in the court's as-
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holding against the party seeking relief.74 Consider, for example, a

court facing a hard, complex, jurisdictional issue but very easy, obvious grounds for a non-jurisdictional dismissal. Following the classical
logic, that court would have to proceed to decide the hard jurisdic-

tional question and could not just dispose of the case on the simple,
non-jurisdictional point, even when the practical difference between a
jurisdictional and a non-jurisdictional dismissal would be nonexistent.
b. The Consequences of Powerlessness

If a court does not have jurisdiction, its actions do not bind.
Consider, for example, contempt of court. Courts can hold persons in

both civil and criminal contempt."5 Civil contempt spurs obedience
to a judicial order, or compensates an innocent party for injuries due
to the contemnor's disobedience. Criminal contempt punishes that disobedience. If an appeals court reverses a trial court on its underlying
order, it also will likely revoke the citition for civil contempt. 76 But
sumption that the trial court's authority to allow an amendment of the pleadings depended in
these circumstances on whether the writ said "1873" or "1874:' In 1917, the Connecticut
General Assembly adopted a provision specifically allowing, under certain conditions, "a proper amendment to civil process which has been made returnable to the wrong return day or is
for any other reason defective." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-72(a) (1958). The purpose of the
provision was to allow "for the amendment of otherwise incurable defects that affect jurisdiction:' Brandriff v. Sellas, 488 A.2d 853 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985) (generally discussing amendment of pleadings) (citation omitted). Neither logic nor hermeneutics should have prevented
the Connecticut courts, even before 1917, from so interpreting the amendment of pleadings
statute as it then existed.
74. See, e.g., Clark v. Gray, 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237
(1934); Chorney v. Chorney, No. 92-1780, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1938 (1st Cir. Feb. 5,
1993); Morgan v. Hay, 426 P.2d 647 (Ariz. 1967).
75. For general discussions of the distinction between criminal and civil contempt, see
United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990); Hicks ex rel. Feioek, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); DeMartino v. Monroe Little
League, Inc., 471 A.2d 638 (Conn. 1984); Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. United
Hawaii Pub. Workers, 667 P.2d 783 (Haw. 1983).
These cases also illustrate the difficulty in many instances of distinguishing between
civil and criminal contempt. Note, also, that some observers have argued that the distinction
is, at its root, neither useful nor sound. See, e.g., RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT
POWER 49-67, 292-94 (1963); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1993).
76. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95:
It does not follow, of course, that simply because a defendant may be punished
for criminal contempt for disobedience of an order later set aside on appeal, that
the plaintiff in the action may by way of a fine imposed in a simultaneous pro-
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it will likely uphold the citation for criminal contempt, because people must obey even erroneous judicial orders.77
If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, however, the classical view
was that the appeals court would reverse the citation for criminal
contempt.7 8 A court with jurisdiction has the right to be wrong, sub-

ject only to ordinary appellate review; a court without jurisdiction
does not even have the right to be right.

A more important consequence of the doctrine that the actions of
a court without jurisdiction do not bind is that the absence of jurisdiction can be raised in a collateral proceeding. It can be an answer,
for example, to a claim of res judicata. Thus, the repose and certainty
that normally follow an unappealed judicial decree are always tempered by the possibility that the issuing court was, for some reason,

without jurisdiction.
The absence of jurisdiction could often also be grounds for spe-

ceeding for civil contempt based upon a violation of the same order. The right to
remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued.
Id.; Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670, 675 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing cases)
(stating that neither "coercive" nor "remedial" civil contempt "can survive the invalidation of
the underlying injunction"); see also United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988).
But cf, e.g., Klett v. Pim, 965 F.2d 587, 590 (1992) (distinguishing between compensatory and coercive civil contempt, and holding that, though "a court cannot impose a
coercive civil contempt sanction if the underlying injunction is no longer in effect . . . [i]f
the underlying injunction abates for a reason that does not go to the jurisdiction of the issuing court, . . . a compensatory civil contempt may still be brought"); Masonite Corp. v.
International woodworkers, 206 So. 2d 171, 183 (Miss. 1968) (noting that "[tihe person who
disobeys the order of a court of general jurisdiction does so at his peril").
77. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Howat v. Kansas, 258
U.S. 181 (1922); Board of Ed. v. Kanakee Fed'n of Teachers, 264 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. 1970).
But cf., e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987) (limited
exception in freedom of the press prior restraint context when publisher disobeys transparently
invalid court order while making good faith effort to seek emergency relief from appellate
court), cert. dismissed sub nor., United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693
(1988); Richard E. Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1988).
78. See In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885); Ex
Parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1881); Tyler v. Connelly, 65 Cal. 28 (1884); Dudley v.
McCord, 65 Iowa 671 (1885); In re Pierce, 44 Wis. 411 (1878); BAILEY, supra note 54,
§ 304b ("when a court undertakes, by its process of contempt, to punish a man for refusing
to comply with an order which the court had no authority to make, the order itself being
without jurisdiction and void, that the order punishing for contempt was equally void . . . ");
cf Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 334 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
This doctrine was radically modified in federal law by the majority opinion in United
Mine Workers. See infra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
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cial collateral relief in, for example, a petition for a writ of prohibition. One of the most well-known themes in English legal history is
the battle over jurisdiction, as one court or court system seeks to
check the pretensions of another.79 In nineteenth century America,
and to an extent well into the twentieth century, the writ of habeas
corpus was largely limited to the correction of jurisdictional errors."

And since ordinary appeals in criminal cases were not always available, the effort to separate jurisdictional from ordinary issues took on

extra importance. Today, much of British administrative law takes the
form of courts policing the jurisdictional pretensions of inferior tribunals.8'
Classical doctrine did blunt the axiom that the acts of a court

without jurisdiction do not bind. For example, it might require adverse parties to prove the lack of jurisdiction in a prior judgment. Or
it might presume jurisdiction unless the record itself showed the contrary. Many of these rules varied with the type of court or other
tribunal at issue.
Classical doctrine also admitted that courts had a certain "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction."82 That is to say, the acts of a

court cannot bind unless it has jurisdiction, but a court does have

79. See, e.g., Fuller's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 42, 77 Eng. Rep. 1323 (Ex. 1605) ("the determination of a thing, whether it belongs to Court Christian, doth appertain to the Judges of
the common law"); cf. Mackonochie v. Lord Penzance, [1881] 6 Ap. Cas. 424, 447 (the
"temporal Courts had carried on a long struggle, first, before the Reformation, with the Pope,
and afterwards . . . with the Church and the Crown, and many of their decisions may be
attributed to a jealousy which they had thus acquired of the Ecclesiastical Courts")
(Blackburn, L.J.).
See generally WmLtAM HOLDSWORTH, A IsTORY OF ENOSH LAW (1936).
More specifically, the crucial development in the inter-judicial battles of English legal history
were the claims of the King's courts to police the jurisdiction of local, administrative, and
ecclesiastical tribunals, rather than the other way around.
80. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Ex Parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193,
202 (1830). See generally WIIAM DuKER, A CONSTrIrroNAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
(1980); Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas
Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966); Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Soci.
etal Change, 44 OHIo ST. LJ. 337 (1983).
But cf Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993) (proposing alternative historical account).
81. See generally H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 213-95 (5th ed. 1982).
82. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 270 U.S. 266, 274 (1925)
(holding that "[e]very court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist"); Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 340 (1894);
Winemiller v. Laughlin, 38 N.E. 111, 113 (Ohio 1894); Ex parte Bushnell, 8 Ohio St. 599,
601 (1858); State v. Wenzel, 77 Ind. 428 (1881). See generally BAILEY, supra note 54,
§§ 138-40, 173-77.
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some power to decide whether it has jurisdiction, and its views on
that question can bind. At least until the modem period, however,
"jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction" was a limited power." For

purposes of collateral review, the jurisdiction of a court to determine
jurisdiction extended only to deciding questions of jurisdictional fact.
It did not extend to the legal question of whether the court, assuming
some given set of facts, had subject matter jurisdiction over a case.s
Thus, the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction only recognized that flowing from, or auxiliary to, each chunk of a court's
subject matter jurisdiction was a necessary power to decide whether

that jurisdiction came to bear in any particular instance. But it did not
overwhelm the underlying notion that a court cannot act beyond its

authority. Nor did it contradict the notion that the jurisdiction of a
court was the sum of a set of discrete chunks.

83. See, e.g., Wright v. Douglass, 10 Barb. 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1850):
[I]n a court of general jurisdiction, it is to be presumed that the court had jurisdiction, till the contrary appears; but the want of jurisdiction may always be shown,
by evidence, except . . . when the jurisdiction depends on a fact that is litigated
in a suit, and is adjudged in favor of that party who avers jurisdiction, then the
question of jurisdiction is judicially decided, and the judgment record is conclusive
evidence of jurisdiction, until set aside or reversed by a direct proceeding by appeal or a writ of error.
Id. at I11 (citations omitted); BALEY, supra note 54, § 177 ("There is, however, a clear
distinction between a finding upon evidence that certain facts exist essential to jurisdiction of
the subject-matter which the court has jurisdiction to determine, and a mere decision of a
court that it has jurisdiction when it has none.").
84. See supra note 83; see also Krugman, Filling the Void, supra note 18, at 165-71
(discussing the development off the voidness doctrine in England, and subsequently in the
United States).
It was sometimes said that jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction only extended to "quasi-jurisdictional" facts. The classical expression of this formulation occurred in Reinach v.
Atlantic & G.W.R., 58 F. 33 (1878):
There is a clear distinction between those facts which involve the jurisdiction of
the court over the parties and the subject-matter and those quasi jurisdictional facts
without allegation of which the court cannot be set in motion, and without proof
of which a decree should not be pronounced. The judgment of a court having no
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the parties is null and void, and may be impeached in collateral proceedings, and the record of the court showing such jurisdiction may be contradicted by parol evidence.
But there are certain facts termed "quasi jurisdictional" which must be
alleged and proved, but, when so proved, are res adjudicata and binding in collateral proceedings.
Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
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c. Of Waiver
Jurisdictional questions are not under the control of the parties.

In this they differ deeply from most other legal rules in the common
law tradition. Parties to a proceeding cannot stipulate the existence of

jurisdiction.'

They cannot, intentionally or not, waive jurisdictional

objections.86

Any party, including the party who claimed jurisdiction

in the first place," can challenge a court's jurisdiction at any
time." Courts are obligated to raise jurisdictional questions sua sponte, even if the parties have not raised them. 9 Even if they only no-

tice those questions late into the proceeding, they must raise them
and resolve them before they may continue.' °

Commentators sometimes say that parties cannot control jurisdictional issues because jurisdictional rules embody societal interests that
go beyond the interests of the parties and that none of the parties

might have an adequate incentive to advance.9 For example, both
85. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Capagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982).
86. See generally Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934); Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d
918 (9th Cir. 1993); Zaborski v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., 812 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1991); Arbitration of Bd. of Directors of Tropicana Manor v. Jeffers, 830 P.2d 503, 509 (Haw. 1992).
87. For a classic example, see American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6

(1951).
88. But cf Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960)
(The court held that a defendant in a diversity suit would be estopped from waiting until
after statute of limitations had run to challenge existence of diversity and thus defeat jurisdiction. "A defendant may not play fast and loose with the judicial machinery and deceive the
courts.").
The Di Frischia case attracted considerable attention in its day, but did not effectively
change the law, and was superseded by numerous Supreme Court decisions. It has since been
explicitly abandoned by the Third Circuit. Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir.
1984).
89. The classic case on point is Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379, 382 (1884). For more recent examples, see Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 494 U.S.
185 (1990); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Ecker v. Town of W.
Hartford, 530 A.2d 1056 (Conn. 1987); Hardy v. West Cent. Sch. Dist., 478 N.W.2d 832
(S.D. 1991).
But c Larson v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34, 38 (N.D. 1991) (concluding that "[w]hile we
recognize it is the duty of this court to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte whenever they
appear on the record, we prefer to proceed cautiously and leave the parties to their remedy
under [the rule of procedure allowing relief from void judgments]") (citations omitted).
90. For objections to this doctrine, see, e.g., 1 MOORE ET AL., supra note 18, J 0.60(4);
AMRICAN LAW INSTiTUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 366 (1969); Dobbs, supra note 18.
91. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1983) ("[H]arsW' rules that
attach to jurisdictional requirements in federal courts "could hardly be defended as a sensible
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parties to a lawsuit might prefer their case to be heard in a fast, effi-

cient, clean federal court than in a slow, clumsy, dingy state court.
But the larger social interest in federalism might dictate otherwise.

This functionalist gloss is all right,' but it also might conceal
as much as it reveals. To some extent, the legal culture treats laws as
jurisdictional because they embody interests that go beyond the interests of the parties. But surely, to some extent, it also comes to perceive such interests in certain laws for no other reason than that they
are, on independent grounds, jurisdictional.

d. Of Discretion
Jurisdictional requirements are-as must already be apparent-mandatory. In the classic idiom, "mandatory" laws are distinguished from both "permissive" and "directory" laws.93

"Permissive" laws grant discretion.94 "Directory" laws, strictly
speaking, are not necessarily discretionary95 though the mandatorypermissive and mandatory-directory dichotomies are often conflated.'

regulation of procedure, and can only be justified by the delicate problems of federal-state
relations that are involved."); Hall, supra note 7, at 419-20 ("[I]f a procedural rule protects
interests larger than those of the immediate parties, if there are greater societal concerns at
stake, then waiver may not be appropriate.").
92. But cf Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REV. 49
(1961) (criticizing historic and policy underpinnings of doctrinal refusal to recognize jurisdiction by consent).
93. See generally IA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 25.03 (C. Dallas Sands ed., 1985).
94. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (discussing
powers of a trustee); Selman v. United States, 941 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing
power of IRS Commissioner to abate interest); Godsey v. Houston, 584 So. 2d 389 (Miss.
1991) (discussing whether discharge of extraditable prisoner is mandatory or permissive if
agent of demanding state does not appear in state to which prisoner has fled within time set
out in statute).
95. As one court has put it, "[b]oth mandatory and directory provisions of the legislature are meant to be followed. It is only in the effect of non-compliance that a distinction
arises." Borough of Pleasant Hills v. Carroll, 125 A.2d 466, 469 (Pa. 1956); see also Chase
v. United States, 256 U.S. 1, 8 (1921) (holding that "[alppellant's contention is that the act
is neither directory nor mandatory; it is permissive only"); People v. Mcgee, 568 P.2d 382
(Cal. 1977) (distinguishing between "mandatory-permissive" dichotomy and "mandatory-directory" dichotomy; former refers to whether an act is required or discretionary, while latter refers
to consequences of non-compliance); In re Property Seized From Richard Sopoci, 467 N.W.2d
799 (Iowa 1991) (same).
96. See, e.g., Goodman v. City Prods. Corp., 425 F.2d 702, 703 (6th Cir. 1970); Wilson
v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 276, 281 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v.
Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 818 S.W.2d 935 (Ark. 1991); Smith v. Gray, 779 S.W.2d 173
(Ark. 1989); Homer Township v. Zimney, 490 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1992); G.S. v. Ewing, 786
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Rather, directory laws are norms whose disregard has no consequence.' Or according to a variant definition, they are norms whose
disregard, at the least, does not impair the efficacy of the act or
proceeding to which the laws relate.98
For example, in public contracts law, statutes requiring contracts

to be in writing are usually treated as mandatory, thus rendering an
oral contract void or unenforceable." On the other hand, rules per-

taining to the specific form that a contract should take are often taken
to be merely directory."° Similar labels attach to procedural rules,

including time limits. For example, time limits on tribunals and agen0

cies (as opposed to parties) are generally held to be directory.' '
Thus, if a statute requires that a tribunal hold a hearing "within ten

days," it can very often still hold the hearing after ten days without

P.2d 65 (Okla. 1990).
Even the standard texts, such as SINGER, supra note 93 and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY tend to make this error.
97. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Meredith, 146 So. 2d 308, 310 (Ala. 1962); Perry v. Planning
Comm'n, 619 P.2d 95 (Haw. 1980); State v. Hartwell, 684 P.2d 778 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
See generally SINGER, supra note 93.
98. See, e.g., Solen Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Heisler, 381 N.W.2d 201 (N.D. 1986);
Department of Transp. v. Passerella, 401 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. CL 1979); Delaware County
v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 383 A.2d 240 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
This formulation emphasizes that when a statute is "directory," it is not necessarily
optional or discretionary.
99. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877); United States v. American
Renaissance Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1974); County of St. Francois v.
Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1957); Gordon v. Board of Directors, 347 A.2d 347 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975). But cf City of Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336, 364 (1878)
(noting that, although writing requirement might be mandatory, "it can not be made a rigid,
unbending rule in every case which can by any possibility arise," particularly when the city
had already received the benefit of the contract).
Note also however, that, as in private law, alternative remedies are sometimes
available. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877) (quantum meruit); Narva
Harris Constr. Corp. v. United States, 574 F.2d 508 (CL CI. 1978) (holding that enforceable
contract can exist if, even after excluding evidence of express oral agreement, contract can be
implied in fact from surrounding circumstances or ancillary documentation).
100. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Jennings, 651 P.2d 1037 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (noting
that the requirement that a contract between a school board and its employee be on a specific form is merely directory).
101. See, e.g., Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Morris,
252 F.2d 643, 649 (5th Cir. 1958); People v. Hamer, 262 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1989);
M.B.E., Inc. v. Minority Business Opportunity Comm'n., 485 A.2d 152 (D.C. 1984); Vann v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Funeral Directors, 441 A.2d 246, 247-48 (D.C. 1982); Anderson
v. Commissioner, 489 A.2d 1094 (Me. 1985).
But cf Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 411 N.E.2d 277
(Ill. 1980), rev'd on constitutional grounds, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982).
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much consequence.
Jurisdictional rules are mandatory in both the non-permissive and
non-directory senses of the word. And the phrase "mandatory and
jurisdictional'" is one of those standard doublets ("null and void,"
"cease and desist") that so fill legal poetics. 3 But there is less to
this than one might think.

First, legal rules can be mandatory without being jurisdictional."o The most obvious examples for present purposes are statutes

of limitations. Second, the "mandatory" label assigned to a rule only
describes- the ontological nature of the rule. The label does not ad-

102. For a random selection of among the more recent of the thousands of cases in
which this phrase appears, see Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990); White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1318 (8th Cir. 1993); Rodick
v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1346 (2d Cir. 1993); Guirguis v. INS, 993 F.2d 508,
509 (5th Cir. 1993); Bocksnick v. City of London, 825 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ark. 1992); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Brown, 619 A.2d 1188, 1189 n.2 (D.C. 1993); Wyoming
Dep't of Employment v. Wyoming Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 859 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Wyo.
1993).
Examples from the earliest cases I have found that use the phrase, in more or less its
present meaning include, Vermont Marble Co. v. National Surety Co., 213 F. 429, 433 (3d
Cir. 1914); United States ex rel Van Clief v. Merrick, 215 F. 256, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 1914);
Horn v. Martin, 87 P. 1073 (Colo. 1906); Clarke v. City of Chicago, 57 N.E. 15, 18 (11.
1900). The earliest apparent use of the precise phrase by the United States Supreme Court is
found in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960); see also Hall, supra note 7,
at 407-18 (discussing the use of the phrase).
It is worth considering some of these dates in relation to the larger historical story
that I recount in part IV.B, infra.
103. Richard Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599, 601 (1986);
George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 333,
340 (1987); Robert P. Charrow, Book Review, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1094, 1101 (1983) (reviewing DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE (1982)).
104. See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892):
The provision is not discretionary only, but mandatory to the government; and its
purpose is to inform the defendant of the testimony which he will have to meet,
and to enable him to prepare his defence. Being enacted for his benefit, he may
doubtless waive it, if he pleases; but he has a right to insist upon it, and if he
seasonably does so, the trial cannot lawfully proceed until the requirement has been
complied with.
Id. at 304; Gorman v. Abbott Labs., 629 F. Supp. 1196 (D.R.I. 1986) (explaining that the
time limit for removing action from state to federal court is not jurisdictional, in that waiver
is possible under some circumstances, but it is mandatory, and must be strictly applied); In
re Sexton, 418 N.E.2d 729 (Il1. 1981) (noting that a provision's mandatory rather than
discretionary quality does not render it jurisdictional in the sense of not being waivable); Ex
parte Henderson, 565 S.W.2d 50, 51 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding that "[w]hether Article
44.34 is mandatory or discretionary, petitioner may waive compliance with the provision").
But cf, e.g., Drainage Comm'r. v. Giffin, 25 N.E. 995, 999 (Ill. 1890) (concluding that
"[t]here can be no doubt that these provisions [as to notice] are mandatory, and therefore
jurisdictional") (emphasis added).
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dress further relevant questions about the content or meaning of the
rule. This fancy verbiage only repeats Justice Black's basic observation: "I agree, of course, that we should follow the statute. But we

must first determine what the statute means."'0 5

The mandatory nature of jurisdictional rules does entail that

courts cannot waive them as a matter of discretion, or put aside their
consequences. It also entails that the existence of jurisdiction is not
an issue that can be committed to judicial discretion."° The law can
give judges discretion whether they will exercise their jurisdiction. 7
It can give them discretion to set, or postpone, the jurisdictional point

of no return. Some statutes, including federal law, for example, explicitly give courts the power to grant extensions of time on limits on
appeal.'08 But courts cannot have discretion to decide whether they
have jurisdiction. Crudely stated, if a court has discretion to decide

whether it has jurisdiction, then, it must have jurisdiction.
This too, though, is of less moment than it might seem to be.
Discretion in the doctrinal sense is a narrow idea. It comes into play

only when the law by its own terms places a decision (within some
range) outside legal argument and commits it instead to the wisdom
or managerial authority of a given decision maker. Thus, federal law
gives trial judges discretion in certain classes of cases to award "reasonable attorney's fees" to prevailing parties,'09 or, as noted, to
grant limited time extensions "upon a showing of excusable neglect
or good cause."" 0

105. Teague, 394 U.S. at 982 (Black, J., dissenting).
106. Cf.Hale v. Ault, 367 N.E.2d 93, 95 (I11.
App. Ct. 1977) ("'Jurisdiction' when the
term is used in the sense of describing the power of the court to render a judgment not
subject to collateral attack does not depend upon an exercise of discretion by the court.").
107. Doctrines such as forum non conveniens and certain forms of abstention grant judges discretionary jurisdictional powers. For example, a perennial question in the theory and
doctrine of federal court jurisdiction has been the extent to which federal courts can decline
to hear cases. See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.
RFV. 543 (1985) (discussing the role of reasoned judicial discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction, particularly to avoid undue interference with the state courts or other branches of the
federal government).
108. See infra note 110.
109. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988) (antitrust actions by State Attorneys General);
17 U.S.C. § 911 (1988) (civil actions for copyright protection of semiconductor chip products); 29 U.S.C. § 2005 (enforcement provisions of Employee Polygraph Protection Act);
42 U.S.C. § 19731 (1988) (voting rights enforcement proceedings); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3
(Supp. IV 1988) (suits for enforcement of Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1988) (Fair
Housing enforcement by the Attorney General).
110. See, e.g., ED-'.
R. APP. P. 4 (1994).
The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend
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This sense of discretion is different from that at work in the

critical or theoretical claim that legal rules are sometimes or always
indeterminate and that legal interpretation is therefore to some degree
an exercise of "discretion...' One author has called these two sens-

es of discretion "procedural" and "jurisprudential."' . I have, in a
previous article, called them "affirmative discretion" and "residual

discretion."".3
Affirmative discretion is specifically granted by law. Residual
discretion does not exist at all, according to some theorists. If it does

exist, it arises not by operation of law, but from a gap in the law. I
will, later, say something about the relationship between residual
discretion and the "Idea of Jurisdiction. 1. 4 For now, however, suffice it to say that the law's internal perspective knows little of residual discretion. All that is certain, at least so far, is that the
jurisdictionality of a legal rule is inconsistent with the exercise of

the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) [in civil cases]. Any
such motion which is filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex
parte unless the court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed
after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with local rules. No such extension shall exceed 30 days past such prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.
Id. at Rule 4(a)(5); see also, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 74(a) (1994) (regarding appeal from
magistrate to district court, "[u]pon a showing of excusable neglect, the magistrate may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 20 days after the
expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this rule"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b) (1991).
When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (I) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to
be done if the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but the court may
not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34, and 35, except
to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
Id.; FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) ("Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the district court
may-before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice-extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal [in a criminal case] for a period not to exceed 30 days
from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision").
111. See George
P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (Autumn 1984).
112. Charles M. Yablon, Justifing the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion,
41 HASTINGS LJ. 231, 234 (1990).
113. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1191,
1228-30 (1987).
114. See infra part In.B.5.b.
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affirmative discretion." '
e. Jurisdiction and the Merits: Of Preclusion

Jurisdictional dismissals are not "on the merits." Dismissal of a
case for jurisdictional reasons might preclude relitigation of those
jurisdictional issues. ' But it does not keep the party who sought
relief from trying again in a different court or in the same court on
different jurisdictional grounds." 7 This is not so because jurisdiction

is usually a question of procedure rather than substance. To the contrary, as I will emphasize shortly, jurisdictional issues sometimes do
touch matters of substance"' Moreover, dismissals on procedural
grounds, though in some circumstances not considered "on the merits"
for purposes of claim preclusion, often are."9 This is particularly
115. I discuss the implications of this conclusion for the doctrine of jurisdictional time
limits infra part III.B.3.a.
116. See Magnus Electronics, Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1400 (7th
Cir. 1987); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.)
(giving res judicata effect to previous dismissal for failure to satisfy jurisdictional amount
requirement in federal diversity suits); Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980); In
re Courtin, 91 So. 67, 68 (La. 1922) (dictum); In re Quinney's Estate, 283 N.W. 599, 602
(Mich. 1939); 5 MOORE, ET AL., supra note 18,
41.14(a), at 41-174. But cf., e.g., Mann v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 488 F.2d 75, 76 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing
party who had not shown diversity of citizenship in earlier litigation to bring new diversity
suit); Cassidy v. Board of Educ., 557 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Md. 1989) (holding that new suit
was not barred by dismissal of earlier suit for failure to plead notice to defendant). As these
cases suggest, this area of preclusion law is not entirely settled. A plausible, if not perfect,
way to reconcile these two lines of cases might be to distinguish between a mere dismissal
for failure to demonstrate jurisdiction, which might not be preclusive, and an affirmative
finding that a jurisdictional prerequisite did not exist, which would be preclusive.
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ (20)(1)(a) (1982); 5 MOORE, Er AL., supra note 18,
41.14. It might, under certain circumstances, not even prevent the party from filing another suit on the same jurisdictional
grounds. See supra note 116.
118. See infra part III.A.2.f.
119. The issue is complex, with significant historical and policy overtones and various
shades of meaning, a full discussion of which is well beyond the scope of this paper. See
generally Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-88 (1961); FED. R. CIv. P. § 41;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS supra note 117, §§ 19-20; FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.15 (3d ed. 1985); CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A (1983).
For cases representing a variety of approaches, see United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 679-80 & n.4 (1958); Saylor v. Linsley, 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968);
Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964); Patterson v. Union Pacific R.R.,
49 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 1951); Weinberg v. Johns-Manville, 473 A.2d 22 (Md. 1984);
Scherman v. Board of Educ., 340 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1975).
For my purposes, it is unimportant whether procedural dismissals are always "on the
merits." There may be sound reasons in preclusion theory why they should not be. What is
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true, and particularly relevant, for statutes of limitation.2 For example, consider a party who seeks relief in tort and is barred by a short
statute of limitations. The general view is that such a party may not
refashion his cause of action, forcing the same operative facts to fit a
cause of action in contract and resubmit his complaint under the

longer statute of limitations. Nor can he try again in another state that
happens to have a longer statute of limitations applicable to tort

claims.
The difference flows directly from the notion that a court with-

out jurisdiction might almost as well be any person on the street. If a
litigant were to come to, say, me and seek legal relief, and I told him
to go away, that would not prevent him from going to a real court.
But if he, from the start, seeks legal relief in a real court with real
jurisdiction, he has arguably had his chance, even if his case stumbles, on procedural grounds, before the court hears the substance of

his claim.
That jurisdictional dismissals are not on the merits reveals an
even deeper principle. Most judicial acts, substantive or procedural,

significant is that jurisdictional dismissals are, by nature, not dismissals "on the merits."
120. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding a demoted
city employee's civil rights action precluded by an earlier petition for a consent decree which
was barred by the statute of limitations and laches; for purposes of res judicata, earlier dismissal was "on the merits"); DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1986)
(upholding state court dismissal of plaintiff's civil rights action in federal court on statute of
limitations grounds because, under state law, dismissal on statute of limitations grounds would
be on the merits for res judicata purposes,. and the state court judgment was entitled to the
same preclusive effect in federal court); Nathan v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir.
1981) (stating that dismissal based upon statute of limitations is decision "on the merits" for
res judicata purposes); Allie v. lonata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 1987) (same);
Sankey Brothers, Inc. v. Guilliams, 504 N.E.2d 534, 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (same); Dennis
v. Fiscal Court of Bullitt County, 784 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Ky. 1990) (holding that where discharged police officer sued to recover for breach of contract, violations of personnel policies,
and state constitutional right of due process, that action was res judicata due to a federal
court dismissal of similar federal civil rights action under statute of limitations);
Nitz v. Nitz, 456 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming dismissal of suit
claiming negligent maintenance and inspection of birdfeeder where plaintiff was injured after
post by which birdfeeder was attached to deck gave way, holding that dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds of plaintiff's earlier action for negligent installation of birdfeeder had res
judicata effect); Gillespie v. Johnson, 209 S.E.2d 143, 145 (W. Va. 1974).
In some contexts, the res judicata effect of statute of limitations dismissals rises to
constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 558 A.2d 454, 457-58 (N.H.
1989).
But cf, e.g., Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 770 F.2d 1566, 1572 (lth Cir.
1985) (holding that earlier Georgia state court dismissal on statute of limitations grounds was
not dismissal "on the merits" for res judicata purposes).
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whether allowing or denying relief, are exercises of power. They

carry with them the onus of that power. A court that is not part of
the solution might well be part of the problem. Yet, in the legal
imagination, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is a genuine assertion of

powerlessness. It carries no onus. A court without jurisdiction is, in
some deep sense, pure.'
f. Jurisdiction and the Merits: Of Overlap

Whether jurisdiction exists in a court is in principle not the same
question as whether one or the other party should prevail on the
merits. The jurisdictional question, that is to say, goes only to whether a particular court should hear a case, while the merits question
goes to whether a particular party should prevail, regardless of the
court hearing the case. Nevertheless, the two issues can overlap, or
even become identical.'2

This can happen because resolution of an issue controlling a
court's jurisdiction is also relevant to, or dispositive of, the inquiry
into the merits. For example, when a state court exercises long-arm

jurisdiction based only upon the acts or omissions directly related to
the suit itself,'" and decides, for example, that there was no con121. With this statement, I explicitly challenge Robert Cover's arguments about the "irony of jurisdiction." See Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8, 53-60 (1983). To take seriously the Idea of Jurisdiction as an element of the legal imagination, and to take seriously the possibility that courts
are mere creatures of law is, it seems to me, to take seriously the claim that those courts are
sometimes genuinely and, without irony, powerless to act.
122. In addition to other cases discussed or cited infra notes 124-33, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485-87 (1974) (holding that determination of Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, under "final judgment rule," to hear appeal from state court judgment
depends in part on whether Supreme Court decision would dispose of case, and that can
depend in part on analysis of the merits of the state court decision); Land v. Dollar, 330
U.S. 731, 739 (1947) (concluding that, in suit against members of federal commission, jurisdictional question of whether suit is really against the United States, and therefore barred by
sovereign immunity, overlaps with merits question of whether members of commission acted
outside their lawful authority); Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U.S. 102, 110 (1912)
(noting that the frivolity of the federal question, on appeal from a state court to the United
States Supreme Court, would, in principle, justify both judgment of affirmance and order of
dismissal); Kibbe v. Benson, 84 U.S. 264, 268 (1873) (holding that jurisdiction to obtain
relief in a court of equity can depend on establishing facts showing that claimant comes
within rules giving relief in equity against judgments at law; that question is "identical with
the question on the merits"); United States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 991 (2d Cir. 1989) (opining that jurisdiction to hear government appeal of criminal sentences for crimes begun before
effective date of new Sentencing Guidelines, but completed after that date, turns on when
offenses were committed for purposes of the Guidelines, which is also an issue on the merits).
123. This basis for long-arm jurisdiction is usually referred to as "specific jurisdiction." It
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tract between the parties-an issue usually identified as going to the

"merits"-it might incidently dispose of its jurisdiction."2 Similarly
interesting configurations of jurisdictional and merits issues have occurred in, for example, administrative law," labor law," 6 and

worker's compensation law."
Overlap between jurisdiction and the merits can also occur when
some given element of a cause of action is, for one reason or an-

other, elevated to jurisdictional status. A paradigm instance is federal
sovereign immunity which, as usually formulated, is a question that
relates both to jurisdiction and to the merits.'

is distinguished from "general jurisdiction" which is grounded in contacts between the defendant and the state that are more substantial, but not necessarily related to the specific lawsuit.
See generally Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV.
723 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610
(1988).
This distinction between "general" and "specific" grounds for long-arm jurisdiction
should not be confused with the distinction, drawn earlier between courts of "general" and
"specific" jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
124. See, e.g., Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1309-10 (Utah 1980); c
id. at 1313 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[]he majority decides the jurisdictional issue by, in effect, deciding the substantive issue of the existence of the alleged contract. I think it is inappropriate to decide the merits of a case on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.").
125. Often, statutory schemes in administrative law will give one or another court jurisdiction to review only agency action that falls under a certain rubric. And, sometimes, deciding whether the action fell under that rubric will involve the same inquiry as that involved in
deciding whether the action was reversible on the merits. See, e.g., Alabama Tissue Ctr. of
the Univ. of Alabama Health Serv. Found., P.C. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 379 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that a federal court of appeal had jurisdiction to review "regulations" of administrative agency issues, but not the agency's "interpretations" of existing statutes or regulations; determining whether act in question was a "regulation" or an "interpretation" depended
on merits-related inquiry, also dispositive of the merits, into whether it was consistent with
prior agency enactments); Williams v. Department of Agric., 832 F.2d 1259, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (concluding that right of Merit Systems Protection Board to review federal worker's
job resignation depended on whether resignation was voluntary or involuntary, an issue that
was "inextricably intertwined" with the merits of the worker's claim against the agency).
126. See, e.g., The Careau Group v. United Farm Workers of Am., 940 F.2d 1291, 1293
(9th Cir. 1991).
127. See, e.g., Bonner v. Minico, Inc., 766 P.2d 598, 605-06 (Ariz. 1988).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1975) (stating that when the
United States consents to be sued, "the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define
that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586 (1941)).
Immunity issues more generally illustrate the range of ways in which jurisdiction and
the merits can be juxtaposed. Federal sovereign immunity, as noted, implicates both jurisdiction and the merits. State and foreign sovereign immunity questions, on the other hand, when
considered by federal courts, usually raise only jurisdictional issues, without implicating the
merits of the lawsuit in a foreign or state forum. At the other end of the spectrum, ordinary,
non-sovereign forms of immunity, such as charitable immunity, generally raise only merits
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Even when elements of the two questions are not identical, they

can be related. The existence of federal question jurisdiction, for
example, does not require that a federal cause of action exist, but it
does require that there be at least a colorable claim to such a cause
of action. 9 Similarly, some state courts interpreting long-arm stat-

utes grounding jurisdiction in a defendant's "tortious acts" have held
that the exercise of jurisdiction does not depend on proving an actual

tort, but only on a prima facie showing of one, 3 or on showing an
act or omission in the state that might colorably be a tort.'

issues.
129. The classic case is Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946):
Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might

fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is
well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment
on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. . . . [But] a suit
may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim . . .
clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.
Id. at 682-83. But cf. id. at 683 (noting that "[tihe accuracy of calling these dismissals
jurisdictional has been questioned"); Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 102 S.Ct.
1032, 1034-35 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that distinction drawn in Bell v. Hood is in tension with scheme contemplated by FED. R. Civ. P. 12).
For more recent cases confirming the doctrine of Bell v. Hood, see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 768 (1993); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536 (1974) (considering related question of District Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) to hear suits claiming "deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States"); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,
666-67 (1974).
There are significant practical differences in this context between dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction and dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Most obviously, dismissal for
want of jurisdiction will have fewer preclusive effects on subsequent claims. See generally
supra part Ill.A.2.e. This might suggest that plaintiffs would favor jurisdictional to merits
dismissals. But perhaps more importantly, if a federal court dismisses a particular federal
claim on the merits, but not for want of jurisdiction, the court might still be able to hear
"pendent" claims, based on state or other federal law, that would not alone provide the court
with jurisdiction. See Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 768; Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804, 817 n.15 (1986); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-64 (1974).
130. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982); Texair Flyers, Inc.
v. Dist. CL, 506 P.2d 367, 369-70 (Colo. 1973).
131. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673 (Il1.1957) (leading case):
The jurisdictional fact, in the language of [the statute], is "the commission of a
tortious act within this State." The word "tortious" can, of course, be used to describe conduct that subjects the actor to tort liability. For its own purposes the
Restatement so uses it. Restatement, Torts, § 6. It does not follow, however, that
the word must have that meaning in a statute that is concerned with jurisdictional
limits. To so hold would be to make the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the
outcome of a trial on the merits. There is no indication that the General Assembly
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The convergence of jurisdictional and merits issues is, in an
important sense, awkward for legal doctrine and the legal culture. It
can also raise complicated conceptual and procedural issues. Should,

for example, factual issues relevant to both jurisdiction and the merits
be decided by judge or jury?'32 In a related vein, should factual
findings made in the course of hearing a jurisdictional challenge be
binding on the parties at trial? 33 If such convergence were ordinary

rather than extraordinary, it would be even more awkward, which is
surely one reason for doctrines such as that I just described for federal question jurisdiction and state long-arm jurisdiction, which separate
jurisdiction and the merits even as they acknowledge their relationship.
But, for our purposes, it bears emphasis that all this is a matter
of nuance rather than absolutes, instinct as much as logic. There is
nothing inherent in the idea of jurisdiction that requires jurisdictional
issues to be formal, simple, or merits-independent.
g. Jurisdiction at the Threshold, and Beyond
Questions of jurisdiction usually come into play at the threshold
of a proceeding." 4 But not always. The typical jurisdictional question is whether a court has the power to hear a case. However, another proper jurisdictional question is whether a court that does have
power to hear a case also has the power to do a particular thing in
the case. Classic doctrine captured this issue under the rubric of "ex-

cess of jurisdiction." 3 ' Thus, a city court whose jurisdiction only

intended a result so unusual. The essential question in cases of this type is where
the action is to be tried. Once it has been determined that the relationship of the
defendant to the State is sufficient to warrant trial here, we are of the opinion that
the court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the controversy, and that its
jurisdiction will not be destroyed by its exercise.
Id. at 680; Hanson v. Murphy, 491 P.2d 551 (Kan. 1971) (citing cases).
132. For thorough discussions, see Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Bonner v.
Minico, Inc., 766 P.2d 598 (Ariz. 1988).
133. See, e.g., Hanson, 491 P.2d at 555-56.
134. Cf. Grevemborg v. Bradford, 10 So. 786 (La. 1892); Denver Brick Mfg. Co. v.
McAllister, 6 Colo. 326 (1882).
135. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 485 (1887); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163
(1873); In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273, 280 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (quoting Abelleira v. Dist.
Court of Appeal, 109 P.2d 942, 948 (Cal. 1941)).
The classical expression of the doctrine of excess of jurisdiction occurs in Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876):
The doctrine invoked by counsel, that, where a court has once acquired jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its
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extends to awards under $10,000 that issues a judgment for $20,000
might be acting beyond its jurisdiction." So might a court that
hands down a criminal sentence not authorized by law. 37 Thus, a

judgment, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is undoubtedly correct
as a general proposition, but, like all general propositions, is subject to many qualifications in its application. All courts, even the highest, are more or less limited
in their jurisdiction: they are limited to particular classes of actions, such as civil
or criminal; or to particular modes of administering relief, such as legal or equitable; or to transactions of a special character, such as arise on navigable waters, or
relate to the testamentary disposition of estates; or to the use of particular process
in the enforcement of their judgments. . . . Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject-matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its
modes of procedure, and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act
judicially in all things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by the law.
If, for instance, the action be upon a money demand, the court, notwithstanding its
complete jurisdiction over the subject and parties, has no power to pass judgment
of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a libel
or personal tort, the court cannot order in the case a specific performance of a
contract. If the action be for the possession of real property, the court is powerless
to admit in the case the probate of a will. Instances of this kind show that the
general doctrine stated by counsel is subject to many qualifications. The judgments
mentioned, given in the cases supposed, would not be merely erroneous: they
would be absolutely void; because the court in rendering them would transcend the
limits of its authority in those cases.
l. at 282 (citation omitted). See generally BAILEY, supra note 54, §§ 22-29 (discussing
excess of jurisdiction).
136. See, e.g., White v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc., 372 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1979):
mhe test for jurisdiction [of the county court] is twofold. In the first instance, the
good faith demand of the plaintiff at the time of instituting suit determines the
ability of the particular court to entertain the action. However, notwithstanding the
bona fides of the plaintiff's demand at the time of institution of suit, as a matter
of judicial power the county court is precluded from entering a judgment for damages in excess of its mandated jurisdiction. Although appellant met the first test
and his action was cognizable in county court, that same court was without judicial
power to enter a judgment in excess of [its maximum jurisdictional amount].
Id at 84; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sutton, 44 So. 946, 947 (Fla. 1907) ("[T]he jurisdiction
of the county judge is determined by the actual demand made or the actual damages claimed.
A judgment entered for an amount in excess of the amount over which the court has jurisdiction is void."); Zimmer v. Schindehette, 262 N.W. 379, 380 (Mich. 1935) (holding judgment rendered by justice of the peace in excess of statutory maximum held void in excess of
jurisdiction). But cf., e.g., Johnson v. Washburn, 19 N.W.2d 563 (Neb. 1945) (stating that if
amount claimed was within jurisdiction of county court at time action was brought, fact that
interest accruing before final judgment inceased amount to more than jurisdictional limit did
not defeat jurisdiction).
137. See, e.g., In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894); Homer v. Webb, 141 P.2d 151
(Wash. 1943). For a landmark case that both affirmed and finessed the relevance of the doctrine of excess jurisdiction to criminal sentences, see Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873). As
I explain in the next paragraph of the text, much of the concern for "excess of jurisdiction"
in criminal law has been subsumed, in modem law, by the expansion of habeas corpus doctrine. Nevertheless, some contemporary doctrine does continue to employ the rubric of "excess
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court with jurisdiction has the right to be wrong, but only while it
continues to act within its jurisdiction.
I reported above that nineteenth century American habeas corpus
law was usually couched in jurisdictional terms. I might have added

that a favorite theme in that doctrine was excess of jurisdiction. As
the doctrine evolved, it developed that almost any serious constitu-

tional violation constituted a judicial act in excess of jurisdiction.'
Eventually, the courts dropped the jurisdictional rubric entirely.'39
Similarly, modem British administrative law often employs the pre-

tense that whenever an administrative agency commits an error of
law, it is exceeding its jurisdiction.""4 But when appeals courts applied the same principle to control judicial behavior, the House of
Lords squelched the effort, noting sheepishly that administrative agencies were simply different. 4 '
The lesson here is that, much like the occasional overlap between jurisdiction and the merits just discussed, the doctrine of excess
of jurisdiction risks erasing any useful distinction between jurisdictional and other issues. The challenge, in making sense of the notion

of excess of jurisdiction, is to draw sensible, intellectually respectable
lines between abuses of jurisdiction and mere errors of law. But this
task is no different, in principle, from the similarly difficult job of
drawing sensible lines between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
issues at the threshold of a case. 42

of jurisdiction." See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.100 (1994) (statutory time limit on collateral attacks in criminal cases not applicable, inter alia, to defeat claim that "sentence imposed was in excess of the court's jurisdiction"); In re Harris, 855 P.2d 391, 407 (Cal.

1993):
The rule requiring a habeas corpus petitioner to justify any substantial delay in
raising a claim, however, is inapplicable to a claim, as here, of sentencing error
amounting to an excess of jurisdiction. An appellate court may "correct a sentence
that is not authorized by law whenever the error comes to the attention of the
court"

Id. at 407 (quoting In re Ricky H., 636 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1981)).
138. For general historical background information related to these developments, see
supra note 80.
139. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).
140. The classic case is Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n., [1969] 2
App. Cas. 147 (appeal taken from A.C.). See generally WADE, supra note 81, at 260-72.
141. In re Racal Communications Ltd., [1981] App. Cas. 374 (appeal taken from A.C.).
142. Nothing in the Idea of Jurisdiction, incidentally, implies that there is, or should be,
a general abstract method or fundamental algorithm for identifying which issues are jurisdictional, and which are nonjurisdictional in the first instance. In fact, the line between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues seems, at least partly, a product of specific doctrinal, historical, and political contingencies. I suggest that this does not, however, compromise either

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

3. Alternatives
In broad outline, this is the Idea of Jurisdiction. As should be
expected, the actual course of the doctrine, even in the nineteenth
century, was more complicated. Specifics varied over time and in
different forums. The doctrine was sometimes open to considerations
of degree. Like all doctrines, it also had its contradictions and inconsistencies. To some extent, courts manipulated it to achieve specific
ends.
Nevertheless, the law's understanding of jurisdiction and
jurisdictionality remained bound to, and for that matter still speaks the
language of, a powerful, unified conception. That conception runs
counter, in its basic commitments, to any number of other paths open
to the legal imagination.
A more managerial or bureaucratic account of jurisdictionality,
for example, would emphasize not the grants of power that define
individual courts, but their institutional connections in a unitary, pyramidal decision machine. This view, for example, would want to
treat collateral attack as nothing more than a species of appeal.' It
would also deem at least incomplete the notion that the authority of a
lowly state trial court is more "general" than that of the United States
Supreme Court.
Similarly, a more behavioralist or "legal realist" account would
want to treat "jurisdiction" as only a label attached to certain legal
rules, carrying with it certain consequences, but not any deeper meaning. In this view, "actual" or operative jurisdiction, so to speak,
would attach to judges, not by virtue of specific grants of power, but
by virtue of their assigned role in society. And real judicial authority,
as in Richard Posner's recent formulation, would be "limited only by
the diffuse outer bounds of professional propriety and moral

the integrity or the utility of the Idea of Jurisdiction as a picture of the consequences of
drawing that line.
143. This view has become particularly influential in discussions of habeas corpus and
similar remedies in criminal procedure. As Professor Kate Stith states the standard view; "In
addition to direct appeal, state and federal collateral review is available to a defendant, for
instance on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Collateral review operates similarly to
direct appeal, in effect permitting additional stages of appellate review of criminal cases."
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry

in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHt. L. REv. 1, 4 n.7 (1990) (citing JAMEs LIEBMAN, FEDERAL. HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 386-88 (1988)); cf.supra text accompanying
notes 138-39 (discussing development of habeas doctrine).
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consensus."''JA
Finally, a more insistently statist view of jurisdiction would treat
it as "simply ancillary to the authority 1of
the sovereign and derivative
45
from the very concept of sovereignty."
These alternative imaginings of jurisdiction and jurisdictionality
have, in either pure or diluted form, influenced much recent academic
writing about jurisdiction.1" They have also made inroads into judicial doctrine, as I will discuss in more detail later. 47 The question
for the moment, however, is what the Idea of Jurisdiction, in all its
original robust particularity, might entail for the construction of jurisdictional time limits. That is the issue to which I now want to turn.
B. The Argument in Full
Part of the answer is easy. Jurisdictional time limits should not
be waivable by the parties. Nor should they be waivable at the (affirmative) discretion of the court. These are not trivial results. But neither do they amount to requiring that courts always interpret jurisdictional time limits rigidly and literally. Is there more?
The remainder of this part of the Article largely looks at whether
there are subtler grounds for the modem doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits. It asks whether the Idea of Jurisdiction, or some related
legal or jurisprudential notion, justifies the doctrine. Some of the
arguments discussed here are attractive. Some find support in bits of
history. But I propose that, whether singly or as a group, they do not
justify the present shape of the doctrine.
1. A Semantic Prologue: Are "Jurisdictional Time
Limits" Necessarily "Jurisdictional?"
Before diving in, though, I need to consider one possibility that,
if it proved correct, might make much of this problem disappear.
Maybe the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is not an analytic
claim at all, but only a semantic usage. That is to say, maybe the
word "jurisdictional" has more than one meaning. As used in the
phrase "jurisdictional time limit," the word might just mean "literal"

144. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 457 (1990).

145. Cover, supra note 69, at 54 n.147 (describing, without endorsing, the "all-encompassing" statist claims of Thomas Hobbes in LEvIATHAN, ch XXVI, at 211-12 (W. Smith ed.,

1909)).
146. See supra note 18 (citing examples).
147. See infra part IV.B.2.
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or "unqualified" or "peremptory" or some such thing. And that definition might be distinct from the sense of the word in the doctrines
associated with the Idea of Jurisdiction. A time limit could be "juris-

dictional" in the sense of being literal or peremptory whether or not

it was jurisdictional in the general sense, and vice versa. 4 '
Of course, even if "jurisdictional" had two--or even
more-distinct senses, that would not be the end of it. Surely, these
two senses would not be strict homonyms-etymologically unrelated
words that happen to look and sound the same, like cleave, which
means both "split or separate" and "adhere or cling."'49 At best, the
senses of "jurisdictional" would be quasi-homonyms 50 like sanction, whose distinct senses--"permission" and "penalty"-have a

common, if archaic, connection.' If that were true, though, it
would still matter what that connection is, just as it matters, slightly,
that the root idea of sanction-as-permission and sanction-as-penalty is
sanctification.'
As likely, though, the various uses of "jurisdictional," if there are

various uses, would stand in an even more uneasy relation to each
other. They are neither homonyms, nor even quasi-homonyms, but

rather examples of polysemy-alternative, possibly competing, defini-

148. Professor Moore has made at least a weak version of this claim in distinguishing
between jurisdictional time limits and questions of subject-matter jurisdiction:
Mandatory preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction are often spoken of as
jurisdictional . . . in the sense that absent compliance, the court can acquire no
jurisdiction of the cause, though otherwise it is a case within its subject matter
jurisdiction ....
. . . In recent years the Supreme Court has been aware of the distinction
between [subject matter] jurisdiction and the "jurisdictional" nature of [Federal]
Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 4(a), placing quotation marks around the term in the
latter usage. But the courts of appeals must obey the mandatory provisions of the
rules whether they are referred to as jurisdictional, "mandatory and jurisdictional",
or merely mandatory. How punctilious they must be lies with the Supreme Court.
Hall, supra note 7, at 408-09 (quoting 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
204.02[2] (2d ed. 1986).
PRACTICE
149. "Cleave" as "split or separate" derives from the Old English "cleofan." "Cleave" as
"adhere" derives from the Old High German "chleben." It is etymologically related to "clay."
150. For an account of the distinction between strict homonyms and quasi-homonyms, see
generally LOUISE ELLYSON, A DICTIONARY OF HOMONYMS (rev. ed. 1981).
151. Both, nearly opposite, senses of the word derive from the Latin root "sancire"-to
make holy. A "sanction" was originally an ecclesiastical decree.
See also WILSON FOLLErr, MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 285 (Jacques Barzun ed.,
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. 1970) (1966); William Satire, Playing in Pretoria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 1985, §6, at 8 ("On Language" column).
152. See supra note 151.
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tions of the same word.'

That, in turn, suggests a more serious set

of concerns."
Consider the multiple definitions of terms like "substantive" and

"procedural."'55 In one definition, a rule of law is substantive if it is
outcome-determinative. 6 In another definition, it is substantive if it
governs primary behavior rather than the mechanics of adjudication.'57 These definitions overlap, but are not identical. Different le-

153. For the distinction between polysemy and homonymy, see generally DAVID CRYSTAL, CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE 106 (1987); JOHN LYONS, LANGUAGE, MEANING, CONTExT 45-47 (1981).
For a philosophical caveat against disposing of ambiguities too easily by such lexicographical expedients as the distinction between polysomy and homonymy, see WILLARD V.
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT § 27, at 129-30 (1960).
154. The discussion that follows here in text can only scratch the surface of deep and
important issues in philosophy of language. For some classic sources, see MAx BLACK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY (1949); C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING
(1923); QtINE, supra note 153; LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958); Michael Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 151 (1981).
I do not mean to suggest that true or quasi-homonyms raise no problems of their
own. Quine cites the delicious ambiguity between the two homonymous forms of the word
"bore" in the sentence "Our mothers bore us." QUINE, supra note 153, § 27, at 129. He also
cites the ambiguity in the word "light." which can refer to weight, color, size, and many
other things. The confusion created by "light," after its exploitation by the marketing industry,
created the need for regulatory intervention:
"Low fat." "No cholesterol." "High in oat bran." "Light:' And don't forget "lite"
Until now, many of these claims have been nothing more than advertising
hype. The public has been misled with products like the "light" vegetable oil that
was just light in color and the "lite" cheesecake that was just light in texture.
But with the publication of new food labeling regulations in January 1993,
the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) address the problem of misleading nutrition
claims and help reestablish the credibility of the food label. The regulations spell
out which nutrient content claims are allowed and under what circumstances they
can be used.
Dori Stehlin, A Little 'Lite' Reading, 27 FDA CONSUMER, June 1993, at 12.
155. See generally WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFucr OF
LAWS 154 (1942); IA [Pt. 2] MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 18,
0.306, at 303053; Dane, supra note 113, at 1207 n.62; D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure"
Revisited, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982).
156. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745-47 (1980); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
157. In the classic formulation, substantive law creates or defines rights and duties in the
world, and procedural law provides the judicial machinery by which the substantive law is
determined, enforced, or made effective. See, e.g., State v. Birmingham, 392 P.2d 775, 776
(Ariz. 1964); State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1969); Thorp v. Casey's General Stores,
Inc., 446 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1989); Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486, 491
(Iowa 1985); State ex rel. Turner v. Limbrecht, 246 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1976);
Bullington v. Angel, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (N.C. 1941); Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 593-94
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gal contexts use one or another of them. And courts and commentators now generally recognize that a rule of law can be substantive
for certain purposes, such as choice of law, and procedural for other
purposes, such as the Erie doctrine.'
That might suggest that the
issue is only semantic. But the line between genuinely contestable
meaning and pure semantics is notoriously fuzzy.'
So here. The
distinct meanings of "substantive" and "procedural" come out of a
history of real theoretical conflict or confusion." They still rest, in
part, on different assumptions about the nature of law and legal
rights. That these words are now conventionally used in different
ways in different contexts is in part a semantic armistice to that conflict. But it does not mean that the conflict has gone away or been
rendered purely semantic.' It does not even mean that the conflict

might not still be resolved.

Something similar might be going on

with the word "jurisdictional."
Thus, if it did turn out that "jurisdictional," like "substantive" or

"procedural," had different meanings in different contexts, and that a
rule of law could be jurisdictional in one sense but not in another,
there would still be a problem and a puzzle to solve.
Nevertheless, such a conclusion would at least remove the urgen-

cy from this discussion. It would certainly remove the exasperation.

And it might demand a very different article than the one I

(Utah 1948).
158. For scholarly discussion, see the sources cited supra note 155. For cases explicitly
recognizing the multiple meanings of the substance/procedure distinction, see Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726-29 (1988); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 754-56 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Whiteside v. New Castle Mut. Ins. Co., 595 F.
Supp. 1096, 1100 (D. Del. 1984).
159. See sources cited supra note 154; cf Steven Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1149 (1989)
("Where the relativist sees contextualism, the objectivist sees homonymy: 'different' words
that sound the same but have disparate meanings. The experientialist, however, understands
this to be polysemy: many usages for the same word that are related to each other by a
common model or central case.").
160. See generally Risinger, supra note 155.
161. But cf OGDEN & RICHARDS, supra note 154 (generally championing an extreme
nominalism that would cast many fundamental disputes as merely semantic).
162. This might turn on whether the meaning of these terms is not only contestable, but
"essentially contestable." See generally W.B. Gallic, Essentially Contested Concepts,
56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTO'rTIAN SOcIETY 167 (Harrison & Sons Ltd., 1956).
163. Cf. Kimble v. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 1978) (certification of
class in civil rights suit does not itself demonstrate existence of the sort of "class-based
animus" required under the statute).
There is a community of interest in this group that warrants treating it as a class
for purposes of a class action. But the only characteristic this class shares is that
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am writing.
Unfortunately, though, the semantic usage hypothesis does not fit
the facts. A handful of cases suggest that the word jurisdictional can
just mean literal or peremptory, 164 or that it can serve "as a policy
label, marking off the indispensable from the dispensable,"'65 and
that a rule of law can be jurisdictional in that sense without neces-

sarily being jurisdictional in other senses.Y But only a handful. 6

of making a claim; this makes it a class within the meaning of that word as used
in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It does not follow, however,
that animus against such a group can be considered class-based. They share no
other trait-racial, religious, ethnic, sexual, geographic, or economic.
The coincidence that the single word, "class", is used to describe both
dnds of groups cannot justify converting a homonym into a legal identity of the
different meanings.
Id. at 274.
164. See, e.g., Stelpflug v. Federal Land Bank, 790 F.2d 47, 49 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986)
(noting that "[m]andatory preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction are often spoken of as
jurisdictional, however, in the sense that absent compliance, the court can acquire no jurisdiction of the cause .. " (quoting 9 MOORE Er AL., supra note 18, 204.02[2], at 4-14)); see
also Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1982):
Federal courts have frequently referred to Title VII's time limitations on
litigation-initiation, whether done administratively or judicially, as "jurisdictional"
prerequisites. This undoubtedly explains why both the movant and the District
Court deemed untimeliness a default auguring jurisdictional consequences. Usually,
however, the cases have left considerable uncertainty as to the precise meaning
which in the particular context the court intended to ascribe to the oft-repeated
word 'jurisdictional," and any assimilation to subject-matter jurisdiction generally
has been highly ambiguous at best. But seldom have Title VII's time limitations
plainly been considered jurisdictional in the sense that nonobservance robs the court
of authority to hear and resolve the plaintiffs claim. To the extent that our own
"jurisdictional" characterizations of those limitations have been revealing at all, they
are irreconcilable with the notion that subject-matter jurisdiction was affected in the
least.
Id. at 364-65 (Robinson, CJ., concurring opinion) (footnotes omitted); Barnett v. Department
of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1159 (D.C. 1985); Bailey v. SWCC, 296 S.E.2d 901,
904-05 (WV.Va. 1982) (discussing in detail history of the characterization of time limits in
Worker's Compensation Act as "jurisdictional."); cf. Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 625 F.2d
521, 522 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (describing a timeliness requirement as a "mandatory precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction").
165. Grubb v. Wurtland Water Dist., 384 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. 1964).
166. See, e.g., Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 934 F.2d
327, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (dictum) ("The term 'jurisdiction,' . . . -an 'all-purpose word denoting adjudicatory power'-bears different meanings in
different contexts. Sometimes, for example, characterizing a provision as 'jurisdictional' implies that a court cannot temper the application of the provision through otherwise available
equitable doctrines such as waiver, tolling, and estoppel:") (citations omitted); Goins v. Southem Pac. Co., 198 F. 432, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1912) (notice requirement can be "jurisdictional,"
in the sense of being a mandatory and unequivocal requirement, though not "jurisdictional" in
the sense of not being waivable).
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More common, admittedly, is a complicated ambivalence or
confusion that might provide indirect support to the linguistic hypothesis. Not infrequently, for example, courts trying to make sense of
time limits will put quotation marks around the word 'jurisdictional,"
or otherwise mark their uneasiness. 6 Sometimes, as noted earlier,
they will treat it as one half of the legal doublet "mandatory and
jurisdictional."
Moreover, at least some cases seem to assume that peremptory
time limits are jurisdictional, rather than the other way around. Thus,
for example, the Shendock case discussed in part II began its analysis
with this apparently definitional pronouncement:
When Congress intends the [time limit] to be a mandatory
condition upon the availability of the judicial remedy of review, the
statutory provisions relating to the time and place of filing are
termed "jurisdictional." If, on the other hand, Congress intends to
grant us discretion to consider the particular circumstances surrounding the efforts of the party seeking review to meet the statute's
requirements, the provisions are treated as a statute of limitations

Less to the point of the present discussion, some courts have distinguished between
jurisdictional time limits and questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pinion v. Dow
Chem. U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522 (l1th Cir. 1991):
We note that the requirement that a notice of appeal be timely filed is not 'jurisdictiona" in the sense of subject matter jurisdiction, since such time limits and the
circumstances for extending them are fixed by the Rules, which Fed. R. App. P.
1(b) declares are not to be construed to extend or limit our jurisdiction as established by law. See 9 Moore's Federal Practice 204.02[2] at 4-14. As mandatory
preconditions to our exercise of jurisdiction, however, filing rules like Rule 4(a)
are "jurisdictional" in the sense that, absent compliance, we can acquire no jurisdiction of the cause even if it is otherwise within our competence.
Id. at 1525 n.3 (citation omitted); Curacao Drydock Co. v. M/V Akritas, 710 F.2d 204, 20607 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ford, 627 F.2d 807, 809 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 923 (1980); Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 625 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1980).
167. Other cases hold that the word 'jurisdictional" can have several meanings, but not
in a sense directly relevant to the discussion here. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987); Martin v. Luther, 689 F.2d 109, 115-16
(7th Cir. 1982).
Note that the discussion here concerns the possibility that the word jurisdiction might
have more than one meaning or attach to more than one concept. A very different set of
issues is raised by suggestions that the concept of jurisdiction, though unitary, might be a
matter of degree, or that an issue might be jurisdictional for some purposes and not for
others. This possibility has arisen acutely, for example, in cases involving the doctrine of the
Eleventh Amendment. See generally ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTON § 7.3
(1989).
168. For discussions of this practice, see Bailey v. SWCC, 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va.
1982); 9 MoOR Er AL., supra note 18,
204.02[2]; Hall, supra note 7, at 409; see also
infra note 177.
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that can be tolled when principles of equity would make their rigid
application unfair."6
Even more revealing, courts often focus their inquiry directly on

whether the time limit at issue is best construed as literal and peremptory, rather than on whether it is "jurisdictional." Jurisdictionality
enters as a label, but is not itself the object of analysis.
This can happen in the course of a single case. A recent Supreme Court opinion provides an extreme but telling example. The

decision began by reporting a lower court holding that a given time
limit "operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit."'

the issue

as

whether

late-filed

claims

were

0

It then framed

"jurisdictionally

barred.'' The Court concluded that the time bar was subject to
tolling and not absolute. But it never thought it necessary to say, in

so many words, that the time limit was not jurisdictional. In the
course of the opinion, the question of jurisdictionality-even the language of jurisdictionality-eventually just dropped out. 7
Something similar can happen across a line of cases. An early
decision in the line will find, as a matter of ordinary textual construction, that a rule of law is peremptory. The case makes no mention of

whether the time limit is "jurisdictional." Later cases in the line,
however, will call the rule "jurisdictional" without more analysis.
They will even report that to have been the holding of the earlier

opinions."

169. Shendock v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d
Cir. 1990).
170. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
171. Id. at-457.
172. See id. at 456-57. The Court's actual holding was that when Congress has waived
sovereign immunity, "the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits
against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States." Id. at 457;
see also id. at 458-60 (white, J., concurring) (arguing that equitable toliing should not be
available, but not resorting to language of jurisdictionality); id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Lower courts have interpreted Irwin in various lights. For example, compare Lyon v.
Brown, No. 93-1982, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 6934 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Irwin for the proposition that "statutory time limits in suits against the government are not jurisdictional") with
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1572 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (dictum)
(opining that "Irwin merely holds that those time limits, while jurisdictional, can be equitably
tolled in certain circumstances"). For further particularly interesting discussions, see the debate
between the concurring and dissenting opinions in Wood-Ivey Sys. Corp. v. United States, 4
F.3d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 298-306 (discussing aspects of historical development of doctrine of jurisdictional time limits).
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Yet, in the end, none of this saves the day. Judicial language or

behavior might sometimes seem to support the homonym hypothesis.
But, with the few exceptions already noted, courts will, when they
get down to it, treat jurisdictionality as a single idea."

In Shendock, for example, the court concluded that the rule it
was interpreting was "jurisdictional" rather than a mere statute of
limitations because Congress chose to call it "jurisdictional."'75 But

if the term "jurisdictional" really had more than one distinct meaning,
this would be no proof at all. Similarly, in Zipes, the Court concluded

that the time limit with which it was dealing was not jurisdictional, in
part because it did not appear in the section of the statute granting

the district courts jurisdiction under Title VII and did not "speak in
jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the
district courts." 76
Then there is the clincher, the most revealing piece of evidence
against the homonymy or semantic hypothesis: Courts have, without
much reluctance, extended the chain of inference out the other end,
so to speak. They have concluded that because a rule of law is "juris-

dictional" in the time-bar sense, it is also "jurisdictional" in other
senses. Thus, for example, courts have held that dismissal on a mere

statute of limitations is "on the merits" while dismissal on a "jurisdict
tional"-which is to say peremptory or literal-time limit is not. 7
174. They are also perfectly happy interpreting a time limit strictly or literally, but declining to go so far as to call it jurisdictional. See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493
U.S. 20 (1989) (applying time limit literally on other grounds, and holding that there is
therefore no need to determine if the time limit is also "jurisdictional").
175. Shendock v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462-63
(3d Cir. 1990).
176. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982); see also Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 851 F.2d 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
177. See, e.g., Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983). The language
in the opinion is worth quoting, particularly for its brief flirtation with, and then rejection of,
something like a homonymy analysis:
Dismissals for want of jurisdiction are not decisions on the merits, while
those based on limitations are ....
. . . Based on [Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982)],
we hold that the timely filing requirements of Title VII are to be treated as limitations periods for all purposes. Zipes clearly holds that these requirements are not
jurisdictional . .. . This leaves us only the choice between viewing them as either
sui generis--subject to waiver and to equitable tolling, but nevertheless not merits
adjudications for purposes for the preclusion doctrines. We see no reason to reach
the second--as it seems to us-bizarre result, especially in view of Zipes' entire
failure to envision it and its repeated analogizing of these provisions to "limitations
periods." Perhaps the quotation marks there applied by the Court are meant as
anchors to windward; if so, it is for the Court to navigate any narrow channel that
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Similarly, courts have held that disobedience of "jurisdictional" time
limits could not be waived,'78 and would have to be raised by a
court sua sponte, 179 and was vulnerable to collateral attack. 180 Even
more intriguingly, they have declined to hold a time limit to be "ju-

risdictionar'--in the sense of peremptory or literal-because that
would then require them to bring to bear the full weight of the Idea
of Jurisdiction."8 '
In sum, the semantic angle to the doctrine of jurisdictional time
limits is not a solution to the problem, but a symptom. If the word
jurisdictional has more than one distinct sense, the legal culture is
hopelessly confused in merging those senses. It is almost as if courts
assumed that every sanctionpermission was also necessarily a

sanctionpunishment. That might make for good tragedy. It would not
make for sound law.
More to the point, the legal culture just sometimes treats the

may remain open, not for those who should attempt to follow the Court's broad
course.

More, dismissals for want of jurisdiction are paradigms of non-merits adjudications; they do not at all regard the merits of an action; instead, they merely
classify that action, whatever its merits, as one on which the court concerned cannot speak. A timebar determination, by contrast, assumes or decides that the court
could have spoken but refuses to do so beyond declaring the claim to be
stale. . . . [S]uch a determination bars not only the stale claim asserted but any
others, though themselves still timely, that are part of the same cause of action.
Id. at 562 (citations omitted).
178. See, e.g., James v. United States, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring in
denial of cert.).
179. See, e.g., Shendock, 893 F.2d at 1466 (quoting Lavallee Northside Civic Ass'n v.
Coastal Zone Management Comm'n, 866 F.2d 616, 625 (3d Cir. 1989)); Brown v. Maine,
426 A.2d 880, 888 (Me. 1981); Hall, supra note 7, at 399 n.l (citing numerous federal cases).
180. See, e.g., Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v. Gundlach, 119 F. Supp. 98
(D. Alaska 1954):
However, I find the District Court has no power or authority, or even discretion in
the matter, to extend the time for appeal and that the statutory time specified is
mandatory and jurisdictional and hence, if an appeal were allowed, any judgment
rendered, in all probability, would be void and subject to collateral attack.
Id. at 99.
181. See, e.g., In re Santos, 112 B.R. 1001, 1006 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (opining that "a
determination that the time limits are jurisdictional would allow a dischargeability judgment to
be collaterally attacked on the grounds of untimeliness at any time, a result clearly at odds
with the purpose of promoting finality and certainty of relief"); cf. Dornfeld v. Julian, 472
N.E.2d 431 (Ill.
1984) (holding time limit contained in Paternity Act to be unconstitutional,
but severable from the rest of the Act; relying for that conclusion on finding that time limit
was not "jurisdictional," which required overruling prior case that had held time limit to be
"jurisdictional" in the peremptory/literal sense).
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doctrine of jurisdictional time limits as if it were simultaneously a
matter of mere semantics and a matter of high principle. Possibly,
this is because it believes the doctrine so compelling analytically that
it might as well be definitional. More likely, the legal culture is only
obscuring its puzzlement with the doctrine by deploying it under a
shield of quotation marks.
2. Ground Rules
The problem of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is, then,
real and not just semantic. And it will take real and not just semantic
arguments to justify it. As I turn now to those arguments, some
points bear reemphasis.
First, remember I am not much interested here in the interpretation of specific time limits. Rather, I am interested in the principles
that should guide their interpretation.
Second, I am not on the whole interested in whether specific
time limits are or are not jurisdictional (in the general sense), or
whether they pose jurisdictional obstacles. Usually, from here on in, I
will assume that they are, and that they do.
Third, I intend to build on, not oppose, the world view of the
Idea of Jurisdiction. The claim here is not that the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is bad because the Idea of Jurisdiction is bad.
Quite the contrary.
Fourth, the arguments here are not the usual arguments for or
against literal interpretation, bright-line rules, or the like. We all know
those arguments. I mentioned some of them earlier. The issue is
whether there are special reasons for treating jurisdictional time limits
different from other rules.
Finally, the goal here is not just to trot out a sundry set of contentions to shoot them down. What I am really getting at is the structure of the thing. One job of this normative analysis is to clear the
way for part IV of the paper, which does try to tell a more satisfactory story about the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. That story,
however, as already noted, turns out to be not a justification, but at
best an explanation. It is less about analysis than about sensibility,
about a legal psyche containing both a certain unity and a good many
contradictions and confusions.
The discussion in this part has four more pieces. The first considers some arguments inspired directly by the logic of the Idea of
Jurisdiction. The second looks at arguments that build on the Idea of
Jurisdiction, but combine it with other concerns and languages. The
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third section considers possible jurisprudential implications of the Idea
of Jurisdiction. The fourth dabbles in a bit of routine functionalism.
Along the way, some themes will recur under different guises. I win
try near the end to give some sense of why that might be.
3. The Logic of Jurisdiction
Courts, even when they do not resort to a semantic dodge, rarely
try to justify the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits explicitly. When
they do, their rhetoric draws directly from the Idea of Jurisdiction.
They speak of power and powerlessness. Jurisdictional time limits,
they say, are about power. Courts are powerless to do anything but
apply them literally and rigidly. Excusing a failure to comply with a
jurisdictional time limit is "possible only when judges are given the
power to excuse. A lack of jurisdiction deprives them of the power.' ' 82 A lack of jurisdiction means "an inability to act, not merely
in unappealing cases, but in compelling cases as well. '8
All this plainly begs the question. What is the content of the
courts' powerlessness in these cases? I do not ask this question in a
legal realist or critical legal sense, which would just mock such
claims of powerlessness. I do believe, as I have said, that jurisdiction
is genuinely about power and powerlessness. But why are courts
powerless to interpret a jurisdictional statute any way other than rigidly and literally?
a. Discretion
One possibility, to which many cases allude, is that the answer
turns on the notion that jurisdictional rules cannot be subject to (affirmative) judicial discretion. Maybe that principle can itself account for
(at least most of) the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. Or maybe
the tempering principles that sometimes attach to non-jurisdictional
time limits would necessarily have to be administered by way of
judicial discretion.
This argument has some attraction. Rubrics such as "excusable
neglect" do have the scent of discretion about them. Moreover, courts
facing at least some of the non-jurisdictional limits on appeal discussed in part II do waive those limits simply as a matter of judicial

182. Shendock v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1465 (3d
Cir. 1990).
183. National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 760 F.2d 1297, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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discretion. They could not do so if the limits were jurisdictional.'
Courts should not treat jurisdictional time limits as they treat, for

example, time limits for filing petitions for certiorari in criminal cases. But that is not the only or the best model. The better comparison
would be to non-jurisdictional time limits that do not allow for merely discretionary waiver. The most obvious examples are ordinary statutes of limitations.
Statutes of limitations, going back to the Statute of James,"'
usually include in their text certain exceptions or tolling rules.'86

Partly for that reason, there is a venerable tradition of not lightly
assuming the existence of other qualifications." s (It would be hard
to guess this from some of the cases contrasting jurisdictional time
limits with "mere statutes of limitations.") There is also precedent to
the contrary.' 8 In any event, when courts have, lightly or not, read

184. Nor would it help to posit that, in these cases, courts do not so much waive the
non-jurisdictional time limits as read into them a power of discretionary extension. True,
many rules setting time limits that are ultimately jurisdictional explicitly allow for discretionary judicial extensions. They might therefore implicitly allow for the same thing. But that is
too easy. I am treating as given here that, whatever the terms of the rule at issue, the jurisdictional line is now drawn. Once that happens, the opportunity for the exercise of discretion
has, by hypothesis, come to an end.
185. An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for Avoiding of Suits in Law, 1623, 21 Jam.
ch. 16 (Eng.). The Statute of James was the first to limit personal actions to a period of
years. See generally WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUrhs OF LltMrATION SAVING STATuraS 7-8 (1978); William W. Blume & BJ. George, Jr., Limitations and the Federal Courts,
49 MICH. L. REV. 937, 964 (1951); Donna A. Boswell, Comment, The Parameters of Federal
Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1447, 1462 (1988). It was the basis for most of the early statutes of limitations adopted
by the American States, and its general form and rubrics remain the dominant model for
such statutes.
186. See, e.g., ARK. CODa ANN. § 16-56-111(a) (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1382-105 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051 (West 1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-7.3
(Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.350
(1988).
187. See, e.g., Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 50 U.S. 522 (1850); Rosen v. Spanierman,
894 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990); Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940); State v.
Whiteman, 526 A.2d 869, 872 (Conn. 1987); Kirwan v. State, 363 A.2d 56 (Conn. 1975);
Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653 (Del. 1987); Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 378 A.2d
1100, 1101 (Md. 1977); Black v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Mo.
1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 920 (1959).
188. See, e.g., Welp v. Department of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Iowa 1983);
Sprung v. Rasmussen, 180 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1970); Bain v. Wallace, 10 P.2d 226 (Wash.
1932).
Interestingly, such cases also often claim to be engaged in "strict construction," i.e.,
narrow construction of the scope of the limitation itself. See, e.g., United States v. St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Manitoba R.R., 247 U.S. 310 (1918); Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook &
Assoc., 241 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1976); see also Van Diest v. Towle, 179 P.2d 984, 989
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additional or more broadly construed qualifications into statutes of

limitations,' 9 they have not claimed to do so simply as a matter of
discretion. Nor have they necessarily relied on discretion in deciding
whether a given qualification, whether explicit or implicit, applies to
a particular case."9 Their tools, besides basic factfinding, have been
the standard methods of legal reasoning and statutory interpretation:
language, logic, structure, purpose, consequences, and prior cases.""'

This is not to warrant that their reasoning has always been good. But
that is not the point.
Nor need we be put off because some provisos to statutes of
limitations are termed "equitable." The original role of the English

chancellor might have been to inject extra-legal, discretionary "conscience" into the law." I will have more to say later about equity
in its philosophical sense. 93 But, as commentators long ago noticed,

the institution of Anglo-American equity-even before the end of
separate equity courts---eventually developed into a body of doctrine

(Colo. 1947) (stating that while statutes of limitations were "formerly looked upon with disfavor and strictly construed, the present judicial attitude is that of liberal construction"). For the
exact opposite understanding of what "strict" construction of a statute of limitations involves,
see Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1992) (commenting that "[a] statute
of limitations is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; therefore, relief from strict construction of a statute of limitations is readily available in extreme cases and gives the court
latitude in a case-by-case analysis"); Former Employees of Terra Resources, Inc. v. United
States, 713 F. Supp. 1433, 1435 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (opining that "protecting the
sovereign's interests warrants strict construction of statutes of limitation" in favor of defendant
United States); State v. Whiteman, 526 A.2d 869, 872 (Conn. 1987) (stating that the policies
that statutes of limitations are significant enough to further their "strict construction" in favor
of those invoking them); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 243 A.2d 745, 750 (R.I. 1968) (noting that
"[i]n those jurisdictions which have pledged to follow the view of strict interpretation [of
statutes of limitations], the courts, recognizing the harshness wrought by its application in
medical malpractice cases, have carved out numerous exceptions to the rule").
As I argue infra text accompanying notes 246-47, whether we call a particular plain
statement rule one of strict construction or liberal construction might not matter very much.
189. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478 (1986) (equitable tolling
in suit against the United States); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (1874) (fraudulent concealment); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1979) (economic duress); Sullivan v.
Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971) (mistake of fact).
190. But see, e.g., Kreges v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d. 656, 661 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that decision whether to equitably toll a statute of limitations is left to the sound discretion
of the district court). Note that, to the extent that some versions of statute of limitations
doctrine do recognize elements of affirmative discretion in the tolling of time bars, I would
not support granting courts the same power over jurisdictional time limits.
191. See generally CALVIN COaIMAN, LIMAIATIONS OF ACTIONS (1991); Recent Developments, Statute of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
192. See sources cited infra note 194.
193. See infra part IV.C.2.
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Equitable remedies are
that was, jurisprudentially, quite "legal."''
more likely than other remedies to be left to (affirmative) judicial
discretion.'95 But equity as 96a whole is by no means synonymous

with that type of discretion.1
There is a larger point here. I said just now that a notion like
"excusable neglect" had the scent of discretion about it. But that is

194. As a contemporary legal historian stated: "By the end of the eighteenth century,
England's chancellors reasoned much the same way as its common-law judges. Analogy, precedent, and rule had largely replaced case-by-case flexibility." PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW's
CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSITrUTIONALISM IN AMERICA

11 (1990).

The classic study of this development is contained in Frederick Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 286 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1913). Equity,
Pollock says,
when it falls into a regular course of official administration, loses its arbitrary
character and gradually assumes all the features of scientific law, becoming, as
Blackstone said a century and a half ago, an artificial system. In technical English
terms, extraordinary jurisdiction ends by being ordinary. So gradual is the change
that it is not altogether easy for the modem student to realize its extent or the
discrepance of the original points of view.
Id. at 287.
Earlier, if partisan, statements of the "legal" character of "equity" are I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1-25 (5th ed. 1849); 3 BLACKSTONB,
CommENTARiES 432; Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sh. & Lefr. R. 428, 429 (1792). There have been
opposing voices on this issue, either arguing that Anglo-American "equity" has remained
fundamentally different from Anglo-American law, or lamenting that it has not. See, e.g.,
Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20 (1905).
For outiines of an argument that the retreat of "equity" back into "law" is both inevitable and salutary, see JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237-38 (1971).
195.

See generally HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY

§ 23 (2d ed. 1948); see also supra note 190.
196. There does remain the possibility that the law of equity admits of more "residual"
discretion than the common law. (For what I mean by "residual" discretion, see supra text
accompanying notes 113-15.) For example:
[the statement that equitable relief cannot be demanded as a matter of right, but is
given in the discretion of the court, is still true with the qualification that the
discretion is not the mere. personal discretion of the chancellor or judge, but is a
judicial discretion, which means that the judge consults precedents to find the
principles, as distinguished from strict rules, which are applicable to a given situation, and then determines, from all of the facts in the case, what relief will best
give effect to the various principles involved.
McCLINTOCK, supra note 195, § 23 (footnotes omitted). Further, "[e]quitable discretion in this
sense is distinguished from the discretion which a common-law, as well as an equity, trial
judge has to make certain rulings on procedural questions which cannot be reviewed unless
the discretion has been abused." Id. at 51 n.16; cf HOFFER, supra note 194, at 18 (assimilating equitable discretion into "the 'gremlin' of interpretation").
To the extent that the "discretion" involved in equity jurisprudence, however, is residual rather than affirmative, that does not distinguish it fundamentally from common law.
Also, residual discretion bears a fundamentally different relation to the Idea of Jurisdiction
than affirmative discretion. See infra part lIt.B.5.b.
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only a prejudice. Virtually any standard can be (affirmatively) discretionary or not, depending on how the law goes about understanding
and implementing it. Take a notion like excusable neglect, treat it as
subject to legal analysis and reasoning-work out some rules, princi-

ples, inferences, and analogies-and it will no longer have the scent
of discretion about it.
Phrased another way, imagine a time limit that, while not allowing for discretionary extensions, did explicitly provide that it would
not apply in the event of excusable neglect. Is there anything that

would prevent the line so drawn from being jurisdictional?'" Admittedly, it would be a complicated, even difficult, jurisdictional line.
But many jurisdictional lines are complicated and difficult. Think of
the well-pleaded complaint rule in federal question jurisdiction.'98
For that matter, think of the whole gamut of questions that make

federal jurisdiction one of the most notoriously difficult courses in the
law school curriculum. Or think of more generic jurisdictional conun-

197. This is not at all far-fetched. Cf. Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir.
1990) (dictum) (explaining that the explicit exceptions to time limits in federal employment
discrimination complaint procedure "would excuse late complaints under most of the same circumstances that such delay would be excused by waiver, estoppel, or tolling," rendering "of
limited practical significance" the question whether the time limit was actually "jurisdictional"), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 1054 (1990).
More generally, consider that in some states, criminal statutes of limitations are considered "jurisdictional," but are also subject to statutory tolling if, for example, the defendant
is a fugitive or is otherwise unavailable. See, e.g., Savage v. Hawkins, 391 S.W.2d 18 (Ark.
1965); People v. Abayhan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 607, 615 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Ansell, 675
P.2d 614, 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
198. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914):
[Wihether a case is one arising under [federal law], in the sense of the jurisdictional statute, ...
must be determined from what necessarily appears in the
plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.
Il at 75-76; see also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (determining grounds for federal question jurisdiction rested on plaintiff's complaint and not the
defendant's anticipated defense).
More recent cases explicating the subtleties of the well-pleaded complaint rule include,
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58 (1987); Merreli Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986);
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
See generally 13B CHARLES A. WRIorT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3566 (2d ed. 1984); Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
812 (1986).
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drums, including the notion of "finality" in the law of appellate
jurisdiction.1 Despite their intricacies, none of these questions (to
the extent they are jurisdictional) are thought of as merely discretion-

ary. Need the law of jurisdictional time limits be any different?'
b. Of Waiver and Estoppel

If the ban on discretion-judicial waiver-does not account for
the breadth of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, maybe the

ban on party waiver does. This possibility is less intuitively obvious,
but a few cases cite it explicitly and it does have some historical and
logical support.

One important rubric for avoiding the literal demands of statutes
of limitations is estoppel. As originally understood, estoppel came into

play when a court-whether an equity or law court-estopped, which
is to say stopped, a defendant from claiming the benefit of the stat-

ute. For example, a party who lulled another into waiting to sue, or
who fraudulently concealed the basis for a cause of action, would not
be allowed in "good conscience"--not only the court's good conscience but his own-to argue the statute of limitations. '
In this sense, estoppel is a form of waiver-an implied or forced
waiver. It is implied in the sense that a party's own behavior deprives
him of the benefit of a legal rule that would otherwise be to his

benefit.'

It is forced in the sense that the court effectively forbids

199. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Connolly v. County
of Orange, 824 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1992). See generally JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 119,
§ 12.4; WsuGHT, supra note 198, §§ 3905-17.
200. For an example of a statute that creates a jurisdictional time limit with exceptions,
though not an exception for excusable neglect, see DEL. SUiPER. Cr. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1) (1991),
which provides:
A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the
judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that
is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three
years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by
the United States Supreme Court.
Id. Obviously, this language raises potentially serious interpretive questions about whether any
particular right is both "newly recognized" and "retroactively applicable." See Robinson v.
State, 584 A.2d 1203 (Del. 1990).
201.
The principle is that where one party has by his representations or his conduct induced the other party to a transaction to give him an advantage which it would be
against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he would not in a court of
justice be permitted to avail himself of that advantage.
Gis v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 234 (1959) (quoting Union Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. 222, 233 (1871)).
202. Bradley v. Gleason Works, 438 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989):
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the party from raising that legal rule.
There, though, is the rub. Jurisdictional time limits, unlike ordi-

nary statutes of limitations, apply even if no party claims their benefit. And they cannot be waived. Therefore, estopping a party from
claiming them-which is to say forcing him to waive them-would

have no effect.
One problem with this argument, of course, is that the rubric of

estoppel only accounts for one subset of the reasons courts have had
for reading the requirements of statutes of limitations flexibly or non-

literally. There are reasons other than fraud or concealment for relaxing or leniently construing a statute of limitations.

Another problem is that some courts have understood even fraud
and concealment and the like, not under the rubric of estoppel, but
more straightforwardly as elements built into the limitation itself. If,

for example, the law reads a statute of limitations to begin running
only on the discovery (not the occurrence) of a set of facts, the

defendant's fraud need not be the basis for anything fancy like "estoppel." It can just be a reason for the statute beginning to run later
rather than earlier.' 3 To the extent that received doctrine cuts off

the possibility of interpreting jurisdictional time limits similarly, it is
unnecessarily conflating the logic of estoppel with the logic of simple

statutory construction.'
This, though, raises a deeper issue. Maybe, just maybe, the two
ways of dealing with fraud and similar contingencies-estoppel and

The doctrine of equitable estoppel, a judicially fashioned exception to the general
rule which provides that statutes of limitation run without interruption . . . "is essentially a doctrine of waiver" which "serves to extend the applicable statute of
limitations-by precluding the defendant from raising the bar of the statute."
Id. at 331 (citations omitted) (quoting Lumber Village, Inc. v. Siegler, 355 N.W.2d 654
(1984)).
203. A similar motif appears in contract law. Some courts still describe detrimental reliance as grounds for estopping a promisor from claiming a lack of consideration to support
his promise; thus the origin of the term "promissory estoppel" Most modem, and many earlier, authorities, though, have simply treated it as a separate substantive ground, alternative to
consideration, for enforcing the promise. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel:
Principlefrom Precedents: I, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1952); Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1984); Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE U. 343 (1969); Charles L. Knapp,
Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 52 (1981); Warren L. Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises - A New Writ?, 35 MCH. L.
REV. 908 (1937).
204. There is at least a surface resemblance between the analysis here and the distinction
drawn infra part IV.C.2 between "Blackstonian" and "Aristotelian" accounts of "equitable"
statutory construction.
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simple statutory construction-really amount to the same thing. That
is, when a court estops a misbehaving party from claiming a statute
of limitations, maybe it is saying, not that the party has "waived" his
rights, but that the statute does not apply to the extent of the misbehavior. Functionally, the identification of estoppel with waiver is
plainly shaky. 5 But even in formal terms (and any friend of the
legal imagination will admit that form is sometimes as important as
function), the law's sense of what is going on might not be what it
might once have been. Estoppel, as the legal culture now experiences
it, is not the act of a court of equity commanding a litigant not to
claim his rights in a court of law. More important, estoppel is not the
intrusion, against a statute of limitations kicking in opposition, of
some extrinsic principle. The application of estoppel is wrapped up in
the statute of limitations itself. It is thought to represent the statute's
best and fairest application to a given case.t' If this is right-even
only sometimes or partly-then the doctrine of jurisdictional time
limits is even more profoundly and misguidedly cutting off possible
avenues of interpretation.
c. The Specter of Bootstraps
The logical nub of both the discretion argument and the estoppel
argument is this: Relaxing the literal terms of a jurisdictional rule
would require a court to use a device that it cannot licitly use unless
it has jurisdiction in the first place. Only courts that have jurisdiction
can exercise discretion. They cannot use discretion to get jurisdiction.
Only courts that have jurisdiction can work an estoppel. They cannot
work an estoppel to get jurisdiction.
This argument falls short, for reasons already stated, for discre-

205. The general notion of waiver is that, in Anglo-American law, the parties control the
shape of litigation and the issues raised for judicial decision. Jurisdictional issues cannot be
waived because they implicate the power or authority of the court, which is one aspect of
the litigation that the parties do not control. The general notion of estoppel, however, understood functionally, is just that certain out-of-court behavior by parties can change a legal
result. But there is nothing in the Idea of Jurisdiction that is inhospitable to this notion. For
that matter, all sorts of jurisdictional rules are necessarily predicated on all sorts of out-ofcourt behavior by parties.
206. To repeat, the issue here is not just functionalist reductionism. A thoroughgoing
reductionist would argue that estoppel never was what it purported to be. On the other hand,
a defender of the legal imagination must be willing to say that, occasionally, form is as
important as function. Here, though, the legal imagination itself no longer believes in the
form. Equity is now more than the conscience of the chancellor, and equitable estoppel is
more than an effort to control the conscience of a litigant.
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tion and estoppel. But maybe it holds the answer in a more general,

less technical, sense. The very effort at non-literal interpretation might
involve some legal operation that is, by its nature, closed off to
courts unless they have jurisdiction in the first place.'
Justice

Black's argument in Teague might contain some hidden step that
amounts to an impermissible bootstrap."es
Something like this claim does seem at work here and I will
have to return to this issue later.' For the present, it seems hard to

pin down what this mysterious, impermissible legal operation would
be. Whatever it is, the fact that it is less doctrinally crisp than discretion or estoppel is not the problem. The Idea of Jurisdiction is itself a
combination of crisp doctrines and evocative images. The doctrine of

jurisdictional time limits might also reflect some metaphor or conviction. The problem, though, is in figuring out what metaphor, or what
conviction.
Courts sometimes plead that they are powerless to add anything
to a jurisdictional provision, or to change it.210 That, however, as-

sumes they know what the dam thing meant to begin with. Courts
also sometimes suggest that to read a jurisdictional time limit in any
way other than literally or less than absolutely is to engage in judicial
legislation. But courts, whenever they refuse to interpret any statute
non-literally or non-absolutely, tend to argue that to do so would be
to engage in judicial legislation. And whenever courts-for whatever
reason-do interpret a statute non-literally or non-absolutely, they just

as vehemently deny that they are engaging in judicial legislation.
207. See, e.g., In re Hanley's Estate, 142 P.2d 423, 424-25 (Cal. 1943). Also, recall the
discussion of Hoxie, supra note 73.
208. The term "bootstrap," in the jurisdictional context, originally arose to describe the
Supreme Court's expansion of the doctrine of "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." The
apparent first use of the term was in Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap
Doctrine, 53 HARV. L. REV. 652 (1946). It was later taken up and canonized by Dan Dobbs,
who was very much in favor of bootstraps, in a series of articles on this and related issues.
See, e.g., Dobbs, Validation of Void Judgments, supra note 18, at 1027; cf. supra note 18
(discussing general trends in scholarship on jurisdiction).
209. See infra part IV.C.3.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Hocking, 841 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that
"time limits define judicial power to act. Courts cannot enlarge their own powers in the
name of equity, and parties who seek aid from the judicial branch must comply strictly with
jurisdictional time limits"); Herrick v. Racine Warehouse & Dock Co., 43 Wis. 93 (Wis.
1877) (holding that a court has "no power to amend the statute by enlarging the time ...
[i.e.,] a court cannot restore its own jurisdiction, lost by statutory limit"); see also Wood-Ivey
Sys. Corp. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("A court may not change a
jurisdictional time period because the statute grants the court no power to act over the matter. This type of time period is mandatory and immutable") (Nies, J.,dissenting).
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Another possible explanation is that courts may not construe
jurisdictional rules purposively."' This argument is not question-begging or rhetorical as the others are, but it is unpersuasive. The claim
is that jurisdictional rules, being about power, somehow transcend
considerations of purpose. Does that mean that those rules do not
have purposes? Or that we should ignore their purposes? Or that
courts can only do purposive interpretation once they have jurisdiction? In any variation, the intuition fades out quickly.
Consider also that if purposive interpretation really were, out of
principle or necessity, illicit for jurisdictional rules, it would have to
be illicit across the board. This would have at least two results. First,
it would bar purposive interpretation for all jurisdictional rules. Maybe time limits can be construed without mention of their purpose. But
what about the substance of subject matter jurisdiction? Imagine deciding the scope of federal question jurisdiction, or bankruptcy jurisdiction, or state claims court jurisdiction, without any reference to the
purpose for which such jurisdiction exists. For that matter, what about
procedural notions such as the final judgment rule or the limits on
personal jurisdiction?
Second, excluding purposive interpretation of jurisdictional time
limits would not only exclude purposive reasons for reading exceptions or qualifications into such time limits, but it also would (at least
in any specific instance) exclude purposive reasons for not doing so.
As noted, courts rarely explicitly justify the doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits."' When they do, they often use the rhetoric of power

and powerlessness.2 3 They also sometimes speak in more purposive,
instrumental terms, reciting the usual litany of reasons for bright-line,
inflexible rules--certainty, incentives, predictability, and so on. As I
have said, these are sound arguments, though it is not clear how they
differ for jurisdictional as against non-jurisdictional time limits. But,
sound or not, these arguments for literalism would have no place in a
211. Cf. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 845 P.2d 559 (Idaho 1992):
Those statutes and rules which fix the time within which procedural rights are to

be asserted are intended to expedite the disposition of causes to the end that justice will not be denied by inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But, except as to

those which are mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations should not be so
applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of causes upon
their substantial merits without delay or prejudice.
Id. at 563 (Bistline, J., specially concurring) (quoting Bunn v. Bunn, 587 P.2d 1245, 1246

(Idaho 1978)).
212. See supra text accompanying note 182.
213. See supra note 210.
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regime of purely mechanical literalism.
Again, this is not to say that jurisdictional statutes must be interpreted purposively. Interpretation is complex work. The purpose of a
legal rule makes its demands on the interpreter, but so do the words
themselves. Juggling those two demands, and understanding their
relation to each other, is a challenge. This is true for all legal rules,
however, not just those that are jurisdictional.
d. The Fear of the Abyss, and the Fear of Judgment
I want to consider now a pair of arguments based on sheer anxiety. Recall that courts in the common law tradition are peculiarly
charged with overseeing the jurisdiction of specialized tribunals such
as administrative agencies." 4 One reason is that tribunals acting outside their jurisdiction are acting ultra vires. But another reason is that
any tribunal has an interest in its own power and much as a party
should not be a judge in its own case, a tribunal should not be the
judge-at least not the final judge-of its own power.
So much for special tribunals. But courts themselves are a party
of sorts in any dispute about their own jurisdiction. Unlike other
tribunals, they only have other courts-their co-defendants, so to
speak-to look over their shoulders. In the absence of some other
neutral arbiter of judicial power, this is inescapable. 5 But maybe it
is a reason for courts to bend over backwards to interpret their own
jurisdiction restrictively.216 Maybe it is a reason for them to tilt their
interpretive scales against themselves to counterbalance their natural
tendency to enlarge their jurisdiction.
Another argument from anxiety, distinct from the first but leading to much the same conclusion, is this: A court without jurisdiction
is a court without power. A court without power is in a normative
void. It can work its will, but illegitimately. Worse yet, it may never
be found out. To take seriously the Idea of Jurisdiction is to fear that
abyss and to try to avoid the cliff that drops straight down on the
wrong side of a court's jurisdictional grant.
Perhaps then, the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is only a

214. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 81 and infra note 244 and accompanying
text.
215. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).

216. State ex rel. Ellis v. Board of Deputy State Supervisors, 71 N.E. 717, 719 (Ohio
1904) (Summer, J., dissenting) (opining that "the court being the exclusive judge of its own
jurisdiction, ought not to exercise any not clearly possessed").
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device for avoiding error. The edge of the cliff is the ideal,

ontologically "true," jurisdictional line. It is precipitous, but it is also
jagged and hard to make out in the epistemological fog. The doctrine

of jurisdictional time limits is one way to step back from the cliff, to
trace out a safer-and clearer-line away from the edge. By this
light, the doctrine is like the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
law 7 or the breathing space notion in free speech law." 8 We acquit some of the guilty to protect the innocent. t9 We protect some
speech that might otherwise not deserve protection so as not to en-

danger truly privileged speech.' Similarly, this argument would
posit, we reject expansive if colorable readings of jurisdictional rules
to guard against exercising illegitimate authority. Avoiding one type

of error raises the risk of the opposite error, but the price is worth it.
Each of these two arguments from anxiety-fear of judging and

fear of the abyss-has its own defects. More material and interesting,
though, are the defects they have in common.
First of all, the angst apparent in these arguments is simply

217. See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of
Innocence, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 457 (1989); Barbara Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of
Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299 (1977).
218. See, e.g., Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (noting that "[iut has
long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly
drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression
has to give way to other compelling needs of society"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963) (stating that "[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity").
219. The classic statement is in Justice Harlan's concurrence in In re Winship: "lit is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970); see Underwood, supra note 217, at 1306-08; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 423 (1979) (opining that "[in a criminal case ....
the interests of the defendant are of
such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have
been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood
of an erroneous judgment').
220. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (noting that
"even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are 'nevertheless inevitable in a free debate,' . . . and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for
false factual assertions would have an undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech relating to public
figures that does have constitutional value"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 34041 (1974) ("[Tlhere is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. . . . [Nevertheless,
t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) ("Authoritative
interpretations of the First Amendment . . . have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth. . . . [E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need . . . to survive'.") (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss1/1

72

Dane: Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination
1994]

JURISDICTIONALITY

missing in the traditional vocabulary of the Idea of Jurisdiction. If
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction means nothing else, it is that
courts are obliged to reach the best judgment they can of the extent
of their authority. The consequence of deciding wrongly might be that
a court's acts do not bind. But that does not change the nature of the

obligation.
Nor should it be otherwise. Remember that true jurisdictional
dismissals are assertions of powerlessness. They bear none of the
onus of other judicial inaction. But to retreat from jurisdiction, or to
redraw jurisdictional lines, even out of a fear of wielding wrongful

authority, is not so innocent."' It is an affirmative act. It deliberately sacrifices litigants to the cause of judicial anxiety.

The analogy to reasonable doubt or free speech tells the story.
Those rules are conscious, direct exercises of legal power. The argument from anxiety, though, suggests ersatz powerlessness, the exercise
of power camouflaged by the rhetoric of powerlessness. The legal

skeptic will argue that this is nothing special, that claims of judicial
powerlessness are invariably exertions of power. This is a difference
between the world view embodied by the Idea of Jurisdiction and

other accounts of law and legal authority. But to accept the argument
from anxiety is to prove the skeptic right.
All this also suggests that the fear that courts are naturally
greedy for more jurisdiction rests on a superficial psychology. Judges

are happy getting rid of some cases.'m And saying "no" can be it-

221. See Cover, supra note 69, at 53-60 (discussing judicial use of jurisdictional holdings
to separate judges from substantive legal interpretation and from the violence that their decisions permit). For my disagreement with Cover's occasional suggestion that this not-so-innocent act of distancing is inherent in any hermeneutic of jurisdiction, see supra note 121.
222. Alan B. Morrison makes a similar observation, in a related context, in his discussion
of separation of powers. Rejecting the view that delegation of the judicial power only poses
a constitutional problem when judges oppose it, Morrison argues:
The proper question, therefore, ought to be whether a person with a dispute that is
to be resolved in a federal forum is entitled to have that forum be presided over
by a person with the protections of life tenure and a prohibition against salary
reduction, which are the hallmarks of article I1 independence. The answer to that
question has little or nothing to do with judicial preferences; in fact, many judges
would be pleased to get rid of some types of cases and hand them off to magistrates, bankruptcy judges, or other non-article III adjudicators.
Alan B. Morrison, A Non-Power Looks at Separation of Powers, 79 GEO. L. 281, 302-03
(1990).
Cf., e.g., John D. Ayer, So Near To Cleveland, So Far From God: An Essay on the
Ethnography of Bankruptcy, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 442-43 n.137 (1992) (citing Amy Singer, Leon Silverman: $4.5 Million, His Clients $??, AM. LAwYER, Oct. 1990, at 1) (noting
that the dominant theme in Manville bankruptcy reorganization was "the court's desire to get
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self a projection of authority, as satisfying to the appetite for power
as saying "yes."

(Think of the doorkeeper guarding the velvet

rope at a trendy nightclub.)'

Thus, the fear of judgment and the

fear of the abyss can easily give way to a positive temptation-a

judicial machismo that finds its kicks in saying no.
These problems might seem to put judges in a difficult fix. They

should not exercise power they do not have, but they also should not
resort to an ersatz powerlessness that betrays the Idea of Jurisdiction
itself. This is all, however, just part of judging. Society pays judges

to avoid temptation and to do their best. That is all judges can do.
Any additional, systematic anxiety is not only unnecessary, but selfdefeating.
The argument from anxiety has another, bigger flaw. Even if the

argument sounds good, it lacks content. When the law says it will
acquit the (factually) guilty to protect the innocent, it has an idea of
rid of the case at almost any costs to aggrieved litigants"); Jonathan R. Siegel, Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 905, 921 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court
sometimes uses standing doctrine "as a way to get rid of cases involving chilling claims instead of answering the difficult First Amendment questions such cases pose") (citation omitted).
Judges themselves sometimes discuss their temptation to get rid of particularly difficult
or otherwise vexatious cases, though usually in the context of congratulating themselves for
resisting that temptation. See, e.g., Broadcasting Rights Int'l Corp. v. Societe Du Tour De
France, S.A.RL., 675 F. Supp. 1439, 1448 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that "[w]hile the
plaintiff's choice of forum is significant, it is not controlling, even in this district where busy
judges are said to be tempted to dispose of international litigation by granting dismissals on
the grounds of forum non conveniens"); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
v. Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R., 294 F. Supp. 727, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1968) ("The final
contention here is that . . . this is a [dispute] over which this Court has no jurisdiction. In
spite of the temptation for a busy court to adopt this contention, and thus get rid of a difficult case, a different conclusion must be reached.").
More generally, any survey of the recent literature on judicial administration reveals a
pervasive, even obsessive, concern with reducing dockets. For an important caution against
the excesses of one aspect of this trend, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ.
1073 (1984).
223. The relationship of parent and child, marked as it is by mutual invocations of the
power to say no, is clearly the paradigm case. I make no explicit claim of its relevance to
the relationship of judge and litigant.
224. Thus the phenomenon in its 1980's heyday:
The usual Saturday-night crowd of trendies, punkettes and individuals in
black leather swarmed outside Area, the "in" disco of the minute. To keep them at
bay, a half-dozen taciturn and burly types stood inside a velvet rope on the Hudson Street sidewalk.
Once in a while, the crowd parted and the rope was lifted for those
deemed suitable for entry by the guardians of exclusivity.
Susan Heller Anderson & David W. Dunlap, New York Day By Day: 'Normals' Pass Up
Shot at Trendiness, N.Y. TamES, Dec. 24, 1984, § 1, at 23.
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what (factual) guilt is.'

When it says it will protect otherwise low-

value speech to give more breathing room to high-value speech, it
has an idea of what high-value speech is.'
But to tell courts to bend over backwards not to exercise authori-

ty, or to stay on the safe side of the jurisdictional cliff, is only a
formal instruction. It says nothing about the content of a court's ideal,

ontologically "true" jurisdiction, or the real location of the jurisdictional cliff. To avoid error, even by tipping the scales, needs at least
a rough sense of what non-error looks like. It needs some, even par-

tial, account of what the weights are against which to tip the scales.
If, for example, the law just assumed, routinely, that excusable ne-

glect was a proviso to jurisdictional time limits, that would radically
change what it meant to bend over backwards. It would give judges a

very different cliff from which to step back.
225. See generally HERBERT PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 166-67 (1968)
(distinguishing factual guilt and legal guilt); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand
Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78
MICH. L. REV. 463, 465-66 n.6 (1980) (same).
Sociologists and historians similarly distinguish convicted offenses (or recorded crimes)
from the "dark figure" of actual crime. See generally Albert D. Biderman & Albert L Reiss,
Jr., On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. I
(1967); M.R. McClintock, The Dark Figure, in 5 COLLECTE STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 9 (1970).
But cf. CHRISTINA LARNER, WrTCHCRAFr AND RELIGION: THE POLmCS OF POPULAR
BELiEF 29 (1984):
It is becoming a common device in the growth area of the history of crime, and
one satisfying to cautious scholarly instincts, to speak of a "dark figure" for offenses, but there is a positivist assumption behind this concept of the "dark figure"
which needs examining. In so far as a dark figure indicates a certain number of
prosecutions for which the record has been lost, or a list of unsolved crimes which
were identified at the time as crimes for which a villain was being sought, it is an
acceptable convention. In so far as it refers to the number of times that the crime
or crimes in question have been committed, this is quite another matter. It gives
an objective status to the crime which it may not deserve, for acts are only crimes
by virtue as having been defined as such by society. If society fails to define
particular acts as belonging to a criminal category, their status must remain ambiguous.
Id. Note, however, that an analogy to something like Lamer's view would be of no help at
all to friends of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. It would amount, instead, to the
sort of legal realist, managerial-bureaucratic, account of jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 143-45, that would consider the type of anxiety I am describing here to be
incoherent. See infra text after note 383.
226. See cases cited supra note 220. I do not mean to suggest that the line between
speech protected for its own sake and speech protected to provide "breathing space" is uncontested. See generally Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
305 (1990). For purposes of my argument, however, it is enough only to observe that the
subject is a matter of explicit debate.
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The argument from anxiety is too abstract, too stripped of context. The next major category of analysis tries to fill that gap. It
makes a stab at providing the content that more purely logical arguments lack. It treats the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits as a
problem, not just in the logic of jurisdiction, but in the law of jurisdiction.
4. The Substance of Jurisdiction
So far, this discussion has gone on as if the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits were a unique thing in the law. In some ways, it is.
Then again, the law is full of interpretive canons that guide the construction of legal materials. Maybe the doctrine of jurisdictional time
limits is just one of those canons.
Classic texts on statutory construction lovingly set out which
types of statutes should be strictly construed and which should be
liberally construed. 7 John Marshall's famous maxim in McCulloch
v. Maryland that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding" was itself only a rhetorical flourish on a standard
argument that the Constitution's enumeration of congressional powers
was one of those texts that should be construed liberally.
Strict construction is narrow construction, limited to the literal
reach of the text. Liberal construction is broad construction, going
beyond the literal and taking account of purpose and structure. A
more useful way of putting it, though, is that both canons of strict
and liberal construction are species of plain statement rules. The
logical form of a plain statement rule is this: "The law is so-and-so
unless the text plainly says otherwise." In McCulloch, for example,
the Court rejected a rule of strict construction that would have limited
the powers of Congress to those "expressly conferred." 9 Instead, it
adopted a rule of liberal construction that Congress could choose any
means it wished to carry out its enumerated powers "unless the words
imperiously require" a limitation on those means." That is to say,
it chose one plain statement rule over another.
A plain statement rule, as McCulloch illustrates, is more than a
guide to reading. It is itself an interpretation of law. The "so-and-so"

227. See, e.g., J.G. StrrHEuRAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 346-433

(1891) (discussing statutes subject to strict construction and liberal construction).
228. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
229. Id. at 409.
230. Id. at 408.
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in the rule is, in its own right, a material proposition of law. It is an

account of the fabric to which specific legal texts are sewn. It is a
default state from which specific texts can diverge, but only if they
do so unequivocally.

To call the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits a plain statement
rule avoids both the problems inherent in the argument from anxiety.
A plain statement rule is not just an effort to stay on the safe side of
the law. Nor is it just a formal compass heading without any substantive landmarks. It is a positive view of what the law generally is, and
how in particular instances it might be otherwise. That said, though,
two difficult challenges remain: How to describe the plain statement
rule that the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits allegedly represents.

And how to justify it.
Description first. The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits might
be reducible to a plain statement rule of this form: "Jurisdictional

time limits do not admit of qualifications or exceptions unless the rule
plainly says otherwise." But this would still be question-begging, too
formal and empty. What is a qualification? What is an exception? A
better formulation would be: "Jurisdictionaltime limits are not satisfied unless the text plainly says otherwise." Even this more resolute

reading, though, does not really reveal the legal principle allegedly at
stake. Maybe, then, the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is only

an instance of a very general, very material, proposition like: A court
does not have jurisdiction unless some legal text plainly says other-

wise." But this proposition is plainly overbroad. There are just too
many instances in which the law entertains presumptions in favor of
jurisdiction rather than against it.2

231. Cf. William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of
Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L. REv. 211, 223-33 (1982) (discussing
use of plain statement rules in the interpretation of scope of federal jurisdiction).
232. The most obvious example is the presumption of general jurisdiction that attaches to
state trial courts. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
For federal courts, the presumption is generally against jurisdiction, though only in the
weak sense that a litigant or court claiming jurisdiction must spell out the ground for that
jurisdiction. (This is, in some sense, akin to a burden of going forward, as against the much
stronger notion of burden of persuasion). Within the ambit of this requirement, however, there
are contexts in which federal courts recognize a presumption in favor of jurisdiction. For
some examples in which this is particularly implicit, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722 (1991) (reaffirming conclusive presumption, first announced in Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983), holding that when state court decision relied on both federal and state
grounds, there was no independent and adequate state ground for the decision, and the United
States Supreme Court therefore had jurisdiction to review state judgment); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (holding that a presumption exists in favor of juris-
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The problem of description probably could be overcome. It is
only a symptom, though, of the more serious problem of justification.
Why should a jurisdictional time limit not be satisfied-why should a
court not have jurisdiction-unless the text plainly says otherwise?
Remember, we are not talking here about mere rules of reading, but
about material propositions of law, landmarks in the legal map.
Marshall's rule in McCulloch was grounded in a specific account of
constitutional structure and federal sovereign prerogative. Does any
equally robust account support the doctrine of jurisdictional time

limits?
a. Deference to the Common Law
Looking to some of the early authority on jurisdictional time

limits does suggest one possibility. It is the old, familiar, AngloAmerican canon of construction that any rule or arrangement foreign
to the common law be interpreted narrowlyY 3 The reason for that
canon of construction was that the common law established the basic
shape of legal doctrine and entitlements. Deviations from it were
possible, but they were islands in the law, limited in their reach.'

diction by federal courts over the actions of administrative agencies); Oestereich v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (holding that a pre-induction judicial review of
draft classification was allowed when the draft board clearly acts in violation of Selective
Service Act, even though literal language of statute seems to deny such review).
Another particularly instructive example of the workings of a presumption in favor of
jurisdiction is found in Daou v. Harris, 678 P.2d 934 (Ariz. 1984), which leniently interpreted
a statutory time limit for referring medical malpractice suits to a "medical liability review
panel" to be "non-jurisdictional" by relying on a "presumption . . . in favor of retention
rather than divestiture of jurisdiction." lId at 937. Interestingly, though, the court chose to
carry out this presumption by finding the time limit to be "non-jurisdictional." Implicitly
following the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, it did not even consider the possibility of
holding the time limit to be "jurisdictional," but not mechanical or absolute. See also
Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178 (Ariz. 1990).
The examples in this footnote have, to some extent, admittedly mixed apples and
oranges. The point, though, was to discredit a particularly broad formulation of a strict construction rule for jurisdiction.
233. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Ross v. Jones, 89 U.S. 576, 592 (1874); Cole v. First Nat'l
Bank, 800 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ark. 1990); Starkey Const. Co. v. Elcon, 457 S.W.2d 509, 513
(Ark. 1970); Person v. Latham, 582 S.W.2d 246, 248 ('ex. App. 1979).
For modem attempts to ground this sort of canon of construction in a theory of public choice, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 533, 541 (1983);
Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
234. See generally Harlan F. Stone, 7he Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 14 (1950).
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Jurisdictional time limits and similar restrictions often involve
causes of action or procedures unknown to, or at least, as with
appeals, 5 not grounded in the common law. Furthermore:
all jurisdiction and authority derived from and dependent upon statute, [including statutory requirements for taking a case to an appellate court, as well as statutes authorizing new methods of proof or
authorizing jurisdiction by courts over persons not found in the
state] must be taken and accepted with all the limitations and restrictions the act creating it may impose. These restrictions and
limitations the courts are bound to observe; they cannot be dispensed with, however much they may appear to embarrass or however unnecessary they may seem to be in the administration of
justice in particular cases. The statute is in derogation of the common law, is an essential departure from the form and modes a court
ordinarily pursues, and must be strictly construed.'
This account makes some sense. It does explain some cases. But
it also suffers from three serious defects.
First, jurisdictional time limits do not only attach to actions or
tribunals foreign to the common law. They might do so in many
instances; that is to say, a time limit is likely to be "jurisdictional"
for the same reason that it is "in derogation of the common law.'
But the link is not absolute. Conversely, actions or tribunals that are
foreign to the common law can be governed by non-jurisdictional
time limits."3 Indeed, many of the cases, particularly early cases,
but recent ones as well, strictly construing time limits make no mention of whether those time limits are jurisdictional or not. The only
point is that they are attached to a mode of action unknown to the
common law. 9
235.

Ordinary actions in ordinary courts of general jurisdiction are usually governed by

ordinary, non-jurisdictional statutes of limitations.
236.

SUTHERLAND, supra note 227, § 394. But cf infra notes 241-43.

237. For a recent case expressing such a view, see Ecker v. Town of W. Hartford, 530
A.2d 1056 (Conn. 1987):
Where, however, a specific time limitation is contained within a statute that creates

a right of action that did not exist at common law, then the remedy exists only
during the prescribed period and not thereafter. In such cases, the time limitation is

not to be treated as an ordinary statute of limitation, but rather is a limitation on
the liability itself, and not of the remedy alone .... The courts of Connecticut
have repeatedly held that, under such circumstances, the time limitation is a substantive and jurisdictional prerequisite, which may be raised at any time, even by
the court sua sponte, and may not be waived.
Id.at 1062-63 (citations omitted).
238. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Term., 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959).
239. See, e.g., Hartray v. Chicago Ry. Co., 124 N.E. 849 (Ill. 1919) (citing earlier cases);
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The second problem is that deference to the common law is only
one venerable canon of construction. There are others, and some of
them yield quite contrary results. The classic canon did insist that
new or unfamiliar grants of jurisdiction should be construed strictly,

that is, against the claim of jurisdiction.2' Antipathy to changes in
the status quo ran both ways, however, so those same texts also
insisted that restrictions on existing jurisdiction should be construed

"strictly," which now meant in favor of the claim of jurisdiction.'"

Whether a time limit was built into a grant of jurisdiction, or was a
later restriction on some existing jurisdiction would, of course, depend
on the history of that specific time limit.

Moreover, some jurisdictional time limits might feel the pull of
more specific countervailing canons. There is at least an argument, for
example, that the opportunity to appeal is part of the fabric of our
law.24 There might be sound reasons, then, for imagining that any

restrictions on the right to appeal, including time limits, and including
jurisdictional time limits, should be construed "strictly" against the
restriction, and in favor of the right.243

Lapsley v. Public Serv. Corp., 68 A. 1113 (NJ. 1908).
For modem examples, see Cadieux v. ITT, 593 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing line
of Rhode Island cases); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 390 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing
New York cases).
But note that in the most venerable of this line of cases, The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.
199, 214 (1886), the Court assumed that, in principle, equitable relief might be available
from the statute of limitations at issue.
240. See, e.g., Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.S. 578, 580 (1882) (As the statute "draws the
boundary line of jurisdiction, it is to be construed with strictness and rigor. As jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by consent of parties, but must be given by the law, so it ought not to
be extended by doubtful constructions.").
241. See SUtmaLAN, supra note 227, § 395 ("Jurisdiction cannot be created or taken
away by implication, except where the implication is necessary from the language and purposes of the statute."); see also Hayes v. Todd, 15 So. 752 (Fla. 1894); Black v. Boyd, 33
N.E. 207, 209 (Ohio 1893) (citing I POM. EQ. JUR., §§ 182, 276-80); State ex rel. Dunbar
v. Superior Ct., 297 P. 774 (Wash. 1931).
A particularly interesting case that explicitly makes this point is Woolridge v.
McKenna, 8 F. 650 (W.D. Tenn. 1881) (analyzing time limits as they relate to removal of
actions to federal court).
242. See generally Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal Seriously, 95 YALE L.
62 (1985).
243. Sutherland's classic treatise says as much explicitly:
Statutes limiting the right to bring actions to particular periods are restrictive and
will not be extended to any other than the cases expressly provided for, and the
exceptions are allowed a liberal effect, thought not so liberal as to embrace cases
within the reason when not within the letter of them.
SUrERLAND, supra note 227, § 368 (footnotes omitted). Sutherland further states:
Provisions which limit in point of time the right to move for a new trial, or to
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Similarly, the same outlook that defended the common law
against legislative encroachments also insisted on the duty of common

law courts to police non-common law tribunals.'" Thus, if a jurisdictional time limit is attached to a provision relating to judicial re-

view of agency action, there are sound, traditional reasons, for construing the restriction "strictly," which is to say favoring exceptions
and qualifications.

More generally, a jurisdictional time limit might occur in a substantive context that, for its own reasons, calls for a canon of liberal

or permissive construction. Thus, for example, in a recent Missouri
worker's compensation case,24 the court held that, although a time
limit was jurisdictional and therefore to be "strictly" applied, strict
application could only happen once ambiguities in the time limitation
had been resolved. To resolve those ambiguities, the court called on

take an appeal, are construed with strictness in favor of the party desiring a review, when the time is to be computed from notice of the judgment to be given
by the opposite party. The right of appeal is general and positive, and as statutes
of limitation are in restraint of that right they are, as already said, to be construed
strictly.
Id. at § 369; cf, e.g., Fry v. Bennett, 16 How. Pr. 385 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1858) (Hoffmn, J.,
dissenting) (opining that "all restrictions upon the right of appeal are to be strictly construed . . . [and] any relaxation of such restrictions is to be liberally construed") Sutherland
does state elsewhere that modes of taking a case on appeal should be construed strictly
against allowing the appeal. See supra text accompanying note 236. But that only confirms
that we are faced with a classic battle of canons, and not a pre-ordained, pre-interpretive
imperative to construe limits on appeal one way or the other. For a modem California case,
that picks up on these issues, see Hollister Convalescent Hosp. v. Rico, 542 P.2d 1349 (Cal.
1975):
What we have said [regarding the inapplicability of notions of estoppel to jurisdictional time limits] in no way conflicts with the well-established policy, based upon
the remedial character of the right of appeal, of according that right in doubtful
cases "when such can be accomplished without doing violence to applicable rules."
(Slawinski v. Mocettini [403 P.2d 143, 144 (Cal. 1965)]). As we have indicated,
there are many cases in which this policy, implemented in accordance with "applicable rules," will lead to a determination, based on construction and interpretation,
that timely and proper notice of appeal must be deemed in law to have been filed
within the jurisdictional period.
Id. at 1359.
244. To this day, English courts have a habit of reading almost out of existence many a
legislative effort to limit judicial review of administrative action. See, e.g., Re Gilmore's
Application, [1957] 1 All E.R. 796.
American courts are less aggressive in defending their jurisdiction, but they also assume that such restrictions are disfavored. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467
U.S. 340 (1984) (holding that, in the absence of reliable legislative history or specific language, a presumption exists in favor of jurisdiction by federal courts over the actions of
administrative agencies).
245. Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Express, 819 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. 1991).
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canons of liberal construction peculiar to worker's compensation. Justice Black, or at least the Justice Black of Teague, would have been
proud.
There is a deeper point here. I stated above that strict and liberal

construction could both be understood as species of plain statement
rules. It turns out that whether we call a particular plain statement
rule one of strict construction or liberal construction might not matter
much.'

6

Thus, the McCulloch rule is equally well understood either

as a liberal construction of congressional power, or as a strict construction of the constitutional constraints on that power. Closer to the

present topic, courts, in speaking of "strict construction" with regard
to statutes of limitations have, depending on the context, used that
phrase either to mean that they would not read an exception into the

statute unless the language plainly required it, or that they would not
to apply in the first place unless the language so
read the 4limitation
7
required.

2

The yet deeper point is that "strict construction," at least when it
takes the form of a plain statement rule, is not any more primal or
pre-interpretive than liberal construction. On the contrary, it is a sophisticated, specific, interpretive commitment.
The final objection to explaining the doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits by way of deference to the common law is that such
deference is now, after all, for better or worse, anachronistic. In this
age of statutes, 8 all sorts of rights and institutions unknown to the
common law are read expansively. 9 In fact, the very idea that the

246. For a dramatic example, in the context of the interpretation of statutes of limitations, see supra note 188.
247. See supra note 188.
248. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Hon. Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1968).
249. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (arguing
that a narrow construction of § 1982 civil rights provisions would be inconsistent with the
breadth of its intended protection); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930);
Beaman v. Superior Products, Inc., 358 P.2d 997, 997-98 (Ariz. 1961) (explaining that even
though unemployment insurance act conflicts with many common law principles, its remedial
purposes require that it be given a liberal construction); Williams Bros. v. Vaughn, 631 P.2d
688, 690 (Mont. 1981) (stating that it is necessary to liberally construe lien statutes so as to
carry out their intended purpose).
A particularly instructive recent case is Central States, S.E. S.W. Areas Pension Fund
v. NAVCO, 3 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1993), in which the Court of Appeals refused to find a
statute of limitations to be jurisdictional merely because it applied to a cause of action "unknown to the common law" '"o the contrary," it wrote, "periods of limitations in federal
statutes-almost all of which establish rights 'unknown to the common law'-are universally
regarded as non-jurisdictional." d at 173. The argument of this Article suggests, of course,
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common law embodies the fundamental principles of the legal order

is now suspect." 0
Note also that modem cases, at least, treat the doctrine of juris-

dictional time limits as arising from principles peculiar to the logic of
jurisdiction. Yet the rule of deference to the common law is not
limited to matters of jurisdiction. One might think that if courts had

before them a legal arrangement alien to the common law, they
would not only construe their jurisdiction strictly, but would also, for
the same reasons, construe the substance of the arrangements strictly.
But the modem cases do not make that link. If, then, the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits still has anything to do with deference to the

common law, it is at best a cultural survival."sl That is to say, it is
one of those habits-like knocking on wood-that was once part of a
larger, coherent set of practices, but is now only a stray superstition,
mysterious to those who practice it and more rigid than it ever was

when it was truly understood."s
b. Deference to the Legislature
Deference to the common law, as a reason for the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits, is under and overinclusive, and anachronis-

tic. Is there a more focused, modem substitute? Most of the candidates do not come close to giving a complete explanation.

3

If there

that the court could have found the period of limitations to be jurisdictional and yet also
have construed it to allow for exceptions or mitigating considerations.
250. See generally James Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213 (1934); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory Age, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405 (1989) (discussing the conflict between traditional constitutional values and contemporary concerns in statute interpretation); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 230 (1983) (discussing
statutory imperatives and legal principles).
Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 29 (West 1981) (requiring liberal construction of
statutes in derogation of common law); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928 (1988).
251. The notion of "cultural survivals" was a mainstay of nineteenth century anthropology. For a classic statement of the notion, see 1 EDWARD B. TYLOR, PRIUITIVE CULTURE 98
(1891).
252. Some contemporary functionalist anthropologists argue that many apparent cultural
survivals can still play a functional role, even if they have lost their original ideological or
practical meaning. See, e.g., MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURE, PEOPLE, NATURE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGY (2d ed. 1975):
Among the favorite candidates for a truly useless, vestigial survival are the sleeve
buttons on a man's jacket suit, which were formerly used to keep shirt ruffles out
of the inkwell. Even here, however, four extra buttons per jacket are not exactly
useless from the point of view of the button manufacturer.
Id. at 153.
253. Federalism, for example, might support a rule of strict construction for the jurisdic-
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is one idea worth exploring, it is a notion that, ironically, is the opposite of the old idea of deference to the common law. This is some
special, or specially construed, deference to the legislature.
What would this special deference look like, and what would be
its reason? If deference to the legislature just means deference to law,
the idea is of no help. Liberal construction is not inherently
undeferential. The issue, then, must be real, flesh and blood legislatures, and their relationship to courts.
Maybe, because jurisdiction is about judicial power, legislatures
should be assumed to take a special interest in writing jurisdictional
restrictions carefully and parsimoniously. So if the literal language
does not yield a way out, there is no way out. But this is surely not
right. Legislatures do not necessarily take a special interest in jurisdictional issues. If anything, the law of jurisdiction, particularly on
matters as arcane as time limits, is quintessential "lawyer's law,"
loved by judges but provoking legislatures to a collective yawn.
Maybe, though, because jurisdiction is about judicial power,
courts should assume that legislatures, whatever their intent about
specific statutes, are unusually sensitive to the prospect of judicial
overreaching. Again, though, it is hard to see any reality behind the
rhetoric. Legislatures are sensitive to lots of things courts do. That
jurisdiction, and jurisdictional time limits, hold a special place in the
list is just not credible.
To see the silliness of such rhetoric, consider Smith v. Mitchell,' a minor dissent from denial of certiorari by then Justice
Rehnquist. The issue in Smith was not a time limit, but the lack of a
certificate of probable cause in a habeas corpus review. Yet the principle is the same. Rehnquist complained that the petitions for certiorari should not have been denied, but dismissed, since, without those
certificates, the Court had no jurisdiction. 5 Rehnquist seemed to

tion of federal courts. The material proposition of law at stake would then be: "Most juris.
diction inheres in state rather than federal courts, unless a legal text plainly says otherwise."
The problem for us, of course, is that state as well as federal courts apply the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits. Moreover, while federalism might-and has-come into play as an

interpretive consideration when the decision is between a federal court and a state court, it
makes much less sense for it to play a role when the decision is between a federal court
and no court at all.
254. 454 U.S. 911, 915 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
255. At stake were several cases involving state criminal defendants who had filed habeas
corpus petitions in federal district courts. The district courts had denied relief, and also refused to issue certificates of probable cause, which are a prerequisite to any further appeal.
(The certificate can be issued by the district judge, or by a circuit justice or judge.) The
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admit there was no practical difference between denial and dismissal." As best as I can tell, he had no hidden agenda. The debate
between him and Justice Stevens's concurrence in denial was subtle
and technical 57 Nevertheless, Rehnquist threw in this flourish:
[A]n even more important consequence of the disregard of congressional provisions as to our jurisdiction is a tendency to weaken the
authority of this Court when it can demonstrate in a principled
manner that it has either the constitutional or statutory authority to
decide a particular issue. The necessary concomitant of our tripartite
system of government that the other two branches of government
obey judgments rendered within our jurisdiction is sapped whenever
we decline for any reason other than the exercise of our own constitutional duties to similarly follow the mandates of Congress and
the Executive within their spheres of authority."
Surely, the Justice's regard for judicial legitimacy was on target.
That it matters whether a court denies or dismisses, even if no practical consequences follow, and even if sorting out the cases is a nuisance, is a conviction born straight out of the Idea of Jurisdiction.
But the notion that Congress itself would care, or that the Court's

prisoners unsuccessfully sought relief in the courts of appeals anyway, and then turned to the
Supreme Court for relief.
256. See Sntith v. Mitchell, 454 U.S. 911 (1982):
Mhe failure to observe the congressional mandate as to this Court's jurisdiction of
a petition for certiorari to a Court of Appeals in the absence of a certificate of
probable cause in no way bars consideration of the merits of a petition which any
Member of this Court believes to be deserving of a certificate of probable cause.
Ld.
at 918 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
257. That Justice Stevens chose to file an opinion concurring in a denial of certiorari
was itself extraordinary, though not entirely unprecedented. He made three arguments: First,
he believed that the Court had jurisdiction over the petitions under the All-Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651. d at 912. Second, he argued that, because a Circuit Justice or the Court had
the authority to issue a certificate of probable cause, "it is part of our responsibility in processing these petitions to determine whether they have arguable merit notwithstanding the failure of a district or circuit judge to authorize an appeal to the Court of Appeals." Id. at 913.
Therefore, he concluded:
[a] complete explanation of the Court's conclusion that these cases have insufficient
merit to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction should therefore include three elements: (1) the petitioner has incorrectly invoked our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254 because no certificate of probable cause was issued; (2) the Court. has
decided not to exercise its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651; and (3) neither the
Circuit Justice nor the Court has decided to issue a certificate of probable cause.
Instead of entering detailed orders of this kind in all of these cases, the Court
wisely has adopted the practice of entering simple denials.
l at 914 (footnotes omitted).
258. Id. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
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sloppiness would "sap" its ability to work its will elsewhere, is a
serious misimpression. Even as a general claim, it is politically and
psychologically dubious. Apparently uneasy arguing only lawyerly
principle, Rehnquist turned to instrumentalist rhetoric. The result was
ersatz instrumentalism, the mirror image of the ersatz powerlessness I
discussed earlier. Similarly, to ground the doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits, not in deference to law, but in some special obeisance to
the legislature, is either empty rant or ersatz instrumentalism camouflaging empty rant.
Even more striking is how analytically and rhetorically meager
this argument looks compared to the argument from deference to the
common law. Deference to the common law might not justify the
doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, but it is a coherent and robust
idea, grounded in a distinct vision of law and legal imagination. If
nothing today can similarly organize the task of interpretation, that
might itself be a sign of the larger problem that this paper is trying
to address.
5. The Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction
The path of jurisdictional logic came up short as a defense of
the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. But the less formal, more
specific, language of interpretive canons was no help either. Maybe
the answer is to go in the other direction, to a higher rather than a
lower level of abstraction. The Idea of Jurisdiction has jurisprudential
bite. Maybe something in the jurisprudence of jurisdiction-the critical counterpoint to the law's own Idea of Jurisdiction-will do the
trick.
I want to look here at two such possibilities. The first concerns
the implications of legal positivism. The second concerns an issue
raised, but bracketed, earlier: the effect of "residual" or "jurisprudential" discretion. Both approaches are, in some respects, only more
rigorous, or at least more urbane, versions of arguments already
raised in earlier conversations, but they also provoke distinct concerns, and distinct responses.
a. Of Positivism
Legal theory sometimes identifies the law of jurisdiction with
what H.L.A. Hart has called "rules of recognition." 9 Rules of rec-

259. HART, supra note 68, at 92-93.
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ognition are the rules in any mature legal system that identify valid
or authoritative statements of law. Legal positivism takes particular
interest in rules of recognition because they are material to its claim
that the validity of legal rules and utterances bears no necessary rela-

tion to morality or natural law.
Legal positivism takes many forms. Some forms of positivism

allow that a legal system could test the validity of law by reference
to substantive criteria, including morality.' Other forms of positivism, however, can be read to make much more restrictive claims
about the character of rules of recognition. To wit: Rules of recogni" ' or they look only to the pedigree
tion are formal,26
and not the

content of legal utterances, 2 or legal validity, at least as to everyday issues in stable legal regimes, is a "hard fact, '263
' an obvious,

descriptively uncontroversial, social phenomenon. Taking this type of
positivism seriously might suggest that the law of jurisdiction should
also be formal, or obvious, or the like. 4 And that might be reason

enough for something like the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits.
This argument runs up against the same obstacle as cognate
arguments earlier: the reality of the law of jurisdiction. As I noted in
first describing the Idea of Jurisdiction, jurisdictional rules can be
substantive, and not merely procedural. They can be complicated and
murky. They can arise either at the threshold of a case, or later.
All this might suggest that the forms of positivism I have described are just wrong, but there is no need to go this far. Maybe all

260. See generally Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
139 (1982); David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, & Legal Theory, 87 YALE LJ. 415 (1977)
(reviewing RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)); Philip E. Soper, Legal
Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The HartiDworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REv. 473
(1977).
261. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HAtV. L. REV. 593 (1958); cf. Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 847 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)).
262. See generally D. NEIL MACCORMACK & AOus AARiNo, LEGAL REASONING 54
(1992). For a critical and influential account of the "pedigree" view of positivism, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17-22 (1978). For one attempt at articulating a
form of legal positivism less reliant on a rigid view of legal pedigree, see MELviN A.
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw (1988).
263. See Coleman, supra note 260, at 143; cf Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness,"
and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.. 1191, 1268 (1987) (discussing "hard-facts positivism" in
the context of an argument about choice of law).
264. Cf. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 296-363 (1950) (arguing that many
legal issues that pass as jurisdictional really are not; seeking to limit jurisdictionality to (1)
bright-line boundaries between judicial power and nullity, and (2) issues that can be determined preliminarily).
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that needs revision is the strict identification of rules of recognition
with the law of jurisdiction. Put another way, maybe the positivist's
notion of "jurisdiction" differs from the law's own. As emphasized
earlier, the social scientist, the bureaucratic analyst, and the legal realist, can each tell his own story of a court's "actual" or operative
jurisdiction, which might differ from the law's story. The same can
be said for the legal positivist.
Alternatively, the positivist can keep the identification of rules of
recognition with the law of jurisdiction, but he can apply his strictures only to the ultimate rule of recognition in a legal system. If, for
example, the authority of United States Supreme Court pronouncements is clear, and content-independent, and so on, that should be
enough to satisfy the positivist. And the positivist does win some
points here. As also noted earlier, legal doctrine itself has never embraced the most radical implications of the Idea of Jurisdiction. What
it says of other courts it does not always say of the Supreme Court.
When the Supreme Court speaks, its decisions, at least insofar as the
law's own discourse is concerned, cannot be void for lack of jurisdiction " and they are not subject to collateral attack.
But none of this entails the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits.
Even if ultimate rules of recognitions must be formal, or obvious, or
clear, that does not constrain the character of more mundane rules of
jurisdiction, even rules of Supreme Court jurisdiction. This particular
jurisprudential lens just does not have the power to resolve issues at
that level of detail.
b. Of Residual Discretion
The next argument I want to address is also broadly jurisprudential. Its inspiration is the current conversation about the character of
legal interpretation.
I distinguished earlier between affirmative and residual discretion.
Affirmative discretion is granted by law. Residual discretion is the
interpretive room left by indeterminacies or gaps in the law." I ar265. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 111-15. Important recent work on the problem

of indeterminacy in law includes AHARON BARAK, JuDICtA DisCRErION (1989); RONALD
DWORKI, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); KENT GREENwALT, LAW AND OBJEcrivrTY (1992); Owen
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982); Ken Kress, Legal Indeter-

minacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 462 (1987); Charles M. Yalbon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6
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gued that a court, by definition, cannot have affirmative discretion to
decide whether jurisdiction exists or to waive jurisdictional requirements. "If a court had discretion to decide whether it had jurisdiction,
then, of necessity, it would have jurisdiction."267 I also claimed that
this is a minor, trivial constraint. I put off discussing the relevance of
any of this to residual discretion.
But maybe what was said about affirmative discretion does have
implications for residual discretion and jurisdiction. Consider a jurisdictional rule whose interpretation leaves legitimate room for residual
discretion. Arguably, the jurisdiction of a court subject to that rule
extends, until interpreted otherwise, to the outer bounds of that zone
of discretion. Residual and affirmative discretion differ. But the same
logic plausibly applies to both: If a court has discretion to decide
whether it has jurisdiction, then, of necessity, it has jurisdiction.
Note the exact point at issue. This is not, or need not be, just
another claim that courts have an "actual" or operative jurisdiction
different from the law's own account of jurisdiction. This is more
than a political claim about effective power, more than a bureaucratic
claim about finality, more than a legal realist claim that the law is
what the judges say it is, and more than a positivist claim about
ultimate rules of recognition. Those types of notions would have no
currency here.
The real punch is the idea that, if there is a zone of discretion
surrounding a legal text, a court is legally entitled to reach any conclusion within that zone.' Indeed, precisely this strong notion of
legal entitlement-and not any naivete about effective power or
epistemic clarity-leads some legal theorists, Ronald Dworkin most
notably, to argue that there is no such thing as residual discretion at
269
all.
But say Dworkin is wrong. Arguably, the effect of residual discretion is to fray the Idea of Jurisdiction, at least in the space between a court's interpreted jurisdiction and the outer bounds of its
plausible jurisdiction. In that space, at least, the claim that the court
is "powerless," and all that follows from that claim, would be suspect. In that space, at least, the specter of ersatz powerlessness would

CARDOZO L. REv. 917 (1985).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
268. For a particularly clear argument to this effect, see BARAK, supra note 266.
269. Dworkin articulates this "right answer" hypothesis most insistently in DWORKIN,
supra note 262.
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necessarily loom.
Thus, the argument is that residual discretion might be inescapable but its scope can be wide or narrow. Because of the severe
tension between jurisdictionality and discretion, jurisdictional rules
should be read to allow for as little residual discretion as possible.
This is not always easy. But time limits are one context in which the
zone of discretion can be made almost to disappear if we only just
accept a doctrine of literal, unqualified, strictly defined enforcement.
A slick answer to this argument might be that there is no such
easy escape from discretion-that embracing the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is itself an act of residual discretion. But this would
not be so if the doctrine were thought to rest on an imperative built
into the jurisprudence of jurisdictionality from the start. The real
problem with'the argument is different.
Note first one important practical difference between affirmative
and residual discretion. The existence of affirmative discretion usually
implies some deference to the official charged with that discretion. A
higher tribunal will reverse for abuse of discretion, but not otherwise.
The existence of residual discretion does not necessarily imply such
deference. An appellate court reading an indeterminate text will (usually) come to its own conclusion regardless of what the lower court
had to say. This is all the more true with respect to jurisdictional
issues. A higher court will not affirm a lower court's exercise of
jurisdiction just because the lower court's interpretation of its jurisdiction was reasonable. Even when deference is shown, as in judicial
review of statutory interpretations by administrative agencies, deference with regard to the scope of the agency's own jurisdiction raises
the most troubling issues."
To Dworkin and others, this might all be evidence against the
notion of residual discretion. At the very least, though, it suggests
that indeterminacy itself does not create or expand authority. It is
only a tool, when all other tools of interpretation run out, for deciding what authority exists.
The deeper point is this: Residual discretion is a response to
indeterminacy or gaps in the law. A jurisdictional rule that is indeterminate neither grants nor withholds power within the range of the
indeterminacy. It is just silent.

270. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990). This is not to say that
such deference is never shown. For a full airing of these questions, see Mississippi Power &

Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
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In criticizing ersatz powerlessness, I imagined a court that knew,
or suspected, that it was claiming for itself less jurisdiction than it
truly had. But a court honestly exercising residual discretion knows or
suspects no such thing. The true extent of its jurisdiction is, by hypothesis, not only unclear, but unknowable. The exercise of discretion
finds meaning where there is no meaning. It is an interpretive stab in
the dark. To argue that the court's "true" legal jurisdiction, before the
act of interpretation, extended to the outer bounds of its zone of
residual discretion is to flinch before the actual implications of indeterminacy."
A court that claims jurisdiction to a point short of the outer
bounds of its residual discretion does not have less jurisdiction after
the interpretation than before. Instead, before the act of interpretation,
its jurisdiction was indeterminate. After the act of interpretation, it has
whatever jurisdiction its legitimate use of residual discretion has fixed
for itself.
Accounts of residual judicial discretion oppose a purely declaratory view of legal meaning. According to the declaratory view, legal
reality is always out there, waiting to be found. But to say that an
indeterminate jurisdictional rule "really" grants jurisdiction to the
outer bounds of its indeterminacy is to let the declaratory view back
in by the side door.
An analogy from physics will help make the point. Quantum
theory posits that certain processes are radically indeterminate. Their
result cannot, even in principle, be predicted in advance, except in
probabilities. More important and profound, only observing the result
can collapse the indeterminacy. (Herein the rough analogy to the
interpretation of indeterminate texts).
In one noted thought experiment, a cat is put in a closed, opaque
box.272 Inside the box is a device that, obeying quantum laws of

271. It is also to commit what some philosophers refer to as a category-mistake. See
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949).
272. This is the famous "Schroedinger's Cat." For accounts of the problem, and its significance for competing characterizations of the philosophical implications of quantum physics,
see PAUL DAvIEs, OTHER WoRLDs 130-41 (1980); PAUL DAVIES & J.R. BROWN, THE GHOST
IN THE ATOM 28-39 (1986); JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHROEDINGER'S CAT. QuANTuM
PHYSICS AND REALrY (1984); ALASTAIR RAE, QUANTUM PHYSICS: I.LUSION'OR REALITY 5962 (1986); Fritz Rohrlich, Schroedinger's Criticism of Quantum Mechanics-Fifty Years Later,
in SnPOStIJM ON THE FouNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICS 555 (P. Lahti & P. Mittelstaedt
eds., 1987).
This thought experiment seeks to manifest, at the macroscopic level, problems in the
philosophical implications of quantum theory that are usually only clear at the level of sub-
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probability, has an equal chance of either killing the cat or leaving it
unharmed. The scientist can only know which it is when, sometime
later, she opens the box.'
Theorists debate what we should think about the condition of the
cat before the scientist opens the box. In one view, the cat is neither
dead nor alive, but is only a probability function. 4 In another view,
the cat is both dead and alive, in parallel universes, only one of
which turns out to be the scientist's own.275 In yet another view, it
really is either dead or alive before the scientist opens the box.""
This last view might deny radical indeterminacy.2' Or it might posit
a notion of backward causation, or possibly imagine the cat itself
being the quantum observer of its own state. Or it might suggest that
there was a flaw in this particular thought experiment.27
But nobody imagines that the cat is necessarily alive during
those fateful moments, waiting for a fifty-percent chance of being
killed when the scientist takes a look at it. For that matter, nobody
imagines that the cat is necessarily dead, waiting for a fifty-percent
chance of being resurrected.
Radical indeterminacy poses profound paradoxes for physics. And
for cats. It also poses profound problems for law. But to assume that

atomic particles.
273. This is, of course, the consequence of quantum indeterminacy, which suggests that
the state of a system depends in part on (and might have no determinate existence apart
from) the process by which that state is measured. See RAE, supra note 272, at 107.
274. This is the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. It is also, for
what it is worth, the standard or "official" view of most physicists. See DAVIES, supra note
272, at 136; DAVIES & BROWN, supra note 272, at 11; GRIBBIN, supra note 272, at 121.
275. This is the many-universes or many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. This
view was first posited by Hugh Everett in 1957, and more recently modified by David
Deutsch and others, as one alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation. Many of the original
papers in the many-worlds tradition are collected in THE MANY-WORLDS INTERPREATION OF
QUANTUM MECHANICS (Bryce S. Dewitt & Neill Graham eds., 1973).

276. This is sometimes referred to as the "hidden variable" view, which argues that just
as classical, deterministic physics gave way to quantum physics, quantum physics will eventually give way to a more complete theory in which determinism returns by way of a new
set of variables. A leading exponent of this view has been David Bohm. DAVID BOHM,
WHOLMSS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980).
277. Id.; cf ABRAHAM PAIS, 'SUBTLE IS THE LORD...

': THE SCIENCE AND TE LIFE

OF ALBERT EINSTEIN 443 (1982) (The author quotes Einstein's famous denial of radical inde-

terminacy: "Quantum mechanics is very impressive. But an inner voice tells me that it is not
yet the real thing. The theory produces a good deal but hardly brings us closer to the secret
of the Old One. I am at all events convinced that He does not play dice.").
278. This is the view of Fritz Rohrlich in his discussion of Schroedinger's Cat. FRITZ
ROHRLICH, FROM PARADOX TO REALITY: OUR BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

166-69 (1987).
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they pose special jurisprudential problems for jurisdictional issues is
to misunderstand both jurisdiction and indeterminacy.
6. A Functionalist Epilogue: Do "Jurisdictional Time Limits"
Have Something in Common Besides Being Jurisdictional?
At least some of the arguments I have just surveyed in favor of
the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits can be read as a survey of
contemporary legal obsessions. Notice, for example, the recurrence,
under various guises, of the problem of discretion. And yet, it probably should not be surprising that these themes were not of much help.
If this discussion is any evidence, those obsessions of our current
legal thinking might not have much to do with the real work of law.
You will notice, though, that I saved particular scorn in this
discussion for the arguments I labeled ersatz powerlessness and ersatz
instrumentalism. Both of these are variations on a legal process
theme, attempts to articulate a meta-functionalism of law. The problem with these arguments is not that they are functionalist. I am not
even sure that they are. It is, rather, that they neither resonate with
the law's own language nor do they really-precisely because they
are so reified-manage to make any functional or instrumental point
worth making. And again, I suspect that the lesson here has broader
implications.
Before concluding here, I do need to consider one more straightforward, and possibly more respectable, functionalist hypothesis. That
hypothesis would take the following form:
Nothing in the mere fact that jurisdictional time limits are jurisdictional would itself require that they be interpreted literally, mercilessly, or unqualifiedly. But time limits that happen to be jurisdictional might also just happen, on the whole, and for independent reasons,
to be the sort of time limits that it would make good sense to interpret strictly or literally. For example, there might be-despite what
I said earlier to the contrary-sound reasons for interpreting limits on
appeal strictly, and the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits might
only be an indirect way of achieving that result.
A few comments are in order here. First, this sort of instrumental explanation, though it seems to resemble some of the canon-ofconstruction arguments I canvassed earlier, differs from them because
it is not really a normative argument for the doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits, as such. Rather, it is a normative rationalization, an account of an alleged underlying rule rather than an account of the
surface rule we have been talking about all along. In that sense, it is
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a bridge of sorts between the justificatory analysis in this part of the
Article and the explanatory, descriptive, analysis that will follow in
part IV.
In common with much functionalist analysis, then, this hypothesis can only rationalize the results of the doctrine of jurisdictional
time linits. It does not justify the doctrine's affect, the way judges
think about it or talk about it, or its hold on the legal culture. In that
sense, it resembles, for example, efforts to use agricultural economics
to explain the Hindu aversion to slaughtering cows. 9 Even if these
explanations make sense, they still fall flat. They never quite click
with the inner texture of the phenomena themselves. 8 (Note that
this is not true of those forms of functionalist analysis that do try to
justify a rule in its own terms, only of those that do not).
The adequacy of functionalist rationalization as a form of both
justification and explanation is a major issue that social scientists,
legal scholars, and philosophers of knowledge have debated for decades." That debate includes some important voices who argue that
it makes no difference to the adequacy of a functionalist rationalization of a rule or practice whether it can capture the subjective attitudes of the persons who adhere to that rule or practice. Suffice it to
say here, though, that I am in good company in finding such a strategy at best the beginning of the story, and not its end.
Putting all this to one side, however, the particular hypothesis at
issue here does not work very well even in its own terms. For the
hypothesis to succeed, there would have to be some functionally
significant common denominator to jurisdictional time limits, other
than their jurisdictionality. But there is not. Many jurisdictional time
limits, for example, are not limits on appeal, and many limits on
appeal are not jurisdictional. There might, of course, be some other

279. See MARVIN HARRIS, Cows, PIGs, WARS, AND WrrcHEs: THE RIDDLES OF CULTURE
6-27 (1974).
280. Cf Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESsIVE CRITIQUE 260 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that instrumental explanations
for the power of certain legal metaphors can be inadequate, and "must be augmented by

emphasizing the sense of naturalness that the significant metaphors have").
281. Some of that literature is reviewed in John Stick, Charting the Development of
Critical Legal Studies, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 407 (1988) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)); see also Carl Hempel, The Logic of Functional Analysis, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SciENcE 297-330 (1965) (comparing functional analysis with deductive and inductive explanations for certain phenomena, as well as applying functional analysis to psychology, anthropology and sociology).
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factor at work, but it is hard to see what it is.
Arguably, the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits would make
functional sense even if jurisdictionality were only an approximate, or
statistically significant, proxy for some other, deeper, criterion. But
this suggests another problem: Why, both normatively and descriptively, should the law use jurisdictionality as a proxy for something else
when it could just as easily latch unto that other characteristic directly? That is to say, if there were, for example, a good argument for
would it not make good
interpreting limits on appeal strictly,
sense just to say so?
Proxies make sense when inquiring directly into the more fundamental variable would be too costly, in intellectual or administrative
effort. But deciding, for example, which time limits are limits on
appeal is actually easier than deciding which time limits are jurisdictional.
IV. THE DOCTRINE AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits does not survive Justice
Black's critique25 3 Nor does it survive a more sustained normative
analysis. But that cannot be the end of it. The doctrine is too entrenched in the judicial psyche to be dismissed as a simple mistake.
The task now is to try to make sense of the doctrine despite its implausibility.
A. First Leads
It will be worth beginning the discussion by canvassing two
tempting possibilities. Both are incomplete and, as I will argue, possibly just wrong, but they do help point the way to a more satisfactory
resolution.
1. Semantics Redux: Jurisdiction as Trope
The first possibility is that jurisdictional language, for all the
weight that I have put on it, is really, in the hands of judges, only a
trope. The language is a hook that judges use when they want to
achieve certain ends, like construing a rule strictly and literally, or
raising a legal issue sua sponte, or engaging in collateral review of

282. But cf Hall, supra note 7, at 399-400, 427 (arguing that there are few important
policy distinctions between limits on appeal and original statute of limitations).
283. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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another court's judgment.
This thesis resembles, slightly, the semantic hypothesis I discussed earlier in the paper.2' However, it is actually very different.

The point here is not that the word "jurisdictional" has two or more
distinct connotations. It is, rather, that any sense of the word, as
judges use it, is only a conclusory label for a judicial refusal to act.
The notion of "jurisdiction as trope" also resembles the functionalist hypothesis.M Yet, it differs from the functionalist hypothesis

because it makes no effort at normative rationalization. The thesis of
"jurisdiction as trope" is purely descriptive.
The "trope" thesis rejects precisely that view of jurisdiction and

jurisdictional language on which this paper has been built. It is just
one particular slant on the legal realist account of the relation be-

tween the law of jurisdiction and "actual" or operative jurisdiction.
But that, in itself, is no reason to reject the thesis once it is understood as mere description.
To some extent, indeed, the trope thesis must be right. Surely,

once the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is in place, courts will
be tempted to use the label of jurisdictionality only to achieve desirable results. This result orientation is true for all of jurisdictional
doctrine, and for that matter, for all law. One would be naive to
think otherwise.
That does leave the question which has been debated since the

dawn of legal realism: Is such manipulation the rule?"s My sense is

284. See supra part III.B.1.
285. See supra part III.B.6.
286. For some of the classic Realist sources in this conversation, compare JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118-47, 264-84 (2d ed. 1931); Joseph C. Hutheson,
Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in the Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285-88 (1929); Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decisions: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 359 (1925) with KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:
SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND rrs STUDY 16-50, 67-91 (1930); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 178-99, 421-23 (1960); Hermann Kantorwicz,
Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.. 1240, 1252 (1934).
For more recent contributions from all shades of the academic spectrum, see J.M.
Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1139-45 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW
ALTMAN, CRrICAL LEGAL STUDIEs: A LIBERAL CRmQuE (1990)); Allan Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinacy: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 548-51,
554-56, 573-76 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in
THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OF IDEOLOGY 141, 166 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan
eds., 1987); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307 (1987); see also Louis M. Seidman, The State
Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 309, 379 (1993) (utilizing a custody case involving
state action to illustrate the court's discretion).
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that judges do, often enough to make a difference, feel themselves the
servants of legal doctrine and not just its masters. That is not, however, a debate we can resolve here.
But even if jurisdictionality were just a trope, another puzzle
would remain. Why this trope? Why would courts that were looking
for a doctrinal fig-leaf for enforcing a time limit literally think that
they were getting anything across by calling the time limit "jurisdictional"? To assume that this is just the way of things is to assume
the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. But that is the very question
at issue here. The trope of jurisdictionality can serve many purposes,
including-as in nineteenth century habeas corpus-legitimating the
judicial correction of certain injustices. Thus, even if jurisdictionality
was an empty vessel that courts only invoked when they felt like it,
such a conclusion would only revise and not resolve the explanatory
challenge of this part of the paper. The basic issue would remain the
same: Why assume that jurisdictional time limits must be interpreted
literally and mercilessly? One possible answer follows.
2. Random Rules: Doctrine as Convention
Earlier, I supposed that the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits
might only be a matter of homonymy. That did not prove out. Just
now, I supposed that it might be a trope. That ended up being a
question-begger. But maybe the doctrine is still only a convention,
though of a different sort than either of these. Maybe it is not a linguistic convention, but a doctrinal convention.
The Idea of Jurisdiction has about it a constellation of doctrines.
I surveyed many of them at the beginning of part m. Some of those
doctrines are more controversial than others. I happen to think that
many of those doctrines are more compelling than their critics allow.
I also think that the historical development of much of jurisdictional
doctrine in its classic age reflected a genuine maturing of legal understanding.' But the connection between the core Idea and any particular doctrine can never be analytically airtight; we know-better than
to imagine that it could be.
What is true of any particular doctrine is even more true of the
whole package. What I have called the Idea of Jurisdiction is also a
Story of Jurisdiction. Tradition can sometimes fill even large gaps in
reasoning. The law's evolution can itself redefine the argument,

287. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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changing premises at the same time as it reaches new conclusions.
A radical nominalist might deny that the story necessarily has
any center at all. This is wrong. But any body of law as elaborate as
that around the Idea of Jurisdiction must have about it elements of
habit, expedience, and half argument, which is to say, elements of
convention. It would do the shaping power of the legal imagination
no favor to say that it could be otherwise.
Maybe the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is a convention
in that sense. The arguments for it do not add up, but some are better than others. And some of those arguments can justify some applications of the doctrine.
From the spillover of these arguments, the legal culture might
have seen fit to fashion a simple, even if simplistic, conventional
generalization. This would not necessarily have been for the better, as
a functionalist account of the sort I discussed earlier would imply. 8
Nevertheless, it is possible.
In one sense, again, something like this must be true. It is also
trivial, though not entirely so if it says something about the workings
of the legal mind. Moreover, speaking of the doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits as a convention does suggest, even as a normative matter,
that abandoning it might not be so easy. Conventions are valuable. If
legislatures include the doctrine, for better or worse, in their own
understanding of jurisdictional time limits, than any appraisal of legislative intent must take that into account.
Whatever its virtues, though, the convention story is also misleading. It suggests a certain serendipity to the whole thing. Doctrines
appear and disappear, and everything is convention. But the full story
might be more subtle, and more interesting. The puzzle of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is not solved by calling it a convention. We still need to know in some more detail how and when this
convention, if that is what it is, came into being.
B. Back to History
To try to figure out what forces in the psyche of the legal culture might have created the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits will
require a historical account more detailed than what I have provided
so far.

288. See supra part

I.B.6.
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1. The Mysterious Story of the Doctrine of Jurisdictional Time
Limits
The history of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits in nineteenth and twentieth century United States law is really many stories,
in many places and many courts. A few common themes emerge,
however. The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, as we know it

now, can be traced back to two sets of doctrines whose import was
really very different. The first set of doctrines identified time limits
that were subject to strict construction, but for all sorts of reasons not
necessarily having anything to do with whether or not they were

jurisdictional. The second set of doctrines did distinguish, sometimes
sharply, between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time limits, but
in all sorts of ways not necessarily having anything to do with a
general rule of strict construction.
a. Strict and Liberal Construction
American courts have long interpreted some time limits strictly,

with little room for excuse or qualification. Limits on appeal, for
example, have traditionally been applied rigidly,2 s9 although the details vary from one jurisdiction to another,"9° and there are also precedents suggesting some leeway for excusable neglect and the
like." What is striking, though, about the cases involving the strict

289. See, e.g., Credit Co. Ltd. v. Arkansas Cent. R.R., 128 U.S. 258, 261 (1888); Adams
v. Law, 57 U.S. 144, 148 (1850); Stark v. Jenkins, 1 Wash. Terr. 421 (1874); Herrick v.
Racine Warehouse & Dock, 43 Wis. 93 (1877).
290. Sometimes there was significant variation even within a single jurisdiction. In New
York State, for example, the cases were incredibly confused and mutually contradictory for
most of the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. For a summary of the earlier cases, see
Sail v. Butler, 27 How. Prac. 133 (1863).
291. See, e.g., Rector v. Fitzgerald, 59 F. 808 (8th Cir. 1894):
It is a well-settled rule of procedure that, unless some special reasons exist to
excuse the delay, which have not been shown in the present case, a bill of review
must be exhibited within the same time allowed for taking an appeal, which by
the federal statute at the time of these occurrences was limited to two years after
the entry of a final decree.
Id. at 812-13; Sams v. Creager, 22 S.W. 399 (Tex. 1893):
If it had been shown that the failure to file the motion within the time prescribed
by law resulted from accident or cause other than neglect of applicant, this court
might consider the application, notwithstanding that the court of civil appeals had
not acted on the motion for a rehearing; but as no such facts are shown, the rule
which requires persons to file and have acted upon motions for rehearing before
coming to this court for relief must be enforced, and for its nonobservance the
application for writ of error will be dismissed without consideration of the ques-
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construction of time limits, including limits on appeal, until more or
less the turn of this century, is how sporadically jurisdictionality plays
a role. Often, the jurisdictionality of a statute is not even discussed.

When it is, it rarely seems the deciding factor.
Why, then, would courts read time limits strictly? For all the
usual reasons, good and bad. Often, what seems to be at work is
sheer formalistic rigidity. But it is the same sort of formalistic rigidity
often applied to other areas of the law. For that matter, although
there were diverse and changing traditions about the interpretation of
what "mere" (non-jurisdictional) statutes of limitations,2' those cases

that did construe such statutes strictly do not necessarily look much
different from cases that construed limits on appeal strictly.
But there were also more reasoned accounts. Some courts spoke

in mildly functional terms about the value of adhering to time limits.
Others feared that the time limit would become a dead letter if exceptions were read in.293 Many courts used the argument, to which I
have already alluded, that certain proceedings were purely statutory
creations and that any right created under the statute had to be taken

tions involved in the case.
Id.; see also Small v. Bischelberger, 4 P. 1195, 1196-97 (Colo. 1884) (holding that
"petitioner's neglect to take his appeal within the time allowed by law is excusable; for if
the judgment against him was wrongfully and fraudulently obtained, and he had no knowledge thereof, he cannot be held negligent for not taking an appeal in the ordinary way");
Smythe v. Boswell, 20 N.E. 263, 264 (lad. 1889) (invoking, in dictum, "inherent right of
every superior court to maintain its dignity and independence and to control its process and
maintain its inherent jurisdiction" in the face of fraud by appellee); Dobson v. Dobson, 7
Neb. 296, 299-300 (1878) ("where a party has been prevented from complying with the legal
requirements to obtain an appeal by the conduct or default of the justice, the appeal may be
made after the expiration of the time required by the statute . . . "); Harmon v. Hart, 53
S.W. 310, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1899); cf. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Prudence Sec. Advisory Group, 311 U.S. 579, (1941):
In this case the effect of the procedural irregularity was not substantial. The scope
of review was not altered. There was no question of the good faith of petitioners,
of dilatory tactics, or of frivolous appeals. Hence it would be extremely harsh to
hold that petitioners were deprived of their right [to apply for an appeal] by virtue
of their erroneous reliance [on the mistaken view of legal requirements]. The failure to comply with statutory requirements . . . is not necessarily a jurisdictional
defect.
Id. at 582-83.
292. For an account of the state of the doctrine in the early to mid-nineteenth century,
see Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 536-39, 541-42 (1867). See generally CORMAN, supra
note 191, § 1.2.
293. E.g., Credit Co. Ltd. v. Arkansas Cent. Ry., 128 U.S. 258, 261 (1888) ("When the
time for taking an appeal has expired, it cannot be arrested or called back by a simple order
of court. If it could be, the law which limits the time within which an appeal can be taken
would be a dead letter."); cf Green v. Elbert, 137 U.s. 615 (1891).
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with all its attendant qualifications.2 ' Other courts engaged in detailed exegesis of the specific piece of statutory text in front of them.

But if, as I have insisted all along, the doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits can only be identified clearly when the law establishes an

explicit contrast between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time
limits, that is what is hard to find in the early cases. When courts in
that early period did draw explicit contrasts in their manner of enforc-

ing various time limits, those contrasts were usually along other lines.
The most common, perhaps, again, was between proceedings that

were purely statutory and proceedings grounded in the common
law.295 Another distinction, which is at the root of the doctrine at
issue in Teague, was between statutory time limits and court-created

time limits.296 But this distinction was generally grounded, not in the

294. The classic case is The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). See also supra notes 23439 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. See also, for example, Haley v. Elliot
37 P. 27 (Colo. 1894) (distinguishing between an appeal and a writ of error).
296. See, e.g., de Yturbide v. United States, 63 U.S. 290 (1859):
It must be admitted, that, as to the matter of filing papers and the entry of rules
under the practice of the court, such modifications may be made as may facilitate
the progress of the court and the convenience of parties; and, indeed, the court
may, under peculiar circumstances, avoid an act of injustice by the suspension of
its rules; but this can only be done where the discretion of the court may fairly
be exercised.
Where an entry is required by statute, on a condition expressed, the court
is bound by the statute. . . . If there be no saving in a statute, the court cannot
add one on equitable grounds.
Id at 292-93; Moot v. Parkhurst, 2 Hill 372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) ("[W]here an act is
required to be done by statute within a given number of days, the courts have no dispensing
power, and cannot enlarge it; though it is otherwise in respect to time as depending on the
mere rules or practice of the court."); cf Hilleman v. Beale, 5 N.E. 108, 109 (Il1. 1886)
(discussing bond requirement: "The right to an appeal is strictly statutory, and a party, to
avail himself of this privilege, must conform to the order of the court which the statute
authorizes it to prescribe."). But cf, e.g., LF.C. v. Prudence Group, 311 U.S. 579, 582-83
(1941) (excusing failure to seek an allowance of appeal within statutory limit, when due to
certainty about whether such an allowance was necessary; failure to comply with statutory
requirements "is not necessarily a jurisdictional defect'); United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1946) (holding that Congress intended a particular statutory time limit to
be subject to same allowances as judicial rules on which it was modeled).
For a more subtle variation on the theme, see Collins v. Millen, 48 N.E. 1097 (Ohio
1897):
The right of appeal is statutory, and we must look to the statutes to ascertain if it
has been lawfully exercised. The party who seeks to exercise this right must comply with whatever terms the statutes of the state impose upon him as conditions to
its enjoyment. The right, doubtless, is remedial in its nature. It is a proceeding in
a civil action, given by our Code of Civil Procedure, and falls within the letter
and spirit of section 4948, Rev. St., which commands a liberal construction of the
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"jurisdictional" character of the statutory time limits, but in the inherent power of courts to excuse or ignore their own non-statutory
rules.'re
As I said, things began to change around the turn of the century.

Cases that relied on specific statutory construction, or on one of the
theories discussed above, were read in later cases as holding simply

that a time limit was "jurisdictional" or "mandatory and jurisdictional. ''211 Precedents that alluded to jurisdictionality, but did not rest on

it, were read to do so. The process of re-reading did not take place
all at once, or everywhere at the same time. But it did give birth to
one of the streams of cases that are now the source of the doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits.

To see this at work, consider this holding from Bornheimer v.
Baldwin, an 1871 California Supreme Court opinion: "The statute
regulating appeals from final judgments as such, requires them to be
provisions of our Civil Code. This court has heretofore recognized these liberal
principles in a number of cases respecting steps necessary to perfect an appeal, and
has been especially liberal in sanctioning amendments made to cure defects in the
methods that parties have pursued in exercising this right of appeal.
We bring with us to the consideration of the question involved in the case
before the court the same liberal views that our predecessors held and announced
in the foregoing as well as other similar cases touching the question of perfecting
appeals, that, by inadvertence, had been irregularly taken. We recognize, however,
that the courts can dispense with no condition prescribed by statute as necessary to
perfect an appeal and that the only field open to the display of liberality in this
connection is in the construction of the statutes that prescribe these conditions.
Id at 1098 (citations omitted); see also Smythe v. Boswell, 20 N.E. 263 (Ind. 1889):
[I1f an appeal within the time limited by law should be prevented by the fraud of
an appellee or his counsel, the court might, notwithstanding the statutory limitation,
grant an appeal upon a proper application. This power, to put the doctrine in a
somewhat different form, exists not by virtue of legislation, but by virtue of the
inherent right of every superior court to maintain its dignity and independence and
to control its process and maintain its inherent jurisdiction.
Id. at 263-64. Nevertheless, when no such reasons exist, the appeal must be dismissed. "This
is not a case of failure to comply with a rule of court, but is a case of failure to obey a
mandatory statute. It is not a mere technical right that the appellees insist upon, for they
base their claim on a statutory command." Id. at 264; cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1946) (holding the Congress intended a particular statutory time limit to
be subject to same allowances as the judicial rules on which it was modeled).
297. But cf. e.g., Morris v. Brush, 17 F. Cas. 810, 813 (W.D. Tex. 1876) (The court
concluded that the rule of court setting a time limit for appeal did not preclude the court
from exercising discretion to hear the case. "As all the requirements of the statute were complied with in this case, the court has jurisdiction of the appeal:'). Even here, however, the
distinction is not drawn with the same crispness and resonance as that attempted in the modem cases.
298. For a nice example of a court taking explicit and intelligent notice of precisely this
sort of development, see Bailey v. SWCC, 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss1/1

102

Dane: Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination
19941

JURISDICTIONALITY

brought, if at all, within one year. This limitation is peremptory.
Neither the pendency of an appeal from an order denying a new trial,
nor any other circumstance, can operate to prolong it."2' "Peremptory" in 1871 meant more or less what it means today: imperative,
absolute, unqualified, and arbitrary. It did not mean "jurisdictional."
(More technical uses of the word, as in "peremptory writ" or "peremptory jury instruction," do not suggest otherwise).
In Henry v. Merguire, an 1896 case in which the appellant
claimed that the time limit for taking an appeal did not apply because
of the pendency of a lower court order granting a new trial, the court
cited Bornheimer: "[The period fixed by the statute is an express and
peremptory limitation within which the right given must be exercised,
and is not a flexible rule to be varied by extrinsic circumstances." 3 '
Again, nothing was said about jurisdictionality, although the language
did come closer.
In 1900, the court decided Williams v. Long."° In Williams, the
defendant sought to appeal from the judgment below. But eighteen
days before the end of the six months allowed for the appeal, the
plaintiff died, leaving no one on whom to serve the notice of appeal.
Six months later, an administrator was appointed for the plaintiff's
estate, whom the defendant served. Nevertheless, the court held that
the law did not suspend the time limit from the time of the plaintiff's
death to the appointment of the administrator. The court relied in part
on case law directly on point, and further stated:
The statutes limiting the time of appeal are jurisdictional and mandatory. [Henry v. Merguire].... In the absence of an express authorization in the statute itself, a court has no power to extend the
time for taking an appeal, or to relieve an appellant from the effects
of misfortune, accident, surprise, or mistake. No such authorization
is found in the statutes of this state.3"
Series of cases like this one plainly support the semantic explanation for the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. For reasons I have
already discussed," 4 that explanation would save us all a lot of
trouble if it were not confounded by the bulk of the evidence. These

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

42 Cal. 27, 31-32 (1871).
43 P. 387 (Cal. 1896).
Id. at 387.
62 P. 264 (Cal. 1900).
Id. at 264.
See supra text accompanying notes 163.
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cases also support the view of some commentators that limits on
appeal are not jurisdictional at all, and that courts have latched on to
jurisdictionality as a formalistic fetish. But, for reasons I have also
discussed, my own approach is to grant, for the sake of argument,
that these time limits really are jurisdictional, in the "power or authority" sense of the word, and then ask why that should require that
they always be read literally and without qualification.
Interestingly, variations on both these arguments appear in a
dissenting opinion in In re Hanley's Estate,"5 a 1943 California Supreme Court case. In this case, one lawyer had actually deceived the
other as to when the order being appeal from had been filed. By the
time the appellant's lawyer discovered he had been lied to, the time
within which to file a notice of appeal had lapsed. The dissenting
opinion, in the course of suggesting several connected arguments for
allowing the appeal, cited Bornheimer and Henry for the proposition
that the time limit was not necessarily "jurisdictional." And he cited
Williams for the proposition that the California courts had in any
event never adequately explained what they meant by "jurisdictional."
But the majority held otherwise:
In examining the appellant's position, it is immaterial whether the
misrepresentations concerning the date upon which the order was
filed were wilful or inadvertent, whether the reliance thereon was
reasonable or unreasonable, or whether the parties seeking to dismiss are acting in good faith or not. It may be assumed that the
appellant has presented grounds for relief which would be sufficient
if relief could be granted. But the requirement as to the time for
taking an appeal is mandatory, and the court is without jurisdiction
to consider one which has been taken subsequent to the expiration
of the statutory period.
In the absence of statutory authorization, neither the trial nor
appellate courts may extend or shorten the time for appeal, even to
relieve against mistake, inadvertence, accident, or misfortune. Nor
can jurisdiction be conferred upon the appellate court by the consent
or stipulation of the parties, estoppel, or waiver. If it appears that
the appeal was not taken within the 60-day period, the court has no
discretion but must dismiss the appeal of its own motion even if no
objection is made.
In strictly adhering to the statutory time for filing a notice of
appeal, the courts are not arbitrarily penalizing procedural missteps.
Relief may be given for excusable delay in complying with many
305.

142 P.2d 423 (Cal. 1943).
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provisions in the statutes and rules on appeal, such as those governing the time within which the record and briefs must be prepared
and filed. These procedural time provisions, however, become effec-

tive after the appeal is taken. The first step, taking of the appeal, is
not merely a procedural one; it vests jurisdiction in the appellate
court and terminates the jurisdiction of the lower court.'

6

None of this adds up to a convincing argument. But it does demonstrate two things about the state of judicial culture by 1943: First, the
court assumed that this time limit was jurisdictional in the full sense

of the word. Second, it had convinced itself that its refusal to read an
excuse for fraud into the statute was entailed by a broader theory of
the consequences of that jurisdictionality.
b. Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Time Limits

One complication in the story I have just told is that, until
around the turn of the century, a fair number of cases paid little
explicit attention in any event to whether particular time limits were

or were not jurisdictional as such, which might indicate that the shift
to jurisdictional language might represent a change of focus rather

than a corruption of doctrine. But enough cases did pay such attention. Those cases reveal a serious effort to map the implications of
the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time limits. The map was often, though by no means always, precise and

fine-tuned, and diretly tied to the central themes of the Idea of Jurisdiction. 3°7

306. l at 424-25 (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, the court then tacked on a more
instrumentalist explanation: "And of particular importance is the fact that the security of
rights of contract, titles to property, and the status of persons rest upon certainty in the finality of judgments occasioned by the lapse of the statutory time for the taking of an appeal."
Id The problem with this argument, of course, is that it would apply just as well, if not
better, to non-jurisdictional statutes of limitations.
The majority also suggested that relief might still be had through a separate suit for
fraud. But the dissent pointed out serious problems with that avenue. ld. at 427-28 (Carter,
J., dissenting).
307. To be sure, there was some ambiguity and confusion, and some of that anticipates
today's issues. For example, in Fellows v. Bumap, 8 F. Cas. 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1876), the court
faced a requirement that an appeal be filed in the circuit court within ten days of a notice of
appeal being filed in the district court. There was some confusion as to the date of the district court filing. The court held that, whether or not the appeal was filed ten days or twelve
days after the notice of appeal, was:
not vital to the rights of the appellant. If there was a failure, it was not in a matter going to the jurisdiction of the court. The party, beyond all question, intended
to proceed in time, and supposed himself to be in time. . . . [S]uch a slip, if it
be a slip, will, of course, be corrected. The excuse is sufficient to warrant relief,
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Some of the distinctions between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time limits were obvious. Jurisdictional time limits were not
waivable by the parties.s They were not subject to the discretion
of the courts."° Courts were obligated to raise them sua sponte.

in any matter which does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. The motion to
dismiss must be denied.
Id. at 1132. What is not clear is whether the court is saying that the filing requirement was
not "jurisdictional," or-to the contrary-that, though the time limit was jurisdictional, the
failure here did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction. The first reading would be consistent
with today's view of the difference between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional time limits.
The second reading would support my account of the general trend of nineteenth-century
thinking.
For another example, consider Herrick v. Racine Warehouse & Dock Co., 43 Wis. 93
(1877), a case clearly employing jurisdictional theory and language:
Section 9 of the appeal act limits the time of appeal from judgment to two
years. And this court has no power to amend the statute by enlarging the time. If
we had any discretion, we should assuredly exercise it in a case like this, where
the right of appeal appears to have been lost by mere inadvertence. . . It appears
to follow that if a court cannot restore its own jurisdiction, lost by statutory limit,
the parties cannot restore it by consent. For it is not jurisdiction of the person, but
of the proceeding. And we are unable to comprehend how that could be done by
the implied consent of waiver, which cannot by express consent.
Id. at 95 (citation omitted). In one sense, the holding and argument in Herrick comes powerfully close to the contemporary doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. If nothing else, it
illustrates that the contemporary doctrine did not just come out of thin air. On th& other
hand, a closer reading of Herrick reveals that the court focuses principally on two notions
that unproblematically flow from the Idea of Jurisdiction, and which I have supported in this
essay: that courts cannot create jurisdiction as an act of naked discretion, and that parties
cannot create jurisdiction by consent or waiver.
308. See, e.g., Stevens v. Clark, 62 F. 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1894) (Holding that the failure
to issue any writ of error at all cannot be excused by implied waiver of the parties; "[tihe
issuing of the writ within the prescribed time is a jurisdictional fact, and neither consent nor
anything else can take the place of it, at the option of the parties."); Peabody v. Thatcher, 3
Colo. 275 (1877) ("It is true the defendant below has joined in error, and so has consented
to the appeal. The doctrine, . . . however, is that such consent is ineffectual to confer jurisdiction. We are unable to follow those courts which announce a contrary doctrine.").
A particularly interesting discussion occurs in King v. Penn, 1 N.E. 84 (Ohio 1885),
in which an appellant deposited a petition in error with the clerk of court, but the petition
was not formally filed and endorsed. Both parties proceeded with their appellate briefs and
arguments, until the appellee discovered the clerk's omission and moved to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. The court insisted that "parties may not, by private agreement or
consent, nor by voluntary appearance, confer upon this court power to hear and determine a
proceeding in error commenced after the time expressly limited therefor." Id. at 86. But estoppel was a different matter. "The circumstances of this proceeding call upon us to say that
the defendant in error should now be estopped from availing himself of his supposed discovery . . . that this court was without jurisdiction to proceed further." Id. at 87.
309. See, e.g., Herrick, 43 Wis. 93:
If we had any discretion, we should assuredly exercise it in a case like this, where
the right of appeal appears to have been lost by mere inadvertence. But, to give
this court jurisdiction of an appeal, the return of the court below must show an

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss1/1

106

Dane: Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination
1994]

JURISDICTIONALTY

And so on.
Other distinctions were less obvious. One line of cases, for example, examined the effects when the legislature shortened an existing
time limit. According to these cases, a change in an ordinary statute

of limitations might not apply retroactively if that left parties without
a reasonable opportunity to secure their rights. But a change in a

jurisdictional time limit would apply regardless, because jurisdictional
time limits defined the court's power, and created no vested
rights."' However harsh this doctrine was, though, it did not rely on

any general notion of strict construction, but on a more specific-whether or not convincing-analytic claim about the character of
the two sorts of rules.
Slowly, though, all these specific doctrines began to overflow
into a more general, loosely defined notion of literal and strict application. And so arose another stream in the evolution of the doctrine
of jurisdictional time limits.

To see this transformation at work, and to see some of the subtleties embedded in the story, consider in some detail a sequence of

appeal perfected within the time and in the manner prescribed by the statute.
Id. at 95. This case is among those that comes closest to the contemporary doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits. Consider also Olimie v. Odell, 20 Mich. 12 (1870):
[When a statute fixes absolutely the time within which an appeal must be taken,
the appellate Court has no power to enlarge it; and its jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal depends upon a compliance with the statute. But when, as in this instance,
the statute gives the appellate Court power, under certain circumstances, to authorize the appeal, the parties may, by stipulation, agree to extend the time beyond
the period fixed by the statute.
I& at 13. Otherwise stated, if the statute allows for discretion, it must not be jurisdictional,
and will therefore also be read to allow waiver.
For a related case involving appeal bond requirements, see Oliver v. Pray, 4 Ohio 175
(1829):
The party has his right of appeal, upon complying with the conditions annexed by the statute. His right is lost, by omitting or neglecting to perform any of
the conditions, and the appellate jurisdiction of this court altogether ceases over the
cause. With regard to notice and filing the bond, within thirty days after the rising
of the court, the decisions have been uniform, that the omission, in either case,
ousts this court of its jurisdiction. It is undoubtedly within the powers of the legislature to attach all reasonable conditions to the right of appeal, and thus place a
limitation upon the appellate jurisdiction of this court. The cause is not appealed
without [sic] the party performs the conditions required by statute, and when he
neglects to do so, to entertain jurisdiction would be mere usurpation of power. But
the objection comes too late, to the correctness of the decision, in dismissing the

appeal.
Id. at 191-92.
310. Spaulding v. white, 173 Il.127, 129-30 (1898).
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federal cases, most of them from the Supreme Court. The sequence
begins in 1879 with United States v. Lippitt.31'
Lippitt concerned the construction of the time limit regulating
entry of claims to the Court of Claims. An army officer had a claim
dating back to 1863 and 1864 for "commutation of fuel and quarters
while awaiting further orders at San Francisco., '3 Rather than
bringing his claim directly to the Court of Claims, which he could
have done, he filed it with the War Department in 1865. The Department, with military efficiency, sat on the matter until 1878. In 1878,
it passed the dispute to the Court of Claims under a statute allowing
any executive departments, under certain conditions, to transmit a
claim "to the Court of Claims, to be there proceeded in as if originally commenced by the voluntary action of the claimant. 3 3
That same referral statute, however, "accompanied this enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims with the restriction
that no case should be referred to it...
unless it belonged to one of
the several classes of cases to which, by reason of the subject-matter
and character, the court could, under the then existing laws, take
jurisdiction on the voluntary action of the claimant." 314 And the statute governing the Court of Claims provided:
that every claim against the United States, cognizable by the Court
of Claims, shall be for ever barred, unless the petition setting forth
a statement of the claim be filed in the court, or transmitted to it
under the provisions of [that] act, within six years after the claim
first accrues .... 31
The government argued that the "express words" of the Court of
Claims time limitation required dismissal of the case. The Supreme
Court disagreed. "Such a construction would work an injustice which
we cannot suppose Congress intended should be done to the citizen
having a demand against the government ....
It should not be sustained, unless we are required to do so by some absolute, unbending
rule of construction.'3 Instead, the Court held that the time limit
would be satisfied as long as a claim was filed in an appropriate
executive department within six years, even if it did not reach the

311.

100 U.S. 663 (1879).

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

665.
666 (citing Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, §7, 15 Stat. 76 (1868)).
665 (citing Act of March 3. 1863, ch. 92, § 10, 12 Stat. 767 (1863)).
667 (emphasis added).
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Court of Claims until many years later.317 Put another way (though

the Court did not), it held that the limitation was tolled by the
executive's delay in administratively resolving the claim.
The Lippitt decision reserved the question whether the six-year
time limitation was one that the Court of Claims itself would be
obligated to raise. That is to say, the Court reserved the question
(though again it did not use the word) whether the limitation was
jurisdictional. That is interesting in itself, since a court today might
think that issue crucial to whether the statute should be318read according to "some absolute, unbending rule of construction."
However, in Finn v. United States, 19 an 1887 case, the plaintiff
filed his administrative claim some eleven years after it accrued. The
claim was decided adversely and was subsequently disallowed. After
newly discovered evidence was produced by the claimant, the executive ordered the case reopened and referred it to the Court of Claims
twelve years after the original filing. The government did not raise

the statute of limitations in its original pleadings. The Supreme Court
held, however, that:
[tihe duty of the court,... whether limitation was pleaded or not,
was to dismiss the petition; for the statute, in our opinion, makes it
a condition or qualification of the right to a judgment against the
United States that-except where the claimant labors under some
one of the disabilities specified in the statute-the claim must be
put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, or be presented
to the proper department for settlement, within six years after suit
could be commenced thereon against the Government. Under the
appellant's theory of the case, the [executive] could open the case
twenty years hence, and, upon the claim being transmitted ... to
the Court of Claims, that court could give judgment upon it against
the United States. We do not assent to any such interpretation of
the statutes defining the power of that court.
The general rule that limitation does not operate by its own
force as a bar, but is a defence .... has no application to suits in
the Court of Claims against the United States .... [T]he Government has not expressly or by implication conferred authority upon
any of its officers to waive the limitation imposed by statute upon
suits against the United States in the Court of Claims."'

317.
318.
319.
320.

Idl at 668.
Ma at 667.
123 U.S. 227 (1887).
Id. at 232-33 (emphasis added).
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Not atypically, the Court was again not crystal clear whether it was
holding that the time limitation was jurisdictional as such, or only
that government lawyers could not waive government rights. I do not
want to make the same mistake that I accuse others of making, of
reading jurisdictional ideas back into cases that do not support them.
Nevertheless, I incline to the first view, particularly because so many
sovereign immunity cases of the period do speak in explicitly jurisdictional terms, and this one comes close. In any event, that was the
reading adopted by an 1898 case, United States v. Wardwell,"'
which held, citing Finn, that the time limitation "is not merely a
statute of limitations, but also jurisdictional in its nature, and limiting
the cases of which the Court of Claims can take cognizance." 3
Wardwell, however, drew no particular conclusions from the
jurisdictional character of the time limit. On the contrary, the claim
there was for payment of three checks issued by the Army in 1869
and lost or destroyed, while in the possession of the payee, in 1872.
The request for payment, however, was made in 1890, and suit was
not filed until 1896. The Court held that the six-year limitation began
to run, not in 1869, but when the Treasury refused payment in 1890.
Although on its face a construction of substantive law, and not the
time limit itself, the decision is still notable for its unapologetic liberality.
The fourth case in my sequence is Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC,
decided in 1923." The cement company asked the Interstate Commerce Commission for an order authorizing a certain railroad company to issue a refund on incorrectly published tariffs. The Commission
rejected part of the petition for failure to comply with a two-year
statutory limitation. The cement company sought a writ of mandamus
in the lower courts, which denied the writ because the Commission
was acting within its statutory discretion. The Supreme Court, however, saw it differently:
[IThe two-year provision of the act is not a mere statute of limitations but is jurisdictional,-is a limit set to the power of the Commission as distinguished from a rule of law for the guidance of it in
reaching its conclusion.... [This view] conforms in principle to
the holdings of the court with respect to a similar limitation, but for

321. 172 U.S. 48 (1898).
322. Id. at 52 (citing Finn, 123 U.S. at 231-33).
323. 246 U.S. 638 (1923).
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six years, on the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.....
[The court], in a proper case, has power to direct the Commission by mandamus to entertain and proceed to adjudicate a cause
which it has erroneously declared to be not within its jurisdiction . .2.
This time, the jurisdictionality of the rule did matter. But it mattered
because it allowed a form of review that would otherwise be closed
off. Moreover, when the Court actually interpreted the import of the
limitation, it held against the Commission, and adopted, again without
apology, a reading that, if not "liberal" as such, was also not "strict"
or formalistic or unpurposive.
The point is brought home again in Louisville & Nashville
Railroad v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.,325 a 1925 Supreme
Court opinion:
The argument is that a petition before the Commission for reparation must give not only the names of the parties complainant and of
the carrier against which the claim is asserted, but also a detailed
description of the specific claims arising out of the several shipments involved; that this detail is indispensable ... and that a later
specification of the claims is of no avail, because the filing of such
a definite description of the claim with the Commission within the
two years is a jurisdictional requirement. It is true that the two-year
requirement is jurisdictional.... But no statute or rule imposes
upon the Commission procedure so exacting as to make fatal mere
failure to present within the period of limitation the detail of a
statement which under the procedure prevailing in courts of law
may ordinarily be supplied by amendment or a bill of
particulars."
The simple lesson of these cases is that jurisdictionality matters.
But it matters in analytically precise ways. And the jurisdictionality of
a legal rule and its construction are, all other things being equal, two
distinct issues.
What happens next? Not surprisingly, beginning as early as the
1920s, state and federal courts, citing cases like Louisville Cement,
have increasingly used the sort of language now familiar as the core
of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits.32 To wit: "That section

324.
325.
326.
327.

Id.at 642-43.
269 U.S. 217 (1925).
Id. at 226-27.
See, e.g., Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Illinois Terminal Co., 88 F.2d 459 (7th
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is more than a mere statute of limitations. It is jurisdictional and
strictly limits the power of the court to assume jurisdiction.""
c. The Road Not Taken
Things could have turned out otherwise. Precedent existed, on
top of that already cited, for steering the case law in a different direction. More than an occasional earlier case, for example, held that
delays not the fault of a party could excuse a jurisdictional time limit.
Consider, for example, this pithy holding from an 1893 Nebraska
case: "The time fixed by section 675 of the Civil Code for perfecting
appeals in equity cases is jurisdictional; and this court cannot extend
it unless it clearly appears that the failure to perfect the appeal is in
nowise attributable to the laches of appellants. 329 This sort of doctrine of excuse did not make the time limit any less jurisdictional, nor
was it applied as a matter of grace. To that extent, the modem doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is on target. Yet this doctrine of
excuse did emphasize that the application of even jurisdictional time
limits to specific situations was, in principle, a subject of legitimate
interpretive inquiry.
On the question of construction more generally, forgive this
lengthy quotation from Cohen v. Cohen, a 1919 Illinois case:
Section 7 of the chapter of our statute on wills authorizes "any
person interested," within one year after the probate of a will, to
file a bill in chancery to contest its validity, "but if no such person
shall appear within the time aforesaid, the probate shall be forever
binding and conclusive on all of the parties concerned, saving to infants or non compos mentis the like period after the removal of
their respective disabilities." It is contended by appellees... that a
minor heir is required to file a bill to contest a will within one year
after its admission to probate or wait until becoming of age and file
his bill within one year after that period arrives.
It is not controverted that statutes of limitation containing
similar provisions to section 7 are construed to authorize an action
to be commenced by a minor during the period of minority ...
but appellees insist that rule is not applicable to will contests, because section 7 is not a limitation statute, but is a statute conferring

Cir. 1937); United States ex reL Nitkey v. Dawes, 151 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1945); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 211 P. 876, 878 (Wash. 1923).
328. Nitkey, 151 F.2d at 643 (citing Louisville Cement Co., 246 U.S. at 642).
329. Fitzgerald v. Brandt, 54 N.W. 992 (Neb. 1893) (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction to entertain a bill to contest a will ....
It is claimed
that, so construed and giving their ordinary meaning to the words of
the statute, the probate of a will is binding and conclusive against a
minor after the lapse of one year from the probate... until the
minor has attained his majority.
Ithas been... often and uniformly held by this court that
section 7 is not a statute of limitation, but is a statute conferring
jurisdiction.... Cases, therefore, involving the construction of
statutes of limitation, are not necessarily conclusive of the question
here involved, if the language of section 7, the purpose of its enactment, and the rules of construction require a different interpretation.
There would seem to be no valid basis in reason and justice for the
distinction in construction contended for between a statute of limitation and section 7 of the Wills Act....
Considering the language used and the subject and purpose of
the enactment we cannot attribute to the Legislature an intention to
provide that if a minor, or some one on his behalf, did not file a
bill to contest a will within one year after its admission to probate,
he should be precluded from contesting the will until he attained his
majority ....
The object sought to be accomplished exercises a potent influence in determining the intent and meaning of a statute. "Statutes
must be interpreted according to the intent and meaning, and not
always according to the letter. A thing within the intention is within
the statute, though not within the letter; and a thing within the letter
is not within the statute, unless within the intention."3'

This holding is not obvious. There would have been reasons
apart from sheer literalism for deciding the other way. But it is also,
as an exercise of legal craft and reasoned judgment, not extraordinary,
or revolutionary, or strange. It might only seem so in the light of the

doctrine of jurisdictional time limits.
2. The Fate of the Idea of Jurisdiction: The Mystery Deepens
As noted, some critics have argued that the problem with the
doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is that it treats jurisdiction, and
jurisdictionality, as a fetish. The real mystery, then, is that during
more or less the same era that courts were patching together the
doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, they were also eroding the Idea
of Jurisdiction.

330.

122 N.E. 543, 544-45 (III. 1919) (citations omitted).
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The most important symptom of this erosion has been the expansion of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. As discussed earlier,
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction was, in traditional doctrine, a
modest power.3 It arose, if at all, from specific grants of subject
matter jurisdiction, or from presumptions attaching to courts of general jurisdiction. It extended mainly to the determination of jurisdictional facts. This century, however, saw a progressive expansion of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, culminating in Stoll v. Gottlieb,332
a 1938 United States Supreme Court opinion. Stoll held that, at least
when the issue was fully and fairly litigated, a court's determination
matter jurisdiction over a case is
that governing law gives it subject
333
not subject to collateral attack.
The Stoll Court implied that it was only taking the old doctrine
of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction to its logical conclusion. But
the difference is clear. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional facts
can be said to arise from particular chunks of subject-matter jurisdiction. But the only source of jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional
law must be some general ascription of authority to the court-as-court.
And it is precisely that ascription that the Idea of Jurisdiction, in its
classic form, was usually successful in avoiding.
The Court in Stoll wrote this:
A court does not have the power, by judicial fiat, to extend its
jurisdiction over matter beyond the scope of the authority granted to
it by its creators. There must be admitted, however, a power to
interpret the language of the jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue before the court. ...
Courts to determine the rights of parties are an integral part of

our system of government. It is just as important that there should
be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation."

Implicit here is the influence of views of jurisdiction that I have
described as bureaucratic, managerial, behavioralist, legal realist. As in
those views, judicial authority rests, not only on specific grants of
jurisdiction, but on the "integral part" that courts play in our "system
of government." And the notion that a court without jurisdiction was
very much like you or I, suddenly looks romantic and impractical,

331. See supra notes 82-84, 267 and accompanying text.
332. 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
333. l. at 171.

334. Id. at 171-72.
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and maybe dangerous.
Even Stoll's expansion of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction
must have some limits. Courts have been working to define those
limits.335 The Second Restatement of Judgments argues that the
question of subject matter jurisdiction in a contested action should not
be subject to collateral attack except if:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the
court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest
abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the
authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or
(3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to
make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning
its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party
seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to
attack the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Apparent here again is an attitude to jurisdiction different from that
which animated the classic Idea of Jurisdiction. "Actual" lack of
jurisdiction, so to speak, is defined by the "hard fact" of a "manifest
abuse of authority." Or it is defined by the need of the judicial decision machine, taken as a whole, to maintain its own internal discipline (the second clause) or its decisional reliability (the third clause).
According to the Restatement's Official Comment, the problem
of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction poses a "sharp conflict of
basic policies" between "finality and validity. '337 "The essential
problem is therefore one of selecting which of the two principles is
to be given greater emphasis. 335 Validity is not the essence of law-

335. See, e.g., Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident &
Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Southem Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1983); Upjohn Co. v.
Zoning Bd., 616 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992).
336. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).
337. Id. § 12, cmt. a.
338. Id., providing:
The problem poses a sharp conflict of basic policies. The principle of finality has its strongest justification where the parties have had full opportunity to
litigate a controversy, especially if they have actually contested both the tribunal's
jurisdiction and issues concerning the merits. Yet the principle of finality rests on
the premise that the proceeding had the sanction of law, expressed in the rules of
subject matter jurisdiction. As long as the possibility exists of making error in a
determination of the question of subject matter jurisdiction, the principles of finality
and validity cannot be perfectly accommodated. Questions of subject matter jurisdiction must be justiciable if the legal rules governing competency are to be given
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ful power, but a "policy" that can be weighed against other policies.
Jurisdictionality itself turns into a label, a token of certain consequences. Under traditional doctrine, according to the Restatement,
"[tihe classification of a matter as one of jurisdiction is ... a pathway of escape from the rigors of the rules of res judicata. '339

effect; some tribunal must determine them, either the court in which the action is
commenced or some other court of referral. If the question is decided erroneously,
and a judgment is allowed to stand in the face of the fact that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, then the principle of validity is compromised. On the
other hand, if the judgment remains indefinitely subject to attack for a defect of
jurisdiction, then the principle of finality is compromised.
The essential problem is therefore one of selecting which of the two principles is to be given greater emphasis. Traditional doctrine gave greater emphasis
to the principle of validity, at least when judgments of tribunals of limited jurisdiction were concerned, asserting that a judgment of a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction was "void" and forever subject to attack. That doctrine was, however,
limited by several concessions to the principle of finality. These concessions were
expressed in the rules that a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction imported
its own validity; that a judgment was presumed valid if valid on its face; and that
a judgment not void on its face was avoidable only by suit in equity, wherein
relief might be denied-and the judgment thus accorded finality-if the applicant
unduly delayed in seeking relief or if there were intervening equities.
The difficulties with traditional doctrine were twofold. First, it was internally contradictory both in tenor and detail, asserting the principle of validity in unqualified terms but admitting the qualifications suggested above. Second, it resolved
the problem of primacy between validity and finality in terms that did not, at least
overtly, refer to other interests that might determine which of the two principles
was given greater effect in a specific situation. If the principles of finality and
validity are recognized as both being fundamental, then the only sensible way of
choosing between them would appear to be in terms of such other interests.
The modem rule on conclusiveness of determinations of subject matter jurisdiction gives finality substantially greater weight than validity.
Id.(citations omitted).
339. Id. § 12, cmt. b, stating:
The peculiar procedural treatment accorded the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has at least two important consequences. One is to create pressure in favor
of classifying as questions of "jurisdiction" various issues that could equally be
regarded as "merely" procedural. This is because so classifying an issue transforms
it into one that may be raised belatedly, and thus permits its assertion by a litigant
who failed to raise it at an earlier stage in the litigation. The classification of a
matter as one of jurisdiction is thus a pathway of escape from the rigors of the
rules of res judicata. By the same token it opens the way to making judgments
vulnerable to delayed attack for a variety of irregularities that perhaps better ought
to be sealed in a judgment.
The special treatment of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is also an
obstacle to a rational theory as to when the right to litigate the issue should finally terminate. If the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal, it requires
little more to say that it may also be raised by collateral attack at any time. If it
can be raised for the first time by collateral attack, it requires little more to say
that the issue may also be raised in collateral attack even if it was raised and
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A very similar development took place in the doctrine of contempt. In United States v. United Mine Workers,' the Supreme
Court in 1947 upset settled doctrine by holding that it would, in
general, sustain the power of a lower court to hold persons in criminal contempt for disobeying the court's orders, even if the court turns
out to have had no jurisdiction to issue those orders."
The Justices were aware of the deeper stakes involved. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring,' 2 wrote that the Constitution
set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of
law .... No one ... can be judge in his own case. That is what
courts are for. And no type of controversy is more peculiarly fit for
judicial determination than a controversy that calls into question the
power of a court to decide....
Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part of a
court, the very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a controversy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has
no power over the particular controversy. Whether a defendant may
be brought to the bar of justice is not for the defendant himself to
decide. 3
Here, then, the profound if muted challenge to statism implicit in the

decided in the original proceeding. That is, if the issue does not become res judicata under the usual rules, it is difficult to see why the issue should ever become
res judicata until it has been decided by another court having jurisdiction to determine the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment was rendered.
Id. (citations omitted).
340. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
341. Id. at 289-95. The underlying jurisdictional issue was the applicability of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, or the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738, to deprive a federal district
court of jurisdiction to enjoin a union and its officers from waging a nation-wide strike when
the mines were being operated by the Government pursuant to an emergency presidential
order. The court held, in the first instance, that there was no jurisdictional bar to an injunction, since the Norris-Laguardia and Clayton Acts did not apply to disputes between the
Goverment and its employees. Id. at 269-89. Its ruling on the district court's power to hold
the union and its officers in contempt even in the absence of jurisdiction was an alternative
holding.
For later extensions of the United Mine Workers principle, see Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81 (1992); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-14
(1967).
342. Frankfurter actually dissented from the Court's holding on the underlying jurisdictional issue. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 312-28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In that
sense, he had to face, more starkly than the majority, the implications of his view of the
contempt question.
343. Id. at 308-10 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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classic Idea of Jurisdiction is dissolved away.3' By contrast, Justice
Rutledge wrote in dissent that:
No right is absolute. Nor is any power, governmental or other, in
[U]nder "a government of laws and not of men"
our system ....
such as we possess, power must be exercised according to law; and
government, including the courts, as well as the governed, must
move within its limitations. 345
On a lesser front,3'

courts have retreated from the proposition

344. Note that even some of the cases limiting United Mine Workers, and Stoll, rely on
statist concerns rather than the anti-statism of the Idea of Jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Green,
369 U.S. 689, 692 (1962) (citing federalism concerns as a limit on United Mine Workers);
Kalb v. Feurstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940) (citing federalism concerns as a limit on
Stol).
345. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 385 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Rutledge, like
Frankfurter, saw the United Mine Workers case as a battle for the rule of law. While
Frankfurter thought the rule of law vindicated by obedience to authority, however, Rutledge
thought it vindicated by adherence to limitations on authority:
No man or group is above the law. Nor is any beyond its protection. These
truths apply equally to the Government. When its power is exerted against the
citizen or another in the nation's courts, those tribunals stand not as partisans, but
as independent and impartial arbiters to see that the balance between power and
right is held even. In discharging that high function the courts themselves, like the
parties, are subject to the law's majestic limitations. We are not free to decide this
case, or any, otherwise than as in conscience we are enabled to see what the law
commands.
Id at 343 (citation omitted). He continued:
This Court has not yet expressly denied, rather it has repeatedly confirmed
Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and its
own appellate jurisdiction. That power includes the power to deny jurisdiction as
well as to confer it. And where Congress has acted expressly to exclude particular
subject matter from the jurisdiction of any court, except this Court's original jurisdiction, I know of no decision here which holds the exclusion invalid, or that a
refusal to obey orders or judgments contravening Congress' mandate is criminal or
affords cause for punishment as for contempt.
If that were the law, the result could only be to nullify the congressional
power over federal jurisdiction for a great volume of cases. And if it should become the law, for every case raising a question not frivolous concerning the
court's jurisdiction to enter an order or judgment, that punishment for contempt
may be imposed irrevocably simply upon a showing of violation, the consequences
would be equally or more serious. The force of such a rule, making the party act
on pain of certain punishment regardless of the validity of the order violated or
the court's jurisdiction to enter it as determined finally upon review, would be not
only to compel submission. It would be also in practical effect for many cases to
terminate the litigation, foreclosing the substantive rights involved without any
possibility for their effective appellate review and determination.
Id at 351-52 (citations and footnote omitted).
346. I say this not because the conceptual affront to the Idea of Jurisdiction is any less,
but only because the implications for a statist view of law and jurisdiction are more muted.
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that they must always decide jurisdictional issues before reaching the
merits." The reasons offered center on some unsurprising considerations-such as judicial efficiency-and some more ironic ones-such

as "restraint.""4 And courts have relaxed the tie, already compli-

347. For examples of federal cases, see Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1976)
(Because holding against appellant on the merits would have same effect as dismissing appeal
on jurisdictional grounds; "[i]t follows that there is no need to decide the theoretical question
of jurisdiction."); McClucas v. De Champlain, 421 U.S. 21, 32 (1975) (doubting whether the
District Court had jurisdiction, but nevertheless deciding case on the merits); Cross-Sound
Ferry Servs. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 154-160 (2d Cir. 1990); Foster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896
F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1990) (unresolved factual dispute as to whether appellant filed timely
notice of appeal; court chose to ignore jurisdictional question and resolve case on merits);
Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907
(1978) (jurisdictional issues in separation of powers case were complex; court assumed the
existence of jurisdiction, in part because the merits were clearly against the party seeking
jurisdiction).
For examples of state cases, see People v. Steinbrook, 149 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1978);
Food Basket, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N.A., 293 S.W.2d
861 (Ky. 1956):
Proceeding on the assumption, arguendo, that jurisdiction of a cause of action for
damages in conjunction with a suit for injunctive relief remains in the state court
after the National Labor Relations Board has assumed jurisdiction of the issue of
unfair labor practices, we come to the question of whether the allegations of the
complaint state a cause of action for damages.
Id. at 862.
For particularly complete discussions of the topic, citing cases, see Browning-Ferris
Indus., 899 F.2d 151. The principal scholarly discussion is Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction
Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712
(1979).
A handful of judges have severely criticized the so-called doctrine of "hypothetical
jurisdiction." See, e.g., Clow v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 948 F.2d
614, 619 (9th Cir. 1991) (Scanlon, J., dissenting); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., 934 F.2d at
342-45 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction" should, however, be sharply distinguished,
as some have failed to do, from the more complex, but also more benign, challenge posed
by cases in which jurisdictional and merits issues overlap, see supra part II.A.2.f., or in
which a court assumes one jurisdictional result, but then dismisses on another, also jurisdictional, ground. Then-Judge Clarence Thomas's dissent in Cross-Sound Ferry Seres., 934 F.2d
327, argued, though not completely convincingly, that Supreme Court cases like Norton v.
Matthews, supra, can be distinguished on these or other grounds.
348. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 899 F.2d at 158-59; Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction,
supra note 347, at 730. The restraint arguments center on the imperatives to avoid difficult
constitutional questions (when jurisdictional issues take that form) and to avoid deciding difficult questions in the absence of hard-edged controversies.
Courts and commentators have emphasized that "hypothetical jurisdiction" should only
be assumed rarely, when the jurisdictional questions are particularly difficult, the merits issue
particularly easy, and the consequences for the parties (of reaching the same conclusion on
merits rather than jurisdictional grounds) particularly minimal. See, e.g., Clow, 948 F.2d at
616-19; Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction, supra note 347, at 753.
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cated even in the heyday of the influence of the Idea of Jurisdiction, 90 between judicial immunity and the presence of jurisdic35
tion.
For all that has happened to the Idea of Jurisdiction, though (and
a longer litany is possible), it would be a mistake to imagine that it
is dead. Justice Frankfurter himself in United Mine Workers invoked
the central metaphor of the Idea of Jurisdiction when he wrote that a
judge whose claim to jurisdiction was frivolous "would not be acting
as a court. He would be a pretender to, not a wielder of, judicial
351
power.
More generally, the judicial attitude to jurisdiction retains both
the rhetoric and the psychology of power and powerlessness. And

most of the specific doctrines surrounding the Idea of Jurisdiction
remain more or less intact. What is evident in the erosion that has

349. See generally supra note 59.
350. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978).
351. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 310 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The surrounding passage is worth quoting more extensively:
Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part of a court, the very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a controversy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has no power over the particular controversy. Whether a defendant may be brought to the bar of justice is not for the defendant himself to decide.
To be sure, an obvious limitation upon a court cannot be circumvented by
a frivolous inquiry into the existence of a power that has unquestionably been
withheld. Thus, the explicit withdrawal from federal district courts of the power to
issue injunctions in an ordinary labor dispute between a private employer and his
employees cannot be defeated, and an existing right to strike thereby impaired, by
pretending to entertain a suit for such an injunction in order to decide whether the
court has jurisdiction. In such a case, a judge would not be acting as a court. He
would be a pretender to, not a wielder of, judicial power.
That is not this case. It required extended arguments, lengthy briefs, study
and reflection preliminary to adequate discussion in conference, before final conclusions could be reached regarding the proper interpretation of the legislation controlling this case. A majority of my brethren find that neither the Norris-LaGuardia
Act nor the War Labor Disputes Act limited the power of the district court to
issue the orders under review. I have come to the contrary view. But to suggest
that the right to determine so complicated and novel an issue could not be brought
within the cognizance of the district court, and eventually of this Court, is to deny
the place of the judiciary in our scheme of government. And if the district court
had power to decide whether this case was properly before it, it could make appropriate orders so as to afford the necessary time for fair consideration and decision while existing conditions were preserved. To say that the authority of the
court may be flouted during the time necessary to decide is to reject the requirements of the judicial process.
Il at 310-11.
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occurred, though, is a battle of perspectives. And what is even more
evident is serious skepticism about the ability of legal words to define
their own reality, and carve out their own categories.
Jurisdictionality, to the modem court, is real. It is not illusory as
some might have it. But its reality is most secure when moored to
something beyond the legal imagination itself, be it a theory of judicial management, substantive imperative, or hard social fact.
C. The Loss of Faith
The sum of the story, then, is this. The doctrine of jurisdictional
time limits is not entirely new or surprising. Some of its early inspirations are typical examples of standard unreflective literalism. But
over the course of this century, not generally known for its legal
literal-mindedness, courts have perpetuated the doctrine. More than
that, they have expanded and entrenched it. As often as not, they
have based it on a misreading of precedents that were grounded in
more limited, more specific, often more sensible, doctrines. And they
allowed tendencies that might have led in a different direction to
atrophy.
Meanwhile, the Idea of Jurisdiction, the putative source for the
doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, has in other regards been eroding. Some of its most important doctrines are in doubt. Others are in
explicit retreat.
On its face, this looks like a contradiction. In insisting on the
rigid interpretation of jurisdictional time limits, the courts are trying
to take jurisdiction more seriously. They want to treat the
jurisdictionality of legal rules as something important, and real. But in
eroding other doctrines, the courts are taking jurisdictionality less
seriously. They are treating jurisdictionality as something less important, less real.
1. Common Themes
But this might not be a contradiction at all. As the Idea of Jurisdiction loses some of its vigor, courts might feel driven to invest
jurisdictionality with some meaning-any meaning. The doctrine of
jurisdictional time limits serves that use, if no other. At least part of
the confusion over whether the term "jurisdictional" has one meaning
or many-the homonymy question-might be the product of such
groping and fumbling.
Of course, this does not explain why courts would choose this
meaning, and not another. Nor does it explain the apparent opposite
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movements toward and away from formalism. That will require some
more work, and some more speculation.
Note that the erosion of the Idea of Jurisdiction and the rise of
the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits are both variations on the
theme that jurisdiction is a "hard fact." The extension of jurisdiction
to determine jurisdiction, and other doctrinal changes, imply an empirical model of jurisdiction. In that model, "actual" or operative jurisdiction is not a legal construct but an unmediated social reality, the
hard fact of effective power.
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits presses the theme from
the other end. It seeks, as suggested earlier, to shape legal rules
themselves into hard facts. Indeed, its goal is not just to construe
jurisdiction as a social fact, but also as something even harder-a fact
of nature. Like a fact of nature, a jurisdictional time limit is immune
to the play of language. It admits of no construction, no role for
human, legal cunning.
Another explanation might be this: The most serious, sustained,
doctrinal inroads into the Idea of Jurisdiction are deeply, insistently,
statist. Their role is to vindicate the exercise of official power, even
against the constraints of law. Particularly in defending a broadened
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, for example, courts speak, repeatedly, of the importance of "finality." That is to say, precisely
where the Idea of Jurisdiction flirted with skepticism about state
power, modem teaching has come to the rescue.
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is also profoundly
statist. Its defenders also invoke "finality." More than that, it is a
tribute to bureaucratic order, the exercise of power through the rhetoric of powerlessness.
Another convincing account might be this: On its face, the consolidation of the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits looks like a
triumph of formalism. The changes in other jurisdictional doctrines
look like blows to formalism. Yet, more than anything, both movements really represent a flattening of formal distinctions, a flattening
of doctrine.
2. Equity, the Spirit of the Law, and Interpretation
These explanations go some way to dissolving the apparent contradiction. But underneath that resolution of contradiction lurk even
deeper tensions and ambiguities, forces at work in the mood of the
legal culture.
The cracks in the constellation of legal rules surrounding the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss1/1

122

Dane: Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination
1994]

JURISDICTIONAL1TY

Idea of Jurisdiction do not-I said this before-mean a complete disavowal of that Idea, or an embrace of either a managerial or a legal
realist vision of law. Too much legal talk and deed, including the talk
and deed of the law of jurisdiction, point the other way. But these
cracks do embody the influence of movements such as legal realism.
More to the point, they reveal a declining faith in the ability of the
legal imagination to fashion its own truths, to establish a normative
framework not easily reducible to other frames of reference.
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is, I think, born of a
similar loss of faith. To see why, consider for a moment this significant jurisprudential puzzle: Why should a court ever apply a statute
against its literal, apparently unambiguous, meaning? I discussed this
question briefly in considering Justice Black's opinion in Teague, but
I want now to take a different cut at the problem. The question represents only the extreme case in a much larger set of issues in the
theory and practice of statutory construction, which I do not want to
rehash here.352 Yet, thinking about that extreme case might illuminate the larger problem, and will at least contribute some vocabulary,
of a self-consciously old-fashioned sort, to its consideration.
Literalism, particularly in the apparent absence of ambiguity, has
its place in legal interpretation. The pendulum of legal history has
also swung back and forth on the legal culture's attitude to.literalism.
But an 1826 Supreme Court opinion said this about why it might
deviate from the literal sense of a statute: "[E]quity, as applied to the
construction of statutes by an eminent writer, means, 'the correction
of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient'; or,
defines it, 'interpreting statutes by the reason of
as another
3
them.'

35

Consider the two accounts the Court cities: (1) "[t]he correction
of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient";
and (2) "[i]nterpreting statutes by the reason of them." Read carefully,
they seem to say two different things.
352. For some recent contributions, with surveys of the literature, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. R v. 20 (1988); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Cass &. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARv. L. REv. 405 (1989); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073 (1992).
353. Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1826). This attitude to statutory interpretation
has had a mixed, and varying, reception from the courts. For very general accounts, see
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 213-16 (1975);
SINGER, supra note 93, at ch. 54.
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The Court almost certainly took the first formula from Aristotle,3 54 probably by way of Grotius. 351 It reflects the famous Aristotelian or "philosophical" notion of equity, 356 distinct from, though
related to, 357 the more technical notion of equity jurisprudence in

Anglo-American legal tradition, addressed earlier. 38 Human language
and human foresight are imperfect. Though general laws are necessary, so is concern for specific justice, and, by extension, justice in

any class of cases not adequately dealt with by the received text.359
Aristotle believed that even good laws, by virtue of the necessity of

drafting them in general terms, could sometimes conflict with justice.

354. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927, 1019-20
(Richard McKeon ed. & W.O. Ross trans., 1941) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics].
355. Most directly, as discussed infra text accompanying note 372, the court probably
took the idea from Blackstone. See WILLAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF ENGLAND *62 (1765) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE _QUrrAE § 3).
356. For some discussions in the legal literature of Aristotle's notion of equity, see Raymond B. Marcin, Epieikeia: Equitable Lawmaking in the Construction of Statutes,
10 CONN. L. REV. 377 (1978); Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 847 (1987) (book review); Peter Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule:
Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process,
1984 DuKE U. 163.
357. See HOFFER, supra note 194, at 9; 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
395-476 (7th rev. ed. 1956); George B. Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L.
REv. 87 (1916).
358. See supra text accompanying notes 192-96.
359. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 354:
What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not the legally just but
a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about some
things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct...
Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than
absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the absoluteness of the
statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is
defective owing to its universality. In fact, this is the reason why all things are
not determined by law, viz. that about some things it is impossible to lay down a
law, so that a decree is needed.
Id. at 1137b.
Plato expressed a similar idea in his Statesman, though his view of the role of equity
was much more imperious than Aristotle's:
[Trhe best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule,
supposing him to have wisdom and royal power ...
[blecause the law cannot
comprehend exactly what is the noblest or most just, or at once ordain what is
best for all. The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human beings, do not admit of any universal or simple rule. No art can
lay down any rule which will last forever ...
[b]ut this the law seeks to accomplish; like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant.
3 PLATO, The Statesman, in THE DLmoGUES OF PLATO 465, 509 (B. Jowett, trans., 4th ed.
1953).
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And he believed-more or less-that in such cases, it might be up to
the enforcer of the law to make an exception and set aside the law in
favor of those principles of justice.
Under this view, equity or "equitable construction" ' is not a
form of interpretation. It is what courts sometimes do when interpretation has served them badly. The "equitable," states Aristotle, "is
just, but not the legally just but a correction of legal justice .... In
fact, this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, viz.
to lay down a law, so that a[n
that about some things it is impossible
361
needed."
is
decree
equitable]
The Court probably adopted the second formulation from
Blackstone:
But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the
true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it ... From this method of interpreting laws, by the
reason of them, arises what we call equity.3"
In this account, which finds echoes in the Roman legal thought
of Cicero3 63 (and the more contemporaneous English accounts of,
among others, St. German3 and Plowden 36 ) particular justice is
not a thing apart from general law. It is the "true meaning" of the
law itself. To get a non-literal reading, the court does not set aside
the law, but plumbs it. Judges have many tools for reading statutes.
This is one of them. As in the Aristotelian view, the imperatives of
apparently unambiguous language must sometimes give way to the
imperatives of principle. Here, though, the balance is internal to the
process of interpretation.
Many sources of our interpretive tradition employ, even more
clearly than Blackstone, the metaphor of body and soul. A law's
words are its body; its "sense and reason" is its soul. 3 6 Body and

360. See generally SINGER, supra note 93, at ch. 54.
361. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 354, at 113T.
362. BLACKSTON., supra note 355, at *61.
363. See Sharon K. Dobbins, Equity: The Court of Conscience or the King's Command,
The Dialogues of St. German and Hobbes Compared, 9 J.L. & REL. 113, 117 (1991) [herein-

after Dobbins, Equity] ("Aequitas," for Cicero, "is the spirit of justice which interprets the
law according to right reason, rather than to the words alone.').
364. See id.

365. See infra notes 366, 371 and accompanying text.
366. Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688 (P. 1574):
From this judgment and the cause of it, the reader may observe that it is not the
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soul are distinct, but they are also part of a whole. I happen to find
this metaphor, with its antinomian theological resonances,367 unsatwords of the law, but the eternal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like
all others) consists of two parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the
body of the law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law, quia
ratio legis est anima legis.
Id.at 695-99 (quoting Plowden's comments).
For American judicial opinions explicitly using this metaphor, see, e.g., Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883):
The opinion in these cases proceeds, as it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too
narrow and artificial. The substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the
constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism. "It is
not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law. The
letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul." Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the purpose of
securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat
the ends the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish,
and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental
law. By this I do not mean that the determination of these cases should have been
materially controlled by considerations of mere expediency or policy. I mean only,
in this form, to express an earnest conviction that the court has departed from the
familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full
effect be given to the intent with which they were adopted.
Id.at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Oldfield v. Marriott, 51 U.S. 146 (1850) (quoting
Plowden); Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Mikva, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623, 631
(8th Cir. 1970) (Lay, J.,dissenting); Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 440 n.13 (2nd
Cir. 1949); Drake v. Thyer Mfg. Corp., 123 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (quoting
Plowden at length); In re Sedbrook, 827 P.2d 1222, 1232, (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
Plowden); Erdheim v. Mabee, 113 N.E.2d 433, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
367. In its famous formulation: "for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." 2 Corinthians 3:6 (King James). The passage in context, in a more modern translation, reads: "[O]ur
sufficiency is from God, who has qualified us to be ministers of a new covenant, not in a
written code but in the Spirit; for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life." 2 Corinthians 3:5-6 (Revised Standard).
At least some cases and other legal sources, in employing the image of "letter' and
"spirit," have explicitly made the link to Paul's more pointed theological claim. See, e.g.,
Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707, 724 (1946) (holding that respondent's argument could not be justified "unless by inversion of that wisdom which teaches that 'the letter
killeth, but the spirit giveth life"'); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943):
I am sure it was never in the mind of Congress to authorize this misuse of the
statute. If ever there was a case where the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life, it
is this. Construed to the letter as the Court does, it becomes an instrument of
abuse and corruption which can only be stopped by the timely intervention of
Congress.
Id. at 559 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229
(D.C. 1990):
We were admonished of old, according to Judge Alexander Holtzoff, that "[t]he
letter killeth but the spirit giveth life." On the question [at bar], we conclude that
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isfactory" But it does make the point.
Yet another metaphor-still inept to my mind but yet more vivid-is:
The law may be resembled to a nut which has a shell and a kernel
within; the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense of it
the kernel. As you will be no better for the nut if you make use
only of the shell, so you will receive no benefit by the law if you
rely only upon the letter.3"
Interpretation is the task of breaking open the shell and, without
discarding it, finding the truth inside.
There are, then, two ways of understanding anti-literalism in the
law. It is either what courts do after they have interpreted a text, and
come up short. (The "Aristotelian" view.) Or it is one of many tools
at the heart of interpretation itself. (The "Blackstonian" view.) It is
either an apology for the exercise of official power over and against
law.37 Or it is a self-confident account of law's dominion itself.

the letter of the statute must prevail. If its spirit is to the contrary, which may
very well be the case, then the [District] Council will have to demonstrate that this
was so by changing the letter.
Id. at 1243 (citation omitted); Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that "even if Byron's case-all equitable considerations ignored--could be fitted within the
letter of [the argued precedent], it would not be within its spirit; and the letter killeth, while
the spirit giveth life"); Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial and Real Estate Consulting Co.,
678 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1982):
That statutes must be read in the light of their purpose is an admonition not only
ancient but wise. That '[tihe letter killeth and the spirit giveth life' is not limited
to hermeneutics but extends as well to the interpretation of congressional text. Yet
we start with the objective reading for the Congress has many members and the
President signs with yet another hand. If what is written is clear and its application leads to no absurd result, we should not seek to obfuscate the obvious.
Id at 561; see also Rosedale-Skinner Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Adjustment, 425
S.W.2d 929, 937 (Mo. 1968) (considering spirit of zoning law); McLean v. Lanza, 143 A.2d
571, 576 (NJ. 1958) (stating that implication is a vital element of the interpretive process);
Missionaries of Our Lady of LaSalette v. Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 1954) (holding that six priests and two lay brothers constituted a "family" for zoning purposes).
I do not address whether the above truly appreciated the full antinomian implications
of Paul's theology.
368. My own theology, and legal philosophy, would reject a clear hierarchy between
letter and spirit, and is profoundly skeptical of the dichotomy in the first place. See infra
text accompanying notes 388-89; see also Perry Dane, The Oral Law and the Jurisprudence
of a Textless Text, S'VARA: A JoURNAL OF PHtLoSoPHY, LAw, AND JUDAISM, Winter 1991,

at 11, 24.
369. The source again, is Plowden's comments in Eyston v. Studd [15741 2 Plowden,
450, 465-67, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695-99. The passage quoted here in text directly follows that
quoted at supra note 366.
370. The statist implications of what I have called an "Aristotelian" account of equity are
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Having made this distinction, though, I need to emphasize three
things about it.
First, one's view of what it is that courts are doing when they
reject literalism does not determine whether or how often they should
do so. 37 ' An "Aristotelian" might think the need for particularized
justice crucial and pervasive. Or he might think it a dangerous, often
illegitimate, device of last resort. A "Blackstonian" might think that
the spirit of a law almost always follows its letter. Or she might not.
Second, the distinction between what I have for my own arbitrary purposes called "Aristotelian" and "Blackstonian" accounts of
non-literal construction is not the same distinction as that embedded
in the jurisprudential controversy about what I have called residual
discretion. The two debates do resonate. To some extent, H.L.A. Hart
sounds like Aristotle, and Ronald Dworkin sounds like Blackstone.
But note that Aristotelian equity, unlike residual discretion, is not just
a matter of gap-filling. To the contrary, it can be a response to laws
that are all too clear, all too gapless. Conversely, someone who understands interpretation as reaching to the innards of a law need not
believe, with Dworkin, that there is, in principle, only one "right answer" to that search. Residual discretion might, in such a person's
understanding, itself be part of, and not apart from, the interpretive
process.
Indeed, I would contend that the difference in views I am trying
to identify here is more important than the often sterile bickering over
the determinacy of laws. It is important, and profound, because it gets
to what we think the law is. And it captures a crucial debate about
how much of the job of perfecting justice we think law, and legal
conversation, can do.
Finally, and most importantly, our-this bears emphasis-legal
culture has traditionally finessed exactly the distinction I have so
carefully drawn. The very authors who speak of the "true meaning"
or "soul" or "kernel" of the law also cite Aristotle.372 Even my quoparticularly implicated in, for example, the passage from Plato quoted supra note 359, and in
Thomas Hobbes's thought. See Dobbins, Equity, supra note 363, at 113.
371. This is apparent, for example, in the many sides of the debate on "unenumerated

rights" in Constitutional law.
372. Consider, for example, Plowden, who, directly after invoking the "shell" and "ker-

nel" metaphor, continued:
And it often happens that when you know the letter, you know not the sense, for
sometimes the sense is more confined and contracted than the letter, and sometimes
it is more large and extensive. And equity, which in Latin is called equitas, enlarges or diminishes the letter according to its discretion. . . .. The sages of our
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tation of Blackstone was a cheat. Had I not stopped where I did, it
would have yielded this: "From this method of interpreting laws, by
the reason of them, arises what we call equity; which is thus defined

by Grotius, 'the correction of that, wherein the law (by reason of its
himuniversality) is deficient."'" And if the truth be told, Aristotle
37
self might arguably be read to finesse the very same question. i

law, who have had the exposition of our Acts of Parliament, have in these and
many other cases, almost infinitely restrained the generality of the letter of the law
by equity, which seems to be a necessary ingredient in the exposition of all laws.
For (as Aristotle says), cum de toto genere lex dicit, atque aliquid iisin rebus
contra generalem legis comprehensionem existit, turn percommode accidit up qua
parte scriptor missum sit corrigatur, quod etiam legislator, si adesset, admoneret,
etiamsi jam legem tulisset. And experience shows us that no law-makers can foresee all things which may happen, and therefore it is fit that if there is any defect
in the law, it should be reformed, by equity, which is no part of the law, but a
moral virtue which corrects the law.
Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695-99 (P. 1574) (Plowden's comments).
The discussion then takes yet another turn, to an intentionalist account of statutory
meaning very similar to the one Justice Black employed in Teague:
And in order to form a right judgment when the letter of a statute is restrained,
and when enlarged, by equity, it is a good way, when you peruse a statute, to
suppose that the law-maker is present, and that you have asked him the question
you want to know touching the equity, then you must give yourself such an answer as you imagine he would have done, if he had been present . . . . And
therefore when such cases happen which are within the letter, or out of the letter,
of a statute, and yet don't directly fall within the plain and natural purport of the
letter, but are in some measure to be conceived in a different idea from that
which the text seems to express, it is a good way to put questions and give answers to yourself thereupon, in the same manner as if you were actually conversing with the maker of such laws, and by this means you will easily find out what
is the equity in those cases. And if the law-maker would have followed the equity,
notwithstanding the words of the law (as Aristotle says he would, for he says,
quod etiam legislator, si adesset, admoneret, etiamsi jam legal talisset) you may
safely do the like, for while you do no more than the law-maker would have
done, you do not act contrary to the law, but in conformity with it.
Id.; cf.infra note 373 (discussing and quoting Aristotle).
373. BLACKSTONE, supra note 355, at *62.
374. Aristotle does write, as I have already quoted, of the "correction" of "defective"
law. But he also insists that the "error" for which equity is a cure
is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the
matter of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks
universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal
statement, then it is right, where the legislator falls us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission-to say what the legislator himself would have said
had he been present. . . . For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite.
ARIsToTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 354 at 1137b. At least to an intentionalist view
of statutory interpretation, and possibly to some other views as well, this set of passages
would sound more like a call for finding enforcing the "true meaning" of a law than for
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This does not render the distinction bogus. It does imply, though,
that one attribute of the legal imagination is the willingness to eclipse
the distinction, to bring into the law and into legal texts that which
might otherwise remain outside.
Surely, a pure "Aristotelian" account of the relation of law to
justice is sometimes right. To assume otherwise would be to ascribe
to secular law a perfection that no human artifact deserves.375 But
the legal imagination seeks, as it creates a distinctly legal order of
things, to put off as long as possible any need to declare failure and
abandon that intra-legal, interpretive conversation.
3. A Narrative of Literalism and Anxiety
Here, then, is the connection to the perhaps otherwise mundane
topic of jurisdictional time limits. Consider the following to be a
tentative, partial, but I think more satisfactory explanation of what is
going on, something between serious historical analysis and homiletic
reconstruction:
Recall the argument that a court could not relax the literal terms
of a jurisdictional time limit unless it had jurisdiction in the first
place, and it could have no jurisdiction in the first place unless the
literal terms of the time limit so allowed. This argument sounded
silly, or just murky, at the time. But now it begins to fall into place.
Assume a modem judicial culture that believes in infusing justice
or right results into the work of applying statutes or constitutions or
other legal texts.376 Assume also that this culture has lost much of
its trust in the special power of legal words and the special potential
of legal imagination. It therefore takes what I have called an "Aristotelian" as against a "Blackstonian" view of the task of doing justice
or seeking right results. Moreover, this judicial culture expands that
view, probably beyond any meaning Aristotle himself meant to give
to it, to take into account its own difficulties with language. Thus, the
judicial culture believes that words can be either too clear for com-

arraying an extrinsic principle over against the law. Note,
Plowden, Blackstone, or for that matter Ronald Dworkin, does
Cf GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 284 (G. Barden
(discussing, in Aristotelian terms, application of general law to

though, that Aristotle, unlike
not take that leap.
& J. Cumming trans., 1975)
specific cases).

375. For a bracing, if in my opinion overreaching, attack on such ascription, see Steven
D. Smith, Idolatry in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 VA. L.
376. For two articulate though unrepresentative examples
spectrum, see DAVID BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORrrY:
(1988); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
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REv. 583 (1993).
at either end of the ideological
JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW
(1990).
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fort, or too ambiguous to be helpful, and that in either event, it must
rise from the text, rather than dig under it, to do its job. It also supposes sometimes that this is itself the legal task, and not, as Aristotle
would say, a useful antidote to law. The judicial culture might not
articulate this; it might not even fully understand it. But at some
level, this is what the culture believes, at least some of the time. And
this is what friend and foe alike would call judicial "activism."
Assume also, however, that this belief has an undercurrent of
anxiety to it. For such judges are also concerned about their legitimacy, and are not entirely comfortable with what they think they are
doing. Also, they identify jurisdiction as essential to legitimacy. A
court with jurisdiction can play the Aristotelian game; a court without
jurisdiction must think twice.
Here, then, is the problem: If a jurisdictional statute appears clear
and unforgiving, then a court has no room to play its activist role.
Many jurisdictional statutes are not clear. But jurisdictional time limits-and similar such rules-are different. They seem to leave no
room. And if the court doubts the lawyerly faith in the power of
words to go beyond themselves, that ends the matter. Hence, we see
the worry over discretion, both affirmative and residual." Thus, we
have the concern over resorting to doctrines like equitable estoppel,
which, for all their differences, still sound too much like reflections
of the philosopher's equity.37 Therefore, we experience the generalized anxiety that I tried to deflate earlier,379 from what I can now
say was a "Blackstonian" perspective on both the duty and the promise of interpretation. Thus also, the thematic tie exists that might, in
part, connect some of the speculations stated earlier: the "hard facts"
view of jurisdiction,3"' the statism of current doctrine,"' the
flattening of the texture of legal analysis.8 2
But how could judges believe this if they have also been eroding
the Idea of Jurisdiction? Because, as I have emphasized, they still
believe in the essence of the Idea. They have only lost faith in the
power of the legal imagination to stand by its own account of jurisdiction.
Put another way, our judicial culture, and our larger legal cul-

377. See supra parts
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

See
See
See
See
See

supra part
supra part
supra text
supra text
supra part

mI.B.3.a, m.B.5.b.
lI.B.3.b.
mIl.B.3.d.
accompanying notes 336-37 and part IV.C.1.
accompanying notes 340-51 and part IV.C.I.
IV.C.1.
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ture, might not fully appreciate what jurisdiction is, or how it is a
product of a distinctly legal discourse. But they do know it is important.
A more cynical take: Courts might be willing to entertain an
escape from law, even in jurisdictional matters, when the stakes are
large and systemic. In those instances, activism will override anxiety.
But when the stakes are smaller, less systemic and more individualized, anxiety overrides activism. So the very pettiness of the issue of
jurisdictional time limits assures its importance to an understanding of
the legal culture.
4. A Neurotic Turn
In reality, this really reveals deep tensions in modem legal culture. The legal culture's anxiety over its own legitimacy has many
layers which are difficult to peel. What I have called the "Aristotelian" account of judicial activism, though it finds support in some
currents of legal theory, also runs counter to the legal culture's conventional account of the sources of its own legitimacy. Strangely
enough, while it conforms to those strains in modem thought that
suggest that law is just politics or that legal language is hopelessly
indeterminate, it also runs counter to the equally modem, and not
entirely contradictory, emphasis on the complexity and contingency of
all language, particularly legal language, and the centrality of the
interpretive enterprise to making sense both of law and of politics.
The legal psyche in conflict, then, perhaps wants, on the whole,
to think it is proceeding in "Blackstonian" terms, plumbing the law
for its inner meaning. But its crisis of confidence in the power of the
legal imagination-the power to construct a legal language and find
in it depth and breath-leads it to find solace in a more "Aristotelian" account. But, that account, as to both its pretensions and its
limitations, is also the source of much of the legal culture's anxiety.
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits, I would submit, is just one
symptom of this turmoil.
I earlier compared the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits to a
superstition, like knocking on wood. A superstition can also be what
psychiatrists and psychologists call obsessive-compulsive behavior;. 3

383. See E.M. COLES, CLINICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY; AN INTRODUCTION (1982):
"Obsessive-compulsive" refers to an extreme conscious preoccupation with an idea

or group of ideas (obsession) and/or the inability to prevent certain actions (compulsion). It may be experienced as a strong urge or impulse to perform meaning-
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a form of neurosis."l I do not want to push the psychiatric analogy
too far. I take it as a casual metaphor, nothing more. But the resemblance is uncanny.
The irony of the story is this: An altogether legal realist or political and managerial account of law would probably have little patience with the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. It would treat
jurisdictionality as nothing more than a functional label, serving probably several specific purposes, and would be skeptical of the claim
that jurisdictional time limits rendered courts "powerless" to act.
At the same time, an account of law that unapologetically embraced the richness of legal hermeneutics would also be skeptical of
the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits. It could never stop itself
from asking the same questions that Justice Black asked in his dissent
in Teague.3 s"
The doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is not the product of a
legal culture serene in either one of these commitments. It is the
product of a legal culture caught between world views, anxiously
trying to find its way.
5. Last Thoughts
So what is this "legal imagination"? If a time limit restricts
action to "ten days" or "thirty days," is there any legitimate way to
avoid the import of those words? In other words, is there any way
except by sinking to nihilism, or rising to a standard of justice external to the legal conversation?
Additionally, what is the relationship between the two aspects of
the law's trust in the power of words, and in the legal imagination?
The first aspect is the power of legal words to impart principle, to
guide specific decisions, to find in themselves reflections of fairness
and justice. The second aspect is the power of legal words to create
their own reality, to build a discourse not reducible to any other.
What do these two strands have to do with each other, and how does

less and trivial actions over which the individual feels he has little control. Howev-

er, rather than raising the patient's anxiety level, obsessive compulsive behavior
typically occur when he is already at a high level, and tend to reduce it.
Id. at 142 (citations omitted).

384. "According to the psychoanalytic conception of a neurosis, the over abnormal behavior is a defense mechanism, an indication or symptom of an underlying conflict which serves
to protect the individual from being overwhelmed by the anxiety that is associated with that
conflict." Id at 364 (citations omitted).

385. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
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confidence (or loss of confidence) in one strand interact with the
level of confidence in the other?
These questions can be answered together. Earlier, I called the
body and soul metaphor for legal interpretation unsatisfactory.386 Its
dualism too easily leads to reductionism. The metaphor of a nut and
its kernel3" is better, but still not good enough.
The truth, I think, comes closer to this: When we break through
the shell of words, what we find, or should find, are-more words.
That is to say, a legal text is not just the stage curtain for the real
drama underneath. But every legal text holds a network of connections to other texts, and to the principles in those texts.
Recall the argument that canons of strict and liberal construction
are both species of plain statement rule, and can often be two ways
of describing the same plain statement rule. 8 Part of the point was
that any interpretive canon-strict or liberal-is an effort to connect
one legal text to its surrounding context. And it is that effort at making connections, setting text into context, with or without specific
canons, that constitutes going to the "soul" or "kernel" of a piece of
law.
How, except by way of either nihilism or extrinsic, "Aristotelian," standards of justice, could we ever read a jurisdictional time
limit other than literally? By noticing that even the apparently clearest
legal language loses some of that certainty when the reader's field of
vision expands to take in all the other relevant texts, whether statutory or not, that the law has collected.8 9
What is the deeper connection between the two aspects of the
legal imagination? Just this: To believe in a distinctive legal reality is
to posit a world of words, a field of vision-a web of truth-that can
stand up to other forms of truth. To believe in the power of words to
impart principle and guide decisions is to posit that the legal web is
also of a piece, that it can support and inform each of its parts. It is
to believe that, strengthened by those internal connections, legal truth
can, in its own way, assimilate standards of justice and rationality
that are embedded in the wider human conversation.

386. See supra text accompanying notes 366-68.
387. See supra text accompanying note 369.
388. Supra text accompanying notes 246-47.

389. What I have in mind is not altogether different from Guido Calabresi's idea of a
"legal landscape." See GuIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6,
163, 165 (1982). It is also related, if with substantial caveats, to Dworkin's account of legal
reading. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 262; DWORKIN, supra note 266.
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The problem with the doctrine of jurisdictional time limits is not,
I have said repeatedly, that it construes some time limits strictly. Law
is not always warm and fuzzy; sometimes it must enforce its rules
mercilessly. The problem with the doctrine of jurisdictional time
limits is the pretense that a distinctive legal idea-jurisdiction-whose
real import is that it subordinates state institutions to law rather than
the other way around, would yield a result that cuts legal language
off from the deepest resources that law can provide to f'x3 ° its own
meaning. This in itself is not a tragedy. But it might be a symptom
of one.

390. "Fix" means both "determine" and "repair." The pun, which I hope captures some
of the creative tension between what I have called the "Blackstonian" and the "Aristotelian"
accounts of non-literal interpretation, is intended.
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